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Introduction
This thesis consists of four independent chapters. The rst two chapters cover topics in the
elds of public economics and political economy, respectively. Chapters three and four focus
on questions from the eld of labor economics.
In Chapter 1, jointly written with Sebastian Siegloch, we analyze the incidence and the welfare
implications of property taxation. We suggest a novel theoretical perspective by introducing
property taxes in a spatial equilibrium model, where workers and rms are mobile but have
location-specic preferences, and where tax revenues nance local public goods. The model
predicts that welfare eects of property taxation depend on four reduced-form elasticities. We
estimate these elasticities using an event-study design and exploiting the institutional setting of
municipal property taxation in Germany with more than 31,000 tax reforms in the years between
1992–2017. We simulate the welfare implications of tax increases and nd that renters bear one
fth, rm owners around one third, and land owners more than 40 percent of the welfare loss.
Our study adds to the existing literature on the eects of property taxation, which has oered a
wide range of incidence estimates, ranging between 0-115 percent. The event-study results also
highlight the dynamics of the property tax incidence, an important but so far neglected issue.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Andreas Lichter and Sebastian Siegloch, we investigate the
long-run eects of government surveillance on trust and economic performance. We study
the case of the Stasi in socialist East Germany, which implemented one of the largest state
surveillance systems of all time. Exploiting regional variation in the number of spies and the
specic administrative structure of the system, we combine a border discontinuity design with
an instrumental variables approach to estimate the long-term causal eect of government
surveillance after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We nd that a larger spying density in the
population led to persistently lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in post-
reunication Germany. We also nd evidence of substantial and long-lasting economic eects
of Stasi spying, resulting in lower income and higher exposure to unemployment. Our study
contributes to the steadily growing literature on the relationship between institutions, culture,
and economic performance. We conrm the long-term positive eects of institutional quality
on economic performance, highlighting the importance of trust, social capital, and social ties
for economic prosperity.
1
Introduction
In Chapter 3, co-authored with Philipp Dörrenberg and Denvil Duncan, we test whether
labor supply responds symmetrically to wage increases and decreases using a randomized eld
experiment with workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The results show that wage increases
have smaller eects on labor supply than wage decreases of equal magnitude, especially on the
extensive margin where the elasticity for a wage decrease is twice that for a wage increase. This
nding suggests that labor supply responses to non-marginal wage changes are asymmetric.
As many studies in the labor supply literature exploit both positive and negative variation in
wages to estimate an average wage elasticity of labor supply, our results suggest that existing
estimates likely overstate the eect of wage increases and underestimate the eect of wage
decreases. Our study further raises questions about the comparability of labor supply elasticities
across studies that dier in the sign of the wage changes used for identication. We discuss
the potential mechanisms behind our results including standard models of labor supply, loss
aversion, and reciprocity.
In Chapter 4, jointly written with Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch, we systematically
investigate the sensitivity of structural labor supply models with respect to underlying modeling
choices. The analysis is motivated by the considerable dispute among researchers about the
magnitude of labor supply elasticities. While dierences in estimates – especially between
micro and macro models – have been recently attributed to frictions and adjustment costs, we
show that the variation in elasticities derived from structural labor supply models can also
be explained by modeling assumptions. To this end, we estimate 3,456 dierent models on
the same data each representing a plausible combination of frequently made choices. While
many modeling assumptions do not systematically aect labor supply elasticities, our controlled
meta-analysis shows that results are very sensitive to the treatment of hourly wages in the
estimation. For example, dierent (sensible) choices concerning the modeling of the underlying
wage distribution and especially the imputation of (missing) wages lead to estimates of the
labor supply elasticity between 0.2 and 0.65. We hence conclude that researchers should pay
more attention to the robustness of their estimations with respect to the wage treatment. Our
ndings have important policy implications as labor supply elasticities are key parameters when
evaluating or designing optimal tax benet policies.
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Chapter 1
Property Taxation, Housing, and Local
Labor Markets∗
1.1 Introduction
Property taxes are an important instrument for governments around the world. Understanding
how they aect local housing and labor markets is important to design optimal policies. In light
of the recent surge in house prices especially in growing cities, knowledge of the incidence and
the welfare implications of property taxation seems more crucial than ever. Despite more than
a century of economic research,1 our understanding of the eects of property taxes is still in a
“sad state” (Oates and Fischel, 2016, p. 415) and we can only speculate about the incidence of
property taxation. There are two main reasons for this.
First, competing theoretical models with quite dierent perspectives on local property taxation
exist. On the one hand, the capital tax view adopts a general equilibrium perspective and argues
that the national average burden of the property tax is borne by capital owners, i.e., landlords
(Mieszkowski, 1972, Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989). Only local deviations from the national
average are passed on to renters. On the other hand, the benet view builds on a Tiebout (1956)
model with perfect zoning and mobile individuals, who choose among municipalities oering
dierent combinations of tax rates and local public goods (Hamilton, 1975, 1976). In this type of
models, the tax is equivalent to a user fee for local public services, whereas the tax is progressive,
falling mainly on richer landlords in the capital tax view.
Second, from an empirical point of view, identifying the impact of property taxes on local
jurisdictions is challenging for various reasons. There is a general lack of high-quality data
on property taxes, public services, and residential dwellings with a suciently large number
of observations. Oftentimes only cross-sectional data is available, where taxes and services
vary simultaneously. Another complication arises as municipalities may not only dier in their
∗ This chapter is based on unpublished joint work with Sebastian Siegloch.
1 See, e.g., the recent surveys by Zodrow (2001), Oates and Fischel (2016) and England (2016) for an overview.
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tax rates, but also in their assessment practice of property values, which renders the tax base
endogenous (as, for example, in the US, see Palmon and Smith, 1998). Last, most papers adopt a
partial equilibrium perspective and only look at quantity or price eects – one exception being
a recent paper by Lutz (2015) who looks at both capitalization and capital investment.
In this paper, we readdress the question of who bears the burden of property taxes. Theoreti-
cally, we make a novel contribution by introducing property taxation into a local labor market
model (Moretti, 2011). In this spatial equilibrium model, individuals and rms pay property
taxes, are mobile and respond to local prices and amenities as assumed in Tiebout sorting models.
At the same time, workers have location-specic preferences and rms vary in productivity
across places, which limits the regional mobility of both agents. We introduce a construction
sector, which produces residential and commercial oor space following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015).
Importantly, we incorporate benet view elements by allowing local governments to use tax
revenues to nance local public goods. We derive theoretical predictions for the incidence of
property taxes on tenants, land owners, and rm owners, and provide simple formulas for the
marginal welfare eects of property tax changes, that are governed by a few estimable price
elasticities.2
In the second part of the paper, we test the theoretical predictions using rich administrative
panel data and the quasi-experimental setting of property taxation in Germany (Grundsteuer).
Municipalities may autonomously adjust local property tax rates via scaling factors that they
can set at their own discretion. Importantly, and in contrast to other tax systems, municipalities,
however, cannot inuence the assessment of property values, which is conducted by states tax
oces. All legal rules determining the tax burden are set at the federal level and cannot be
inuenced by municipalities, either. Hence, municipalities can only set the tax rates, which
is important for the identication of causal eects. We gathered administrative data for the
universe of 8,481 West German municipalities between 1992–2017. Each year, more than
ten percent of the municipalities change their local property tax, resulting in a maximum of
31,862 tax reforms that we can exploit for identication. As house price data is much harder
to obtain, we rely on a smaller sample with house price and net rent indices for dierent
construction types and qualities for 436 (mostly urban) municipalities. We restrict most of our
analysis to this subsample covering roughly 40 percent of the population.
We implement a series of event studies exploiting within-municipality variation in tax rates
over time to estimate the eects of property taxes on housing and land prices, the housing stock,
population levels, land use, and wages. Our empirical model enables us to assess the dynamics
2 We use the term incidence in the strict sense describing the eect of taxes on prices. We use the term pass-through
as a synonym. We use our incidence estimates to simulate marginal welfare eects of the tax, which measure the
share of the welfare loss borne by the respective agents.
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of the treatment eect in the short and medium run (up to ve periods after the tax reform).
In addition, we can test the exogeneity of tax reforms with respect to the outcomes of interest
by investigating pre-trends. In the absence of a pre-trend, the identifying assumption is that
there is no systematic regional factor driving both municipal property tax rates and outcome
variables. We explicitly test this assumption by exibly controlling for shocks at the commuting
zone level and nd that estimates are robust.
Our spatial equilibrium model shows that the tax incidence depends on the relative size
of the eective housing supply and housing demand elasticities, which mirrors the stylized
textbook result of tax incidence in partial equilibrium models. The tax burden is fully shifted
on renters if housing supply is suciently elastic. As suggested by the benet view literature,
the compensating, negative eects of property taxes on net rents are mitigated if property
tax increases translate into higher public good provision. In addition, our model predicts
that municipal population decreases in the medium run as cities become less attractive when
property taxes increase. In a similar vein, capital investment, the housing stock, land use, and
land prices decrease after tax increases. This corresponds to the new view result that property
taxes distort the location of capital. Last, we show that local wages might increase following a
tax increase, partly compensating workers for rising costs of living.
The empirical results conrm most of the theoretical priors. We show that real net rents
decrease in the short run – implying that part of the tax burden is on the landlord – but start to
revert back to the pre-reform level three years after a tax increase. This suggests that both the
statutory and the economic incidence of the tax are on the tenant in the long run. As predicted
by the model, both municipal population and the housing stock respond negatively to higher
local property taxes, reecting the fact that higher costs of living make a city less attractive. The
same pattern holds for land sales and land prices. However, we do not nd signicant eects on
local wages. We also show that house prices, land prices, wages, population levels, the housing
stock, and land sales do not change systematically prior to a tax change, which suggests that
reverse causality is not an issue.
Linking the empirical results to the theoretical model, we calculate marginal welfare eects
of property tax increases borne by tenants, rm owners, and land owners, respectively. Our
simulation results show that workers bear one fth and rm owners one third of the welfare
loss. The remaining half of the burden is borne by land owners, who thus face the largest loss
in welfare. Importantly, the welfare implications hardly depend on whether or not and to which
degree property tax increases are mirrored by rising local public good levels. These results also
highlight the importance of going beyond the pure economic tax incidence and studying the
welfare implications of property tax increases.
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Related Literature. We add to the literature by analyzing the eects of property taxes in a
local labor market framework, which has become the “workhorse of the urban growth literature”
(Glaeser, 2009, p. 25). In recent years, the traditional Rosen-Roback model (Rosen, 1979, Roback,
1982) has been extended to account for location-specic preferences of workers and dierential
productivity of rms, which relax the perfect mobility assumption in traditional models (Moretti,
2011, Kline and Moretti, 2014, Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016). We further add to the literature
by endogenizing the supply of developed land, and incorporating a construction sector as
in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Moreover, we introduce endogenous amenities by allowing local
governments to spend the property tax revenue on local public goods.
Our framework allows for capitalization into local prices while workers’ utility might still
dier across places in equilibrium, other than in Brueckner (1981). While our model is close to a
capital tax world with endogenous amenities, we deviate from the assumption of a xed capital
stock in the economy. In contrast, we assume global capital markets and perfect mobility of
capital. As a consequence, higher property taxes reduce the overall capital stock in the society, a
channel that has been neglected in the previous literature (Oates and Fischel, 2016). Our model
further implies a second type of capital, namely oor space, which is consumed by workers and
used as input in rms’ production. The housing stock is provided by a perfectly competitive
construction sector (see Thorsnes, 1997, Epple et al., 2010, Combes et al., 2016). As in classical
property tax studies, our model predicts that land owners will bear a substantial share of the
property tax burden via lower prices and reduced demand for developed land.
Empirically, we provide evidence on the eects of the property tax on housing and labor
market prices and quantities using administrative data from German municipalities. In particular,
we add to the existing empirical literature on the property tax incidence on rents, which has
predominantly focused on the US. Using Germany as a case study is particularly interesting in
this context, as it has one of the highest renter rates and one of the largest private rental markets
among Western countries. The previous literature has oered a wide range of estimates of the
property tax incidence on rents: Orr (1968, 1970, 1972), Heinberg and Oates (1970), Hyman
and Pasour (1973), Dusansky et al. (1981), and Carroll and Yinger (1994) estimate that between
0-115 percent of the tax burden is shifted onto renters. Our results show the dynamics of the
property tax incidence in the short and medium run, an important issue given time lags in
housing market adjustments (England, 2016). We nd that property tax increases lead to lower
house prices, which is evidence of capitalization into house values (Palmon and Smith, 1998,
de Bartolomé and Rosenthal, 1999). Our ndings of a negative eect on municipal population
levels are in line with evidence provided by Ferreira (2010) and Shan (2010), who show that
property taxes aect mobility rates of the elderly. Last, our study oers evidence that property
tax increases reduce housing investment, a mechanism identied by Lyytikäinen (2009) for the
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case of Finnish municipalities. In a similar vein, Lutz (2015) nds that property taxes reduce
building permits and capital investment in rural areas, while they are capitalized into land prices
in urban areas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we set up our theoretical
model. Section 1.3 presents the institutional framework of property taxation in Germany.
Section 1.4 provides information on the used data. We set up our empirical model in Section 1.5.
In Section 1.6, we present our reduced-form results. Section 1.7 discusses welfare eects of the
tax, Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Model
We introduce local property taxation in a Rosen-Roback type general equilibrium model of local
labor markets (Moretti, 2011, Kline and Moretti, 2014, Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016). The
model consists of four groups of agents: workers, rms producing tradable goods, construction
companies producing oor space, and land owners. Workers and rms are mobile and locate in
one out of C cities, indexed by c .
First, we outline the model in Sections 1.2.1–1.2.5. Second, we solve for the spatial equi-
librium and use comparative statics to show how changes in the property tax rate aect the
equilibrium outcomes, i.e., population size, oor space, land use, rents, wages and land prices
(see Section 1.2.6). In Section 1.2.7, we derive the welfare eects of tax changes and show how
marginal welfare eects relate to the key elasticities of the model. Appendix 1.B provides a
more comprehensive description of the model including all derivations.
1.2.1 Workers
There is a continuum of N = 1 workers indexed by i . Labor is homogeneous and each worker
provides inelastically one unit of labor, earns a wage wc , and pays rent rHc for residential
oor space. In the theoretical model, we assume that there is only one homogeneous housing
good and do not dierentiate between owner-occupied and rental housing. In equilibrium,
the implicit price of rental and owner occupied housing has to be the same (Poterba, 1984).3
Workers maximize utility over oor space consumption hi , a composite good bundle xi of
non-housing goods, whose aggregate price is normalized to one, and locations c . Workers are
mobile across municipalities, but individuals have idiosyncratic location preferences eic , such
that local labor supply is not necessarily innitely elastic. In addition, there is an exogenous
city-specic consumption amenity Ac , related to climate and geography, for instance. Each
3 Empirically, we will look separately at the eects of rents and house sales price.
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city c levies a municipal property tax denoted by tc , with the statutory incidence on the user of
the housing service.4 Local governments spend (part of) the tax revenue on (improvements) of
local public goods Gc .
Workers maximize utilityUic = AcGδc
(
hαi x
1−α
i
)1−δ
eic , subject to the budget constraint rHc (1+
tc )hi + pxi = wc , which yields indirect utility:
V Hic = a0 + (1 − δ )
(
lnwc − α ln rHc − α ln[1 + tc ]
)
+ δ lnGc + lnAc︸                                                                     ︷︷                                                                     ︸
=V Hc
+ ln eic
where α denotes the housing share in consumption, individuals have preferences δ ∈ (0, 1) for
the public vs. private goods, and a0 is a constant. Indirect utility can be rewritten as the sum of
a city-specic part V Hc and a worker-location-specic component eic . In line with the literature
on local labor markets, we assume that the logarithm of eic is independent and identically
extreme value type I distributed with scale parameter σH > 0. Hence, the greater σH , the
stronger workers’ preferences for given locations and the lower their mobility.
Given that the total number of workers is normalized to one and the number of cities C is
large, log labor supply in municipality c is given by:
lnN Sc =
1 − δ
σH︸︷︷︸
=ϵNS
lnwc −α(1 − δ )
σH︸      ︷︷      ︸
=1+ϵHD
ln rHc −
α(1 − δ )
σH︸      ︷︷      ︸
=1+ϵHD
lnτc +
δ
σH︸︷︷︸
=δϵA
lnGc +
1
σH︸︷︷︸
=ϵA
lnAc + a1 (1.1)
where a1 is a constant and we redene the property tax rate as τc = 1 + tc . Equation (1.1) also
denes various key elasticities of our model, such as the labor supply elasticity ϵNS = 1−δσH .
Demand for residential housing in city c is determined by the number of workers in city c
and their individual housing demand:
lnHc = lnNc + lnα + lnwc − ln rHc − lnτc . (1.2)
It follows that the intensive margin housing demand elasticity conditional on location choice is
equal to −1. In addition, there is an extensive margin with people leaving the city in response
to higher costs of living. The aggregate residential housing demand elasticity is given by:
∂ lnHc
∂ ln rHc
=
∂ lnNc
∂ ln rHc
− 1 = −α(1 − δ ) + σ
H
σH
= ϵHD < 0.
4 For simplicity, we assume that property is taxed ad valorem. Our main theoretical prediction regarding the tax
incidence is however unchanged when modeling the property tax as a specic tax instead (see Appendix 1.B.9).
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1.2.2 Firms
There are F rms indexed by j that operate under monopolistic competition and produce a
tradable output good Yjc , using labor Njc and commercial oor space Mjc . Similar to the worker
problem there is an exogenous local production amenity Bc and idiosyncratic rm-location-
specic productivity shifters ωjc . The price of the output good is denoted by pjc . Following
Melitz (2003), we can use total product demand Q to write rms prots as:
ΠFjc = Q
1−ρ
(
BcωjcN
β
jcM
1−β
jc
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
=Yjc
ρ −wcNjc − rMc τcκMjc
where β denotes the labor share in production, rMc is the factor price of commercial oor
space, κ > 0 is a scale parameter that allows property taxes on commercial rents to dier from
residential property taxes, and the constant product demand elasticity is given by ϵPD = − 11−ρ .
Prot maximization yields optimal factor demands, ND∗jc ,MD∗jc , conditional on local produc-
tivity and factor prices. Using the prot function from above, the value of rm j in city c in
terms of factor costs and local productivity is then given by (Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016):
V Fjc =
1 − ρ
ρ
lnΠFjc
(
ND∗jc ,M
D∗
jc
)
= b0 + lnBc − β lnwc − (1 − β) ln rMc − (1 − β) ln(τcκ)︸                                                         ︷︷                                                         ︸
=V Fc
+ lnωjc
where b0 is a constant. Assuming that idiosyncratic productivity shifters lnωjc are drawn
i.i.d. from an extreme value type I distribution with scale parameter σ F , we can derive the
number of rms in city c , normalizing the total number of rms to F = 1. Using the number of
rms in a given city, which denes the extensive margin of labor demand, and optimal labor
demand conditional on location at the intensive margin (ND∗jc ), aggregate labor demand in city c
is given by:
lnNDc =
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
=ϵB
lnBc −
(
1 + β
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
=ϵND
lnwc −(1 − β)
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
=1+ϵMD
ln rMc
−(1 − β)
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
=1+ϵMD
ln(τcκ) + b1 (1.3)
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where b1 is a constant. The labor demand elasticity is dened as:
∂ lnNDc
∂ lnwc
= − β
σ F︸︷︷︸
Ext. margin
−1 − βρ1 − ρ︸       ︷︷       ︸
Int. margin
= ϵND < 0.
Analogously, we can derive the demand for commercial oor space using the intensive margin
demand, MD∗jc , and the location choice of rms:
lnMDc =
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
=ϵB
lnBc −β
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
=1+ϵND
lnwc −
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
=ϵMD
ln rMc
−
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
=ϵMD
ln(τcκ) + b2 (1.4)
with constant b2. The commercial oor space demand elasticity is dened as:
∂ lnMDc
∂ ln rMc
= −1 − β
σ F
− 1 − ρ(1 − β)1 − ρ = ϵ
MD < 0.
1.2.3 Construction Sector
We assume that a competitive, local construction sector provides both residential and commercial
oor space. For positive supply on the two markets, there must be a no-arbitrage condition
between both construction types. Following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), we assume that the residential
share µ of total oor space is determined by the price of residential housing, rHc , and commercial
oor space, rMc :
µ = 1, for rMc < ϕrHc
µ ∈ (0, 1), for rMc = ϕrHc
µ = 0, for rMc > ϕrHc
(1.5)
with ϕ ≥ 1 denoting additional regulatory costs of commercial land use compared to residential
housing.5 In equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition xes the ratio between residential and
commercial oor space prices and every municipality has positive supply of residential hous-
ing Hc and commercial oor space Mc . We can rewrite the two types of oor space in terms of
5 We abstract from heterogeneity in the residential land use share, µ, and the regulatory markup, ϕ, for simplicity.
This assumption does not inuence our results qualitative.
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total oor space, Sc , available in city c:
Hc = µSc Mc = (1 − µ)Sc . (1.6)
We follow the standard approach in urban economics and assume that the housing construc-
tion sector relies on a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale using land ready
for construction Lc and capital Kc to produce total oor space (see, e.g., Thorsnes, 1997, Epple
et al., 2010, Combes et al., 2016):
Sc = Hc +Mc = L
γ
cK
1−γ
c (1.7)
with γ being the output elasticity of land. We assume global capital markets with unlimited
supply at an exogenous rate s . Prots in the construction industry are given by ΠCc = rMc Sc −
lcLc − sKc , where lc denotes the price of land. Capital demand is then given by:
lnKc =
1
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + 1
γ
ln rMc + lnLc −
1
γ
ln s (1.8)
which can be used to solve for the price ratio of land to oor space in city c:
ln lc = c0 − 1 − γ
γ
ln s + 1
γ
ln rMc (1.9)
with c0 being a constant. Land prices increase in the commercial oor space rent rMc (and
equivalently in residential rents rHc ).
1.2.4 Land Supply
While the total land area in each municipality is xed and inelastic, the share of land ready for
residential or commercial construction may be elastic. We model land supply in city c as:
lnLc = θ ln lc (1.10)
with the supply elasticity of land ready for building dened as ϵLS = θ > 0. We model the land
supply elasticity as constant across places for simplicity. In the empirical part of the paper we
test for heterogeneous eects by geographical supply determinants. In line with the literature,
we assume that landowners are absent (see, e.g., Kline and Moretti, 2014, Ahlfeldt et al., 2015,
Diamond, 2016).
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1.2.5 Local Governments
Local governments use shareψ ∈ (0, 1) of the property tax revenue to nance the local public
good Gc . All remaining revenues are distributed lump-sum to all workers in the economy
irrespective of location (share 1 −ψ ). The government budget is dened as:
Gc = ψ
(
Hcr
H
c tc +Mcr
M
c [{1 + tc }κ − 1]
)
︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
Total tax revenue
, (1.11)
where total tax revenue is the sum of residential property taxes, HcrHc tc , and property taxes on
rented commercial oor space, McrMc . Increases in city c’s property tax rate tc yield higher tax
revenues, leading to a mechanical increase in local spending on the public good.
1.2.6 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
The spatial equilibrium is described by equations (1.1) through (1.11). It is determined by
equalizing supply and demand on the markets for labor, residential housing, commercial oor
space, and land in each city, accounting for the government budget constraint. The solution
to this system of equations yields equilibrium quantities in terms of population, residential
housing, commercial oor space, use of capital, and developed land as well as equilibrium
prices for labor, residential housing, commercial oor space, and land, which are derived in
Appendix 1.B.6.
In the following, we show how equilibrium outcomes respond to changes in property taxes.
The comparative statics of our model yield theoretical predictions on the impact of property
taxes on equilibrium quantities and prices that eventually govern the welfare eects (see
Section 1.2.7). We estimate and test quantity and price responses against the theoretical priors
using the institutional setting in Germany in Section 1.6. Proposition 1 summarizes the price
eects of property tax increases in our model.
Proposition 1 (Price Eects). Let rH∗c , rM∗c , l∗c , andw∗c , respectively, denote the equilibrium net
rent for residential housing, the net rent for commercial oor space, the land price, and the wage
level in municipality c , each as a function of the local property tax rate τc and equilibrium public
good provision G∗c (τc ). An increase in city c’s tax rate triggers two eects on equilibrium prices:
(i) A direct, negative eect on residential and commercial rents as well as the land price, and a
direct eect on the local wage level that is theoretically ambiguous and may be positive or
negative.
(ii) An indirect eect operating through the capitalization of public goods, which moderates
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the negative eect on housing and land prices as long as tax increases raise the public good
supply.
d ln rH∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnτc︸   ︷︷   ︸
<0
+
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸   ︷︷   ︸
>0
∂ lnG∗c
∂ lnτc
=
d ln rM∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
(1.12a)
d ln l∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ ln l∗c
∂ lnτc︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂ ln l∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0
∂ lnG∗c
∂ lnτc
(1.12b)
d lnw∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnw∗c
∂ lnτc︸  ︷︷  ︸
Q0
+
∂ lnw∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸  ︷︷  ︸
<0
∂ lnG∗c
∂ lnτc
. (1.12c)
Proof. See Section 1.B.7 in the Appendix. 
The direct eect decreases equilibrium rental prices for residential and commercial oor space
and thereby compensates for rising taxes. The equilibrium price of land, being the inelastic
input factor in the oor space production, also decreases in response to tax increases while
holding public goods constant. As shown in the Appendix, the model intuitively xes the ratio
of these direct marginal eects to be equal to the land share in the oor space production,
∂ ln rH ∗c
∂ ln τc
/
∂ ln l ∗c
∂ ln τc = γ . The direct eect on rents closely mirrors the tax incidence in a standard
partial equilibrium model.
Corollary 1. The direct rent response to property tax increases in the spatial equilibrium is deter-
mined by the eective housing supply and demand elasticities, which also account for equilibrium
responses on the land and the labor market as well as the market for commercial oor space:
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnτc
=
ϵ˜HD
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD < 0 (1.13)
where ϵ˜HS and ϵ˜HD denote the eective housing supply and demand elasticities, respectively.
Proof. See Lemma 1.B.2 in Appendix 1.B.7. 
The more elastic the eective housing supply, the lower the tax burden for the supply side,
i.e., landlords and constructors. The more elastic eective housing demand, the larger the
compensating eects on net rents and wages, and the lower the tax burden on renters.
The direct eect on wages is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher property tax payments raise
the factor price of commercial oor space and reduce rms’ oor space demand, which decreases
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the marginal product of labor. On the other hand, property taxes increase worker’s costs of
living, which – given worker mobility – induces a demand for higher wages as a compensating
dierential. Hence, the sign of the direct wage eect is determined by the relative sizes of the
commercial and residential oor space demand. The direct eect of property taxes on the local
real wage, dened as the wage over costs of living in city c , is unambiguously negative as shown
in Lemma 1.B.4 in the Appendix.
The total eects on equilibrium prices dier from the direct eects because tax increases
raise additional revenues that the local government (partly) spends for additional supply of
local public goods. Public goods are one of the determinants of workers’ location choice and
thus aect labor supply and residential housing demand. If higher taxes increase the local level
of public goods, which is the case if initial tax rates are not too high, there is an indirect eect
that alleviates the direct, compensating eect on rents, land price, and wages (if the direct
wage eect is positive). The magnitudes and signs of the total eects depend on the relative
importance of direct and indirect eects.
Quantity eects of property tax increases follow immediately from the model outlined above.
Lemma 1 (Quantity Eects). LetH ∗c andM∗c denote the residential housing stock and the commer-
cial oor space in equilibrium, respectively, let L∗c be the equilibrium land area used for development
and let N ∗c be the equilibrium population level in municipality c , each as a function of the property
tax rate τc and equilibrium public good provisionG∗c (τc ). An increase in city c’s property tax rate tc
triggers (i) a direct, negative, and (ii) an indirect, potentially moderating eect on equilibrium
quantities:
d lnH ∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnH ∗c
∂ lnτc︸  ︷︷  ︸
<0
+
∂ lnH ∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0
∂ lnG∗c
∂ lnτc
=
d lnM∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
(1.14a)
d lnL∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnL∗c
∂ lnτc︸  ︷︷  ︸
<0
+
∂ lnL∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0
∂ lnG∗c
∂ lnτc
(1.14b)
d lnN ∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnN ∗c
∂ lnτc︸  ︷︷  ︸
<0
+
∂ lnN ∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0
∂ lnG∗c
∂ lnτc
. (1.14c)
Proof. See Section 1.B.7 in the Appendix. 
Again, looking rst at the direct eects, the model predicts the quantities on the oor space,
land, and labor market to decrease in response to an increase in the property tax given the
real-wage loss in city c . Workers thus leave the city, employment declines, construction and
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land use decrease.
The magnitude and the sign of the total eects of tax increases on equilibrium quantities again
depend on the relative importance of the direct vs. the indirect eect, that operates through
increases in local public good supply and moderates the direct eects as long as property tax
increases lead to higher spending on local public goods.
1.2.7 Welfare Eects
In this section, we derive the marginal welfare eects of property tax changes for the dierent
agents in the model. We present the results for representative agents in city c , implicitly
assuming that the distribution of agents across municipalities is homogeneous (Suárez Serrato
and Zidar, 2016). Proposition 2 summarizes the welfare eects based on price responses.
Proposition 2 (Welfare Eects). LetW H ,W F ,W C , andW L denote the welfare of workers, rm
owners, constructors, and land owners in the spatial equilibrium, respectively. A marginal increase
in city c’s property tax rate tc leads to welfare changes that are determined by:
(i) the elasticities of equilibrium rents, land prices, and wages with respect to the property tax
rate,
(ii) the responsiveness of the local public good provision in equilibrium with respect to the tax,
(iii) three exogenous model parameters, namely the housing share in consumption, α , the labor
share in the tradable good production, β , and the preferences for local public goods, δ
dW H
d lnτc
= −
(
[1 − δ ]
[
α + α
d ln rH∗c
d lnτc
− d lnw
∗
c
d lnτc
]
− δ d lnG
∗
c
d lnτc
)
(1.15a)
dW F
d lnτc
= −
(
[1 − β] + [1 − β] d ln r
M∗
c
d lnτc
+ β
d lnw∗c
d lnτc
)
(1.15b)
dW C
d lnτc
= 0 (1.15c)
dW L
d lnτc
=
d ln l∗c
d lnτc
. (1.15d)
Proof. See Section 1.B.8 in the Appendix. 
The analysis shows that workers’ marginal welfare loss from tax hikes decreases in the
preference for the local public good, δ . Hence, the stronger the preferences for public goods
and the stronger the transmission of taxes into public good spending, the smaller the welfare
loss as workers are compensated for rising costs of living.
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Proposition 2 implies that the rent, land price, wage, and public good elasticities with respect
to the property tax are sucient to infer the welfare eects of the tax in a local labor market
model – given the housing share in consumption, the labor share in production, and the
preferences for public goods, which can be calibrated according to ocial statistics. In the
following sections, we estimate the behavioral responses to changes in property taxes using the
German institutional framework. In Section 1.7, we use these behavioral elasticities and the
respective welfare formulas to assess the marginal welfare eects of the property tax.
1.3 Institutional Background
We test the theoretical predictions of our model using administrative data from German munici-
palities. In this section, we provide a short overview on the institutional setting of property
taxation in Germany (see Spahn, 2004, for more details).
Property taxes are one of the oldest forms of taxation that is still used today. The current
German property tax regulations are based on a law from 1936.6 Besides local business taxes
and municipal shares on federal income and sales taxes, the property tax is one of the three
most important income sources for German municipalities. Property taxes account for around
15 percent of municipal revenues, amounting to a total of 12 billion EUR for all municipalities
in 2013. All legal regulations of the German property tax, i.e., the denition of the tax base,
as well as legal norms regarding the property assessment, are set at the federal level and have
rarely been changed over the past decades.
The property tax liability is calculated according to the following formula, that we discuss in
more detail below:
Tax Liability = Assessed Value × Federal Tax Rate ×Municipal Scalinд Factor︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
Local Property Tax Rate
. (1.16)
Assessed Values. The house value (Einheitswert) is assessed by the tax oces of the federal
state (not by the municipality) when the property is built and, importantly, remains xed over
time. There is no regular reassessment of properties to adjust the assessed value to the market
value of the property or to ination rates. Even when being sold, the assessed value does not
change. Reassessments only occur if the owner creates a new building or substantially improves
an existing structure on her land.7 The last general assessment of property values in West
6 The law distinguishes between taxes on agricultural land (Grundsteuer A) and taxes on residential and commercial
land as well as improvements (Grundsteuer B). We focus solely on the latter one in this paper as only this type of
the tax is relevant for residential housing markets and commercial oor space.
7 The improvement has to concern the “hardware” of the property, such as adding a oor to the building. Maintaining
the roof or installing a new kitchen does not yield reassessments. Lock-in eects or assessment limits are thus
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Germany took place in 1964. In order to make the assessment comparable for buildings that
have been constructed after that date, property values of new structures are evaluated on market
rents as of 1964 using historical rent indices. So even new buildings are assessed as if they had
been built several decades ago. As a consequence, assessed values dier substantially from
current market values. Assessment notices do not provide any detail on how specic parts
of the building contribute to the assessed value. This practice makes the assessment barely
transparent for house owners, landowners and renters. The average assessed value for West
German homes was 48,900 EUR in 2013, roughly a fth of the reported current market value
(according to the German Income and Expenditure Survey, EVS).
Federal Tax Rates. The federal tax rate (Grundsteuermesszahl) is set at 0.35 percent for all
property types in West Germany with two exceptions (see Figure 1.1). First, single-family homes
are taxed at 0.26 percent up to the value of 38,347 EUR; and at 0.35 percent for every Euro the
house value exceeds this threshold. Second, two-family houses are taxed at 0.31 percent. All
other property types are taxed at 0.35 percent. The federal tax schedule is thus progressive for
single-family houses and otherwise at. Once the property type has been determined by the
state tax oces, land and structures are taxed at the same rate.8 The average federal property
tax rate in our sample is 0.32 percent.
Municipal Scaling Factors. Municipal councils decide yearly on the local scaling factor
(Hebesatz). The decision is usually made in the last months of the preceding year, and most tax
changes become eective on January 1st.
For a given housing stock and a xed federal rate, local property tax rates only vary due to
changes in local scaling factors. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the substantial cross-sectional and
time variation in tax rates induced by changes in scaling factors. The left panel of the gure
shows the local tax rates for all West German municipalities in 2017, assuming a federal tax rate
of 0.32 percent. Local property tax rates vary between 0.73 and 1.71 percent (bottom and top
one percent). Annual mean and median tax rates increased steadily from around 0.86 in 1992
to 1.17 percent in 2017. The average tax per square meter was 0.20 EUR for rental apartments,
which corresponds to 3.29 percent on top of the average net rent in our sample.9
The right panel of Figure 1.2 demonstrates the number of municipal scaling factor changes in
the period from 1992 to 2017. Over this period, more than ninety percent of all municipalities
not an issue in the German context other than in some US states (see, e.g., Ferreira, 2010, Bradley, 2017).
8 As tax rates for developed properties and undeveloped land are also similar, the German system is thus essentially
a one-rate property tax (see the discussion in Plassmann and Tideman, 2000, and Lyytikäinen, 2009, for the
dierences between one-rate and multi-rate tax systems and their eect on housing construction).
9 The average tax burden for rental apartments in West Germany is published annually by the German Tenants’
Association (Deutscher Mieterbund) based on a survey on operating costs (Betriebskostenspiegel).
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Figure 1.1: Federal Tax Rates in West Germany (in Percent)
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Notes: This graph shows the federal tax rates for dierent property types in West
Germany. Federal tax rates are at except for single-family houses, which are taxed
at 0.26 percent up to an assessed value of 38,347 EUR and with a marginal tax rate
of 0.35 percent above that threshold. All tax rates are in percent. The average
federal tax rate in our sample is 0.32 percent. Source: § 15 Grundsteuergesetz.
changed their local tax rate at least once, while less than six percent of municipalities still have
the same multiplier as in the beginning of the 1990s. On average, municipalities changed the
factor four times during this period, i.e., every six years. Many municipalities experienced even
more changes. One percent of municipalities changed their property tax multiplier more than
ten times since 1992. Almost 97 percent of all tax changes during this period are tax increases.
Statutory Incidence. Property owners are liable for the tax payment irrespective of whether
the property is owner-occupied, for rent or vacant. However, for rental housing, property taxes
are part of the ancillary costs that renters have to pay on top of net rents to their landlords
according to the legal regulations on operating costs (Betriebskostenverordnung). In this regula-
tion, landlords are directed to include the tax payments in the ancillary bill the renters receives
each year and it is a common practice to do so. As a consequence, the statutory incidence is on
the user of the housing service for both owner-occupied and rental housing.
Commercial Property Taxes. For German rms property tax liabilities are of second order.
Municipalities’ tax revenues from local business taxes were 43 billion EUR as of 2013, tax
revenues from property taxes amounted to 12 billion EUR. From these 12 billion EUR, the
largest share came from residential buildings. A conservative estimate is that two thirds of a
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Figure 1.2: Variation in Local Property Tax Rates in West Germany
(a) Local Property Tax Rates in 2013 (in Percent) (b) Number of Property Tax Changes 1992–2017
Notes: The left panel of this gure shows the local property tax rates in 2013 for all West German
municipalities, assuming a federal tax rate of 0.32 percent. The right panel depicts the number of local
property tax changes by municipality in the period 1992–2017. Jurisdictional boundaries are as of
December 31, 2010. White lines indicate federal state borders. Source: Federal Statistical Oce and
Statistical Oces of the federal states. Maps: © GeoBasis-DE / BKG 2015.
municipality’s total area are for residential, one third for commercial use. Commercial property
taxes thus make up less than ten percent of rms’ total tax bill on average.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section gives an overview on the data used for our empirical analysis. We combine
administrative data on the scal and economic situation of German municipalities with housing
market information, and administrative wage data from social security registers (Section 1.4.1).
In Section 1.4.2 we dene our baseline data set used in the empirical analysis. Appendix 1.A
provides more details on the denition and the sources of all variables.
19
Chapter 1 Property Taxation, Housing, and Local Labor Markets
1.4.1 Variables and Data Sources
German Municipality Data. We collect a comprehensive data set for all West German mu-
nicipalities from the Federal Statistical Oce and the Statistical Oces of the Länder, including
data on the economic, scal and budgetary situation, most importantly local scaling factors,
as well as population gures and information on the housing stock, land prices, land use, and
local GDP. In addition we collect unemployment data from the Federal Employment Agency.
The Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development provides
us with denitions of commuting zones that are dened according to commuting ows (Ar-
beitsmarktregionen). Using these sources we construct a balanced panel for the universe of all
8,481 West German municipalities ranging from 1992 to 2017.10 Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix
provides details on the denition and data sources of all variables as well as the years for which
data is available, Appendix Table 1.A.2 shows descriptive statistics.
Housing Price Data. We combine the municipality panel with housing market data provided
by the German real estate association IVD (Immobilienverband Deutschland). This data set
delivers eight distinct rent indices for standardized rental apartments with 70 square meter and
three bedrooms, and seven house price indices for single-family buildings. These indices dier
by construction year and apartment quality and thus allow us to study heterogeneous eects of
property taxes. It is important to note, that this data only includes quoted net prices and quoted
net rents (Nettokaltmiete) and does not contain information on operating costs, taxes, or actual
transaction prices. Thus, we do not observe gross prices including property taxes.
We validate the house price and rent data against several other data sources: (i) ocial
household survey data from the German micro census, which includes information on rents at
the county level every four years, covering 89 large municipalities; (ii) housing market indicators
provided by Empirica, an independent economic consultancy specialized in the real-estate
sector, covering the same large municipalities over the period 2004–2013; (iii) data provided
by Bulwiengesa, another real-estate consultancy, whose data set includes 102 municipalities.
Figure 1.A.1 in the Appendix compares the dierent measures and shows that data quality of
our IVD data set seems reasonable. In addition, Appendix Figure 1.A.2 plots average reported
rents in 2010 for all West German counties and the regional coverage of the IVD data.
Wage Data. We additionally use linked employer-employee data from the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (LIAB) to study the eect of property taxes on wages at the municipal level.
The LIAB data is based on a one percent stratied random sample of all German establishments,
10 We complement this panel with earlier data from the Statistical Oces of the federal states of Bavaria (since 1970),
Lower Saxony (since 1981), and Northrhine-Westfalia (since 1977), three of the largest states in Germany.
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covering about 15,000 plants. The rm data are linked to social security records, matching all
employees working in these plants. Overall, the LIAB data covers between 1.6 and 2.0 million
workers per year, which corresponds to about 6 percent of all German workers (see Alda et al.,
2005, Fuest et al., 2018, for more information on the dataset). We link the municipal tax informa-
tion to the LIAB via the plant location, and calculate the mean wage for all municipality-year
cells.11
1.4.2 Sample Definition
While our panel data set contains the universe of all West German municipalities, the housing
data covers only 436 jurisdictions (ve percent of all West German municipalities). Panel A of
Figure 1.A.3 in the Appendix shows that the housing data set accounts for roughly forty percent
of the West German population. Panel B dierentiates the sample by city size. The housing data
set includes all large cities above 100,000 inhabitants and a substantial part of the medium-sized
cities with a population above 20,000. Appendix Figure 1.A.4 shows the size distribution of
municipalities in the baseline sample and in the full sample. Despite the dierence in population,
both samples are rather comparable when looking at the number and the size of property tax
changes, i.e., the source of identifying variation in our empirical analysis, as can be seen in
Appendix Figure 1.A.5.
In the empirical analysis below, we use the housing data sample as the baseline sample, also
for results on other outcomes, in order to have a consistent sample denition.12 Yet, if data is
available, we additionally present estimates on the full sample of all West German municipalities.
We exclude East German municipalities from our analysis for two reasons. First, and foremost,
East German housing markets don’t seem ideal testing grounds for our theoretical predictions
given the tremendous population loss and the large inow of public and private capital after
reunication. In fact, East German municipalities on average lost more than 15 percent of their
population since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. As a consequence, housing markets in many
East Germany regions have been subject to substantial excess supply during the past decades.
Second, there were substantial mergers of East German municipalities after reunication, which
complicates any longitudinal study at the municipal level. About 60 percent of the East German
municipalities experienced at least one merger since 1990. Given that our data are based on
municipal boundaries as of December 31, 2010, we cannot assign the correct tax rates.13
11 About 10 percent of the wages in the LIAB are right censored at the social security contribution ceiling. We get
similar results when using the median municipal wage, which should be hardly aected by wage censoring.
12 Note that for some outcomes we have to restrict the estimation sample even further to only 89 city counties
(kreisfreie Städte) if data is solely available at the county level.
13 A possible solution would be to use a (weighted) average of the municipalities which merged, but this would
introduce considerable measurement error and several articial tax changes. Moreover, using these municipalities
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1.5 Empirical Model
We make use of an event study design to investigate the eects of property tax changes. As
identied by our theoretical model, we are interested in the eects of property taxes on the
following outcome variables: net rents, house prices, number of houses, number of apartments,
wages, population, land sales, and land prices. Denoting an outcome in municipality c in year t
as yc,t , our regression model reads as follows:
lnyc,t =
6∑
k=−4
βkD
k
c,t + µc + ζc,t + εc,t . (1.17)
We regress logged outcomes on a set of event study indicators Dkc,t with the event window
running from four years prior to a tax reform (k = −4) to six years after the event (k = 6).
We estimate two dierent variants, which dier in the way we dene event indicators Dkc,t .
First, we implement the most intuitive and basic model, where Dkc,t is simply a dummy variable
indicating a tax increase k years ago.14 Second, we follow Simon (2016) and Fuest et al. (2018) in
estimating a specication where the event indicator Dkc,t switches on only for large tax increases,
i.e., increases being equal to or greater than the median of the tax increase distribution. The
reason is that tax reforms might only have real eects if tax changes are sizable, for example,
due to adjustment costs.
Our baseline specication of the event study includes four leads and six lags, k = −4, . . . , 6,
which enables us to investigate the dynamics of the relation between property taxes and
outcomes on the housing, land, and labor market, where (quantity) responses might take some
time (England, 2016).15 In both models, end points D−4c,t and D6c,t of the event study are adjusted
to account for the fact that our panel is unbalanced in event time due to staggered tax reforms
across municipalities (McCrary, 2007).16 This adjustment makes the set of 4 + 6 + 1 event
indicators Dkc,t perfectly collinear and we thus normalize coecients to the pre-reform year by
omitting the respective event indicator D−1c,t from the regression, i.e., β−1 = 0.
in our analysis would require the strong assumption that the decision to merge is unrelated to the scal and
economic situation in a municipality.
14 Almost 97 percent of the property tax reforms between 1992–2017 are tax increases. Estimates are not sensitive
to whether we keep municipalities with tax decreases in the control group or exclude them from the sample.
15 Clearly, the choice of the event window is determined by data availability over time. The chosen baseline is a
compromise between the length of the event window and statistical power. We experimented with other event
window denitions, nding very similar results.
16 Hence, the coecient β−4 captures the eect of all tax changes occurring four or more years before the current
reform. Likewise, the coecient β6 measures the eect of all tax changes that happened six or more years after a
reform. Since endpoints are estimated on unbalanced data, we follow standard practice and do not plot them in
the event study graphs (Smith et al., 2017, Fuest et al., 2018).
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To control for time-invariant factors, we include municipality xed eects µc .17 The vector ζc,t
controls for local shocks by including state × year xed eects and linear county trends.
Moreover, we include event study coecients indicating whether the local business tax, the
other tax instrument at the disposal of municipalities, changed.18 The error term is denoted
by εc,t . We allow for clustering of standard errors at the municipal level to account for correlation
in unobservable components over time and between the dierent building and construction
types.19
Identication of the βk coecients comes from changes within a municipality relative to the
pre-reform year and relative to the regional trend. The identifying assumption is that there are
no other factors that simultaneously aect property taxes and the outcome variables. Using
an event study design allows to directly test for reverse causality problems. In order to obtain
causal estimates, we need pre-trends to be at and insignicantly dierent from zero.
While municipality xed eects control for time-invariant confounders, our estimator will
be biased if local shocks aect both municipal scal policies and housing as well as labor
markets. We test for confounding factors in two ways. First, we assess the sensitivity of our
estimates with respect to the inclusion of a very rich set of time-varying control variables. In
our baseline, we include state × year xed eects and linear county trends. As a robustness
check, we estimate one less demanding specication, dropping the linear county trends, and
one more demanding one, including commuting zone × year xed eects. Estimates prove to
be robust (see Appendix 1.C.1). Second, we directly test whether tax reforms are driven by the
local business cycle by using municipal unemployment and GDP per capita at the county level
as outcomes variables in the event study regression in equation (1.17).
1.6 Reduced-Form Results
In this section, we present reduced-form results for the eects of property tax changes on prices
and quantities on the housing, land, and labor market. First, we test the theoretical predictions
derived from our spatial equilibrium model in Section 1.2. Second, we investigate heterogeneous
eects with respect to city size, population density, the availability of developable land, and
the housing quality to check whether the mechanisms implied by our theoretical model are
supported by the data.
17 Our data contains several indices for each municipality diering by construction type and building quality. We
include all indices and account for type-quality-specic municipality xed eects in rent and price regressions.
18 As it turns out, controlling for changes in the local business tax, does not aect our results on the housing or land
market. But intuitively, and in line with the results in Fuest et al. (2018), we nd dierences in wage responses.
Ignoring changes in business taxes would lead to more negative wage eects.
19 The results are not sensitive to whether we cluster at the municipal level or the level of commuting zones.
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1.6.1 Main Results
We report event study results for various outcomes on the housing, land, and labor market. For
each outcome, we plot two event study specications: the classic design where event study
dummies indicate tax increases, and an alternative specication where event dummies are equal
to one for large tax increases only. For both models, estimated treatment eects of (large) tax
increases are rescaled such that plotted coecients can be interpreted as average elasticities.
Various sensitivity checks with respect to the length of the event window, and the way we
account for local shocks are presented and discussed in Appendix 1.C.1.
Housing Market. We start by analyzing housing market eects, Figure 1.3 summarizes the
results. Panel A reports the event study results using log quoted net rents as an outcome. While
pre-reform trends are at as required by our identifying assumption, we nd that net rents
for new contracts are about 0.1 percent lower in the three years following a tax increase of
one percent. This short to medium-run eect is statistically dierent from zero at the 90 percent
level. However, after three years, the negative eect on rents starts to revert slowly towards
zero. This implies that in the medium run, more and more of the incidence is borne by the new
renter. A likely explanation of this adjustment path lies in the supply of rental dwellings, which
is inelastic in the short run but becomes more elastic over time.
Next, we look at the eects of property tax increases on net house prices, which are plotted in
Panel B of Figure 1.3. We detect a gradual decrease in house prices after a property tax increase.
The implied elasticity ve years after the tax increase is about -0.2. Hence, and in line with the
literature, we nd clear evidence of property tax capitalization into house values. While buyers
have to bear the full tax burden in the short run, they are able to shift part of the future tax
liability onto the seller of the house, which is reected in lower transaction prices.
Panels C and D show the quantity eects of rising property taxes on the housing market.
While we nd a gradually negative eect on the stock of apartments and residential buildings in
a municipality, magnitudes are small and results are not statistically signicant at conventional
levels. The lower magnitudes of the quantity responses are intuitive as the housing stock
cannot adjust as quickly as prices. This is also predicted by the theoretical model, where the
tax elasticity of oor space equals the tax elasticity of rents multiplied by the eective housing
supply elasticity. Because of this sluggish construction response, it is dicult to identify quantity
eects that are statistically signicantly dierent from zero. A potential way to overcome this
problem is to increase the number of observations. As mentioned in Section 1.4.2, our baseline
sample is restricted to municipalities for which we have housing price data. Yet for some
variables, we have data from the universe of West German municipalities. While eects might
be dierent across samples due to heterogeneous treatment eects, we can increase statistical
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Figure 1.3: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Housing Market
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the housing market using the event study set-up
from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases), or as an
increase that is greater than or equal to the median of the tax change distribution (big increases). The base
sample includes all municipalities from our housing data set (see Section 1.4.2 for details), the full sample
includes all municipalities for which we have data on the respective outcome. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for
details on all variables.
power by testing quantity responses in the full sample. For this reason, we plot two additional
sets of event studies estimates for the full municipality sample in Panels C and D. We nd
that the eect on the number of residential houses is very similar across samples, but highly
signicant in the full sample with an elasticity of around -0.03 six years after a tax increase
(Panel D). Moreover, we nd an eect of similar magnitude on the number of apartments in
the full sample, while eects in the base sample, which covers larger, more urban areas, is
closer to zero (Panel C). These ndings are in line with evidence from Lutz (2015) who reports
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capitalization eects in more urban areas, while property taxes reduce residential construction
in rural communities. The results again highlight the importance of treatment eect dynamics
as the quantity eects take time to evolve, which is again in line with the idea that housing
supply is rather inelastic in the short run.
Land Market. Next we turn to the land market. Figure 1.4 summarizes the results. Panel A
shows that the land price strongly decreases in response to a tax increase and only gradually
starts to recover ve years after the tax reform. This is in line with the theoretical prediction
from our spatial equilibrium model. Notably, the magnitude of the eect is larger compared
to the eects on rents, which suggests that the land supply is relatively inelastic in German
municipalities (cf. Section 1.2.6). As above, eects on the quantity of residential land use are
not conclusive within the house price sample and we cannot reject the null hypotheses of no
eect. However, we nd negative and statistically signicant eects on the land area used for
residential housing in the full sample of municipalities: ve years after a tax change, the land
use is reduced by 0.07 percent for a one percent tax increase (see Panel B of Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Land Market
-2
-1
0
1
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
A. Log Land Price
-.1
0
.1
.2
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
B. Log Land
All Increases (Base Sample) Big Increases (Base Sample)
All Increases (Full Sample) Big Increases (Full Sample)
Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the land market using the event study set-up from
equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases), or as an
increase that is greater than or equal to the median of the tax change distribution (big increases). The base
sample includes all municipalities from our housing data set (see Section 1.4.2 for details), the full sample
includes all municipalities for which we have data on the respective outcome. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for
details on all variables.
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Labor Market. Last, we turn to local labor market outcomes. Panel A of Figure 1.5 shows that
wages are largely unaected by tax increases. In light of our theoretical predictions derived from
the spatial equilibrium model, this implies that the rent elasticities of commercial and residential
oor space are roughly of similar size. As for the housing stock, we see a gradual decline of
around 0.02-0.03 percent in municipal population in response to a one percent tax increase (see
Panel B). Eects are again similar in magnitude for the baseline and the full sample, but we again
lack statistical power in the house price sample. Panels C and D show a insignicant but visible
decline of roughly equal size in local employment and the number of plants in a municipality
when we focus on large tax increases, which is in line with the mechanisms predicted by the
theoretical model.
Sensitivity Checks. We conduct a wide range of robustness checks. First, we can directly
test the identifying assumption that tax reforms are not driven by local business cycles by
putting log GDP and log unemployment on the left-hand side of our estimation equation (1.17).
As shown in Appendix Figure 1.C.1, pre-trends are very at for GDP, while we detect a small
pre-trend for local unemployment. In terms of post-treatment eects, the gure suggests no
eect on local GDP due to the property tax increase. Local unemployment is increasing after tax
reforms, in particular in the baseline house price sample. While most eects are not statistically
signicant, the results suggest that an increase in local property taxes tends to hurt the overall
local economy.
Moreover, and in a similar vain, we test the sensitivity of our estimates with respect to
confounders. In our baseline specication we include state times year xed eects and linear
county trends. This rich set of non-parametric controls is likely to account for various potentially
confounding shocks at the local level. As a sensitivity check, we estimate one more parsimonious
specication including only state times year xed eects but excluding county trends, and one
richer specication, where we control for commuting-zone times year xed eects. There are
204 commuting zones which delineate local labor markets based on commuting ows. Including
commuting zone times year xed eects thus absorbs any common shocks within labor market
regions.20 Figures 1.C.2–1.C.4 in Appendix 1.C.1 show the results. If anything, pre-trends
become atter in the more involved baseline specication. In terms of post-treatment eect, the
general pattern is conrmed for most outcomes.
20 The rich specication is only meaningful for outcomes measures at the municipal level. We are forced to focus
on a subset of 88 municipalities (city counties) for the few outcomes that we observe at the county level only, i.e.,
land prices, employment, number of plants. There are 88 municipalities and 73 commuting zones in this sample,
which makes commuting zone × year xed eects highly collinear with the identifying variation, which is at the
municipality-year level.
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Figure 1.5: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Labor Market
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the labor market using the event study set-up from
equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases), or as an
increase that is greater than or equal to the median of the tax change distribution (big increases). The base
sample includes all municipalities from our housing data set (see Section 1.4.2 for details), the full sample
includes all municipalities for which we have data on the respective outcome. Panels C and D are based on a
subsample of large municipalities (“urban counties”) as data on employment and plants are only observed at
the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
1.6.2 Heterogeneous Eects
We can further test the underlying mechanisms of the theoretical model by estimating hetero-
geneous eects for certain municipality types. For instance, the theoretical model assumes
that the negative eect of property taxes on rents is higher, the less elastic the supply of rental
housing. While the adjustment pattern shown in Panel A of Figure 1.3 has provided a rst
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Figure 1.6: The Eects of Property Taxes on Prices by City Size
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on prices by city size using the event study set-up from
equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases). Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the
Appendix for details on all variables.
indication for this mechanism with net rents decreasing in the short run, but reverting to pre-
reform levels in the longer run, we can exploit cross-sectional dierences in the housing supply
elasticity by dierentiating between municipalities with below and above 50,000 inhabitants.
With strong urbanization trends and growing cities, housing and land supply in cities is rather
inelastic. Hence, we would expect to see stronger price reactions in larger municipalities. This
is conrmed by Figure 1.6, which shows that rents, house prices and land prices decrease more
strongly in larger cities. Conversely, Figure 1.C.10 in Appendix 1.C.2 demonstrates stronger
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quantity responses in smaller, more rural municipalities.21 In light of the theoretical predictions,
these results suggest that housing and land supply are indeed more elastic in rural areas than in
cities.
A dierent way to investigate heterogeneous eects is to distinguish municipalities by the
share of undevelopable land (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). Following the rationale of Saiz (2010),
municipalities with a high share of undevelopable land are assumed to have less elastic land and
housing supply and should see stronger price eects. Figure 1.C.13 in the Appendix conrms
this prediction – at least for house and land prices. While the municipalities with a more elastic
housing supply hardly face any price changes, they experience stronger quantity responses
instead (see Appendix Figure 1.C.14).
Last, we check for dierential responses by construction quality, Figure 1.7 shows the results.
We nd that net rents in apartments of the lowest quality revert back more quickly to the
pre-reform level than net rents of higher quality housing (see Panel A). This implies that the
pass-through of the tax burden on renters in lower quality housing is higher and faster ceteris
paribus. Looking at sales prices of houses, Panel B suggests that the tax shifting from buyers
to sellers is slightly lower for high quality housing, yet estimates are not statistically dierent
from each other.
1.7 Combining Theory and Empirics
In the following section, we combine the reduced-form estimates presented in Section 1.6.1 with
the theoretical model set up in Section 1.2. First, we calculate marginal welfare eects of property
tax increases using the reduced form results and the welfare formulas from Section 1.2.7. Second,
we assess the role of endogenous amenities in shaping the welfare eects of the property tax by
running counterfactual simulations.
1.7.1 Welfare Eects of Property Tax Increases
Ignoring public goods, Proposition 2 shows that the marginal welfare eects of property tax
increases are governed by four key elasticities and three additional model parameters, which
we calibrate using estimates from the literature and external data sources. In Table 1.1, we
summarize the key medium-run elasticities after ve years for both the house price sample and
21 We nd similar results when interacting tax hikes with population density indicators (see Figures 1.C.11 and 1.C.12
in Appendix 1.C.2). The heterogeneous responses by city size or density already became apparent when looking at
the main results in Section 1.6.1, where quantity responses become stronger and more signicant when switching
from the mostly urban baseline to the full sample, which also includes smaller and more rural municipalities.
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Figure 1.7: The Eects of Property Taxes on Prices by House Quality
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on prices by house quality using the event study set-up
from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases). Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1
in the Appendix for details on all variables.
the full sample.22 All elasticities are negative and have the predicted sign. As already discussed
above, price eects are larger in magnitude than quantity eects.
Calibrating the housing share in consumption α and the labor share in production β , we
can derive the welfare losses of property tax increases for workers, rm owners, and land
owners, calculated as respective shares of the marginal welfare eects over the total welfare
loss. Figure 1.8 visualizes the results for dierent assumptions on the calibrated parameters α
and β (see Table 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C.3 for the corresponding numbers). For our preferred
baseline values of the housing and labor share, α = 0.3 and β = 0.55, we nd that workers bear
22 percent of the welfare loss of property tax increases, rm owners bear 35 percent, and land
owners 43 percent.
22 The presented elasticities are the coecients of the conventional event study design using all tax increases after
ve years. As noted above, we scale the coecients such that they represent elasticities, i.e., they measure the
eect of the outcome in percent in response to a one percent increase in the local property tax rate. For the
simulation, we are interested in the medium to long-run eect of property taxes. The traditional dierence-
in-dierence estimate would provide us with average treatment eect relative to the pre-treatment period.
As shown above, most of the eects materialize gradually rather than sharply after treatment, which would
mean that the DiD estimate is lower than the medium-term eect. We nevertheless present DiD estimates in
Appendix Table 1.C.1 and conrm this pattern empirically. The event study results provides unbiased estimates
for medium-run eects in case of at pre-trends, which is the case for our outcomes.
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Table 1.1: Reduced Form Elasticities
Base Sample Full Sample
Outcome Elasticity S.E. Obs. Elasticity S.E. Obs.
Log Net Rent -0.096 (0.079) 37,672 -0.096 (0.079) 37,672
Log House Price -0.201 (0.072)∗∗∗ 33,767 -0.201 (0.072)∗∗∗ 33,767
Log Apartments -0.009 (0.020) 2,780 -0.026 (0.009)∗∗∗ 93,212
Log Houses -0.024 (0.023) 2,780 -0.031 (0.011)∗∗∗ 93,212
Log Land Price -0.999 (0.687) 1,205 -0.512 (0.524) 6,987
Log Land -0.004 (0.076) 1,712 -0.072 (0.030)∗∗ 50,843
Log Wage -0.029 (0.092) 973 0.014 (0.108) 8,067
Log Population -0.029 (0.022) 5,050 -0.025 (0.010)∗∗ 189,535
Notes: This table summarizes the reduced-form results for the key medium-run elasticities of our model
for both the house price sample and the full sample. For detailed information on all variables, see
Appendix Table 1.A.1.
Figure 1.8: Welfare Eects Without Endogenous Local Public Goods
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Notes: This gure presents welfare eects arising in a model where property tax revenues are not spent on local
amenities. The marginal welfare eects are shown for dierent values of the housing share in consumption (α ) in
Panel A (assuming parameter β = 0.55), and the labor share in the production of the tradable good (β) in Panel B
(assuming α = 0.3). Marginal welfare eects are based on Proposition 2 in Section 1.2.6 and the following
three reduced-form elasticities: d ln rH∗c /d lnτc = −0.096, d ln l∗c /d lnτc = −0.512, and d lnw∗c /d lnτc = 0.014
(see full sample results in Table 1.1). The dashed vertical lines mark the baseline specication with parameters
calibrated at α = 0.3 and β = 0.55.
1.7.2 The Relevance of Local Public Goods
Next, we assess the empirical relevance of endogenous local public goods. Public goods aect
marginal welfare eects in two ways: (i) through the valuation of public relative to private goods,
and (ii) via the transmission of property tax increases into additional public good spending.
While we do not know the average individual valuation of the public goods, δ , we can calibrate
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the parameter to the average share of local public expenditures relative to local GDP (Fajgelbaum
et al., 2016, Michaillat and Saez, 2017), which yields an average of δ = 0.06. The importance of
local public goods for marginal welfare eects also depends on how responsive public good
spending is to changes in property taxation. As explained in Section 1.2.6, the direct, negative
eects of tax increases on equilibrium prices are alleviated if the tax revenue is spent on local
public goods valued by the population (see Proposition 1).
Figure 1.9: Welfare Eects With Endogenous Local Public Goods
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Notes: This gure presents welfare eects arising in a model where property tax revenues are partly spent on
local amenities. The marginal welfare eects are shown for dierent assumptions on the valuation of the local
public good (δ ) in Panel A (assuming parameters d lnG∗c/d lnτc = 0.15), and the local public goods elasticity
with respect to tax changes (d lnG∗c/d lnτc ) in Panel B (assuming δ = 0.06). Marginal welfare eects are based
on Proposition 2 in Section 1.2.7 and the following three reduced-form elasticities: d ln rH∗c /d lnτc = −0.096,
d ln l∗c /d lnτc = −0.512, d lnw∗c /d lnτc = 0.014, and parameters α = 0.3 and β = 0.55. The dashed vertical
lines mark the baseline specication with parameters calibrated at δ = 0.06 and d lnG∗c/d lnτc = 0.15.
Using the reduced form price elasticities and the calibrated parameters α , β , and δ , we can
simulate marginal welfare eects over a range of potential elasticities d lnG
∗
c
d ln τc , i.e., dierent
assumptions on the transmission of property tax increase in government spending. Figure 1.9
shows the welfare losses for workers, rm owners, and land owners. Panel A shows the welfare
eects for dierent assumptions on the valuation of public goods δ . Panel B illustrates the welfare
impact of property tax increases for dierent values of the public goods elasticity. Accounting
for endogenous local public goods changes the results from Section 1.7.1 only marginally. Even
large public good elasticities with respect to tax increases hardly lower the welfare loss for
tenants within a reasonable range of assumptions for the valuation of public goods. When
considering that taxes are used to nance local public goods, tenants bear around 20 percent of
the welfare loss of higher taxes, rm owners roughly 36, and land owners 44 percent.
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1.8 Conclusion
We propose a new theoretical angle to study the incidence and welfare implications of property
taxation by introducing property taxes into a local labor market in the spirit of Moretti (2011).
Our spatial equilibrium models encompasses elements of both the capital and the benet view
of property taxation. It also nests simple partial-equilibrium analyses of the housing market.
We show that rising local property taxes should lead to a decrease in housing and land prices,
a decrease in the housing stock and the use of developed land, and a decrease in municipal
population levels. Based on the price eects of property tax increases, the model also allows us
to quantify marginal welfare eects.
In the second part of the paper, we empirically test the theoretical predictions of the model
using rich administrative panel data and the institutional setting of German municipalities. An
event study research design enables us to study treatment eect dynamics and to test for reverse
causality in a straightforward manner. We conrm our theoretical predictions. In particular, we
show that house prices, the housing and apartment stock as well as population levels decrease if
property taxes increase in a municipality. We nd no evidence of compensating wage increases
following a tax hike.
The results for the net housing prices (rents and house price) inform about the incidence of
the property tax. While we detect a short-run decrease of net rents following a tax increase, net
rents start to revert back to the pre-reform level three years after the tax reform. This implies
that in the medium-run the economic incidence of the property tax is largely on renters. House
prices show a negative response, which is still visible after ve years. Hence, house buyers are
able to shift part of their future property tax burden on the sellers (which are either previous
owners or construction companies for newly built houses). Using the reduced-form results we
also quantify the welfare implications of property tax increases for the dierent agents in our
model. Our simulations show that workers and tenants bear roughly 20 percent of the welfare
loss, rm owners 36 percent, and land owners the largest share with 44 percent of the welfare
loss. Importantly, the simulated welfare eects change only little when accounting for the fact
that property taxes may be used to nance public goods and local public good provision may
thus be endogenous.
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Appendix 1.A Data Appendix
Table 1.A.1: Denition of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Years Source
Property Tax Rates 1970–2017 The local property tax rate is calculated as the product of local property
tax multipliers and an average federal tax rate of 0.32 percent. Data on
property tax multipliers is provided by the Federal Statistical Oce and
the Statistical Oces of the federal states. Data for the period 1998–
2017 are published by the Statistical Oces (Hebesätze der Realsteuern),
data prior to 1998 were provided by the Statistical Oces of the federal
states and are partly available online.
Net Rents 1972–2013 Data on quoted net rents are provided as indices for dierent market
segments in the IVD-Wohn-Preisspiegel by the German real estate asso-
ciation IVD (Immobilienverband Deutschland). We validate these indices
against county-level data from empirica Preisdatenbank for 2004–2013,
bulwiengesa AG (RIWIS) for 1990–2013, and the German micro census
provided by the RDC of the Federal Statistical Oce and Statistical
Oces of the Länder (1998, 2002, 2004, 2010, 2014).
House Prices 1972–2013 Data on quoted house prices are provided by the German real estate
association IVD in the IVD-Wohn-Preisspiegel in addition to data on net
rents.
Housing Stock 2001–2015 Data on the number of apartments (Wohnungen in Wohn- und Nicht-
wohngebäuden) and the number of residential buildings (Wohngebäude)
in a municipality are provided by the Federal Statistical Oce and the
Statistical Oces of the federal states. Data for the years 2001–2007
stem from the database Statistik lokal, data for later years are published
online in the database Regionalstatistik.
Wages 1999–2008 Data on wages as of June 30 are available in the linked employer-
employee data of the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB, see
Alda et al., 2005). The data set is based on a 1 % stratied random
sample of all German establishments and contains information on all
employees working in these plants. Sampling is based on the location
of the establishment not the residence of the worker. Social security
data covers more than 80 percent of the work force in Germany but
excludes civil servants and self-employed individuals.
1996–2009
(counties)
Data on yearly wages in German counties are provided by the Work-
ing Group Regional Accounts (Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der
Länder, Revision 2005). We restrict the sample to city counties (kre-
isfreie Städte) and discard rural counties that contain more than one
municipality to avoid measurement error.
continued
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Table 1.A.1 continued
Variable Years Source
Population 1970–2017 Data on municipal population are provided by the Federal Statistical
Oce and the Statistical Oces of the federal states combined with
local property tax multipliers.
Employment 1996–2009
(counties)
Data on the average number of employed individuals in a county come
from the ocial employment statistics of the Federal Statistical Oce
and the Statistical Oces of the federal states. We restrict the sample to
city counties (kreisfreie Städte) and discard rural counties that contain
more than one municipality to avoid measurement error.
Plants 1999–2012
(counties)
Yearly data on the number of establishments in a county come from the
Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). We restrict
the sample to city counties (kreisfreie Städte) and discard rural counties
that contain more than one municipality to avoid measurement error.
Land Prices 1995–2013
(counties)
Data on land transaction prices are provided online in the database
Regionalstatistik for all German counties by the Federal Statistical Oce
and the Statistical Oces of the federal states. We restrict the sample to
city counties (kreisfreie Städte) and discard rural counties that contain
more than one municipality to avoid measurement error.
Land Use 2008–2015 Data on land use in German municipalities is provided online in the
database Regionalstatistik by the Federal Statistical Oce and the Statis-
tical Oces of the federal states. We use the area covered by buildings
and the surrounding land assigned to residential or commercial use
(Gebäude- und Freiäche, measured in hectare) as our indicator of land
used for construction.
Spending/Revenues 1998–2008 Data on municipal revenues and municipal spending are provided by
the Federal Statistical Oce and the Statistical Oces of the federal
states. Data for the years 2001–2008 stem from the database Statistik
lokal, data prior to 2001 come from the Statistical Oces of the federal
states.
Local GDP 1992–2009
(counties)
Data on the gross domestic product in a German county is provided by
the Working Group Regional Accounts (Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrech-
nung der Länder, Revision 2005). We restrict the sample to city counties
(kreisfreie Städte) and discard rural counties that contain more than one
municipality to avoid measurement error.
Unemployment 1998–2013 The number of unemployed individuals in a municipality is published by
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Arbeitslose
nach Gemeinden).
Notes: This table summarizes the denition of the used variables and provides details on the data sources.
36
1.A Data Appendix
Table 1.A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Min Max N
Panel A – Price Data Sample
Local Property Tax Rate 1.20 0.22 1.04 1.18 1.33 0.26 2.49 5,593
Number of Tax Changes 1992–2017 5.88 2.49 4.00 6.00 8.00 0.00 15.00 5,593
Change in Property Tax Rate 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.51 0.94 5,531
Log Population 11.06 1.17 10.34 10.98 11.74 6.25 14.41 5,593
Log Houses 9.34 0.93 8.85 9.36 9.85 6.54 12.40 2,840
Log Apartments 10.18 1.12 9.47 10.12 10.87 7.20 13.72 2,840
Log Wage 3.11 0.08 3.05 3.10 3.14 2.93 3.48 840
Log Land Price 5.11 0.70 4.65 5.15 5.60 1.53 7.29 1,296
Log Land Sales 3.62 1.19 2.89 3.74 4.43 0.00 6.93 1,391
Log District Plants 8.36 0.80 7.75 8.26 8.84 6.85 10.85 1,054
Log Employment 9.90 1.28 9.16 9.88 10.71 5.25 13.66 3,969
Log Net Rent 1.73 0.31 1.53 1.74 1.94 0.57 3.77 41,779
Log House Price 12.31 0.50 11.99 12.29 12.61 4.59 14.36 37,072
Log Flat Price 7.30 0.45 7.02 7.35 7.60 4.61 9.39 27,858
Panel B – Full Sample
Local Property Tax Rate 0.98 0.19 0.86 0.96 1.08 0.00 3.06 277,182
Number of Tax Changes 1992–2017 5.03 2.55 3.00 5.00 6.00 0.00 19.00 277,182
Change in Property Tax Rate 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.06 2.04 268,769
Log Population 7.64 1.40 6.75 7.60 8.60 1.10 14.40 277,182
Log Houses 6.32 1.32 5.45 6.31 7.27 0.00 11.37 90,383
Log Apartments 6.70 1.43 5.72 6.66 7.73 0.00 12.64 90,383
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on the variables used. For detailed information on all variables, see Appendix
Table 1.A.1.
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Figure 1.A.1: Alternative Rent and House Price Measures
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Notes: Panel A shows binned scatter plots for alternative rent price indices relative to our baseline IVD data.
Panel B plots binned scatter plots for an alternative house price index, empirica prices are measured per square
meter, IVD prices refer to total prices. Rents and prices measured in EUR. Sources: IVD-Wohn-Preisspiegel 1970–
2013; empirica Preisdatenbank; bulwiengesa AG, RIWIS; RDC of the Federal Statistical Oce and Statistical
Oces of the Länder, Microcensus, 1998–2010, own calculations.
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Figure 1.A.2: Rents and Housing Price Data in West Germany
(a) Average County-Level Rents in 2010 (in EUR) (b) Regional Spread of Price Data Sample
Notes: The left panel of this gure shows average residential rents in 2010 at the county level (measured
in 2010 EUR). The right panel shows the geographical distribution of the base sample for which we have
house price data. Jurisdictional boundaries are as of December 31, 2010. White lines indicate federal state
borders. Sources: RDC of the Federal Statistical Oce and Statistical Oces of the Länder, Microcensus,
2010, own calculations; IVD-Wohn-Preisspiegel 1970–2013. Maps: © GeoBasis-DE / BKG 2015.
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Figure 1.A.3: Share of Population and Municipalities in Price Data Sample (in Percent)
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Notes: Panel A plots the share of the West German population that is included in our price data IVD estimation
sample over time. Panel B shows the share of West German municipalities that is included in the price data
estimation sample over time and by municipality size.
Figure 1.A.4: Number of Municipalities by Size
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Notes: This gure plots the size distribution of all municipalities in West Germany
in light grey and the size distribution of municipalities in our price data estimation
sample in dark grey. Size is measured as log population in 2013. Vertical lines
indicate the population thresholds of 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. For details on
all variables see Appendix Table 1.A.1.
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Figure 1.A.5: Number and Size of Tax Changes
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Notes: Panel A plots the distribution of the number of tax changes in the period 1992–2017 for all West German
municipalities and for the municipalities in our price data sample. Panel B shows the kernel density estimate
of the size distribution of relative tax changes for both groups of municipalities (excluding zeros and truncated
at the bottom and top one percent). For details on all variables see Appendix Table 1.A.1.
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Appendix 1.B Theoretical Model
In this appendix, we provide an extended and more detailed description of our spatial equilibrium
model outlined in Section 1.2. Most importantly, it includes all derivations and intermediate
steps needed to solve the model and analyze the equilibrium properties. The appendix is
self-contained and consequently reiterates and replicates parts of Section 1.2.
We introduce local property taxation into a Rosen-Roback type general equilibrium model of
local labor markets (Moretti, 2011). There are N = 1 workers that locate in one out of C cities.
The model consists of four groups of agents: workers, rms, construction companies and land
owners. We solve for the spatial equilibrium and use comparative statics to show how changes
in the property tax rate aect the equilibrium outcomes, i.e., population size, oor space, land
use, rents, wages and land prices.
1.B.1 Workers
We assume that labor is homogeneous and each worker, i , provides inelastically one unit of
labor. Each worker earns a wage wc and pays rent rHc for residential oor space.23 Each
municipality c has a specic unproductive consumption amenity Ac that is exogenously given.
In addition, there are endogenous local public goods Gc provided by the local government.
Workers maximize utility over oor space hi , a composite good bundle xi of non-housing goods
and locations c . We normalize the aggregate price of the composite good bundle to one. Workers
are mobile across municipalities, but mobility is imperfect due to individual location preferences,
so that local labor supply is not necessarily innitely elastic. In addition to the net house price,
there is a property tax in each city, denoted by tc , with the statutory incidence on the user of
the housing service.24 We assume that households have preferences for public goods measured
by δ ∈ (0, 1).
The household’s maximization problem in a given municipality c is given by:
max
hi ,xi
Uic = AcG
δ
c
(
hαi x
1−α
i
)1−δ
eic s.t. rHc (1 + tc )hi + pxi = wc (1.B.1)
with the bundle xi of non-housing goods Z and the normalized aggregate price index p dened
as in Melitz (2003):
xi =
(∫
z∈Z
x
ρ
iz dz
) 1
ρ
p =
(∫
z∈Z
p
− ρ1−ρ
iz dz
)− 1−ρρ
= 1 (1.B.2)
23 We assume that there is only one homogeneous housing good and do not dierentiate between owner-occupied
and rental housing in our model (Poterba, 1984).
24 For simplicity, we assume that property is taxed ad valorem. Our main theoretical prediction regarding the tax
incidence is however unchanged when modeling the property tax as a specic tax instead (see Appendix 1.B.9).
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and hi ,xiz ,Ac ,Gc , rHc ,wc , tc ,piz , eic > 0 and α , ρ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter ρ relates to the
elasticity of substitution between any two composite goods, which is given by 11−ρ (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977). The Lagrangian reads:
max
hi ,xi
L = lnAc + δ lnGc + α(1 − δ )hi + (1 − α)(1 − δ ) lnxi + ln eic
+ λ
(
wc − rHc [1 + tc ]hi − xi
)
(1.B.3)
and rst-order conditions of the household problem are given by:
∂L
∂hi
=
α(1 − δ )
hi
− λrHc (1 + tc ) != 0
∂L
∂xi
=
(1 − α)(1 − δ )
xi
− λ != 0
∂L
∂λ
= wc − rHc (1 + tc )hi − xi != 0
Now we can solve by substitution. The optimal oor space consumption is then given by:
α(1 − δ )
hi
= λrHc (1 + tc )
=
(1 − α)(1 − δ )
xi
rHc (1 + tc )
hi =
α
1 − α
xi
rHc (1 + tc )
=
α
1 − α
wc − rHc (1 + tc )hi
rHc (1 + tc )
=
α
1 − α
(
wc
rHc (1 + tc )
− hi
)
h∗i = α
wc
rHc (1 + tc )
(1.B.4)
and we can solve for the optimal consumption level of the composite good bundle:
xi = wc − rHc (1 + tc )hi
= wc − rHc (1 + tc )α
wc
rHc (1 + tc )
x∗i = (1 − α)wc (1.B.5)
where α is the share of the household’s budget spent for housing. Household i’s demand of
good variety z is then given by x∗iz = (1−α)wcp
− 11−ρ
iz . Using the optimal consumption quantities,
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log indirect utility is dened as:
V Hic = lnU (h∗i ,x∗i ,Ac ,Gc , eic )
= α(1 − δ ) lnh∗i + (1 − α)(1 − δ ) lnx∗i + lnAc + δ lnGc + ln eic
= α(1 − δ ) ln
(
α
wc
rHc (1 + tc )
)
+ (1 − α)(1 − δ ) ln ([1 − α]wc ) + lnAc + δ lnGc + ln eic
= (1 − δ ) (α lnα + [1 − α] ln[1 − α])︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
=a0
+ lnAc + δ lnGc + ln eic
+ (1 − δ )(α lnwc − α ln rHc − α ln[1 + tc ] + (1 − α) lnwc )
V Hic = a0 + (1 − δ )(lnwc − α ln rHc − α ln[1 + tc ]) + lnAc + δ lnGc︸                                                                   ︷︷                                                                   ︸
=V Hc
+ ln eic .
We dened a constant term a0 = (1−δ )(α lnα + [1−α] ln[1−α]) that is the same for all workers
in the economy to simplify the notation. The individual (indirect) utility is a combination of this
constant a0, a common termV Hc identical to all workers in the municipality and the idiosyncratic
location preferences eic . As in Kline and Moretti (2014), we assume that the logarithm of eic is
independent and identically extreme value type I distributed with scale parameter σH > 0. The
corresponding cumulative distribution function is F (z) = exp (− exp[−z/σH ]) . Due to these city
preferences, workers are not fully mobile between cities and real wages wc
rHc (1+tc ) do not fully
compensate for dierent amenity levelsAc across municipalities (other than in Brueckner, 1981).
The greater σH , the stronger workers’ preference for given locations and the lower workers’
mobility. There is a city-worker match that creates a positive rent for the worker and decreases
mobility. A worker i will prefer municipality a over municipality b if and only if:
V Hia ≥ V Hib
V Ha + ln eia ≥ V Hb + ln eib
V Ha −V Hb ≥ ln eib − ln eia .
Given the distribution of ln eic , it follows that the dierence in preferences between two munici-
palities follows a logistic distribution with scale parameterσH , i.e., ln eib−ln eia ∼ loдistic(0,σH ).
The probability that worker i locates in municipality c when choosing between C cities is then:
Nc = Pr
(
V Hic ≥ V Hij ,∀j , c
)
=
exp
(
V Hc /σH
)∑C
k=1 exp
(
V Hk /σH
) .
This expression is equivalent to the share of workers locating in municipality c given that
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we normalize the total number of workers N to one. Note that the term a0 cancels out as
it is constant across municipalities. Taking logs we arrive at the (log) labor supply curve in
municipality c:
lnN Sc =
V Hc
σH
− ln
(
CpiH
)
︸        ︷︷        ︸
=a1
lnN Sc =
1 − δ
σH︸︷︷︸
=ϵNS
lnwc −α(1 − δ )
σH︸      ︷︷      ︸
=1+ϵHD
ln rHc −
α(1 − δ )
σH︸      ︷︷      ︸
=1+ϵHD
lnτc +
1
σH︸︷︷︸
=ϵA
lnAc +
δ
σH
lnGc + a1 (1.B.6)
where we dene all terms constant across municipalities as a1 = − ln
(
CpiH
)
with piH =
1
C
∑C
k=1 exp
(
V Hk /σH
)
being the average utility across all municipalities and we rewrite the
property tax rate as τc = 1 + tc . Note that C is given and for large C , a change in V Hc does not
aect the average utility piH . The labor supply elasticity is given by:
∂ lnN Sc
∂ lnwc
=
1 − δ
σH
= ϵNS > 0. (1.B.7)
Floor Space Demand. Demand for residential housing in city c is determined by the number
of workers in city c and their individual housing demand as indicated by equation (1.B.4):
Hc = Nch
∗
i = Ncα
wc
rHc (1 + tc )
lnHc = lnNc + lnα + lnwc − ln rHc − lnτc . (1.B.8)
It follows that the intensive margin housing demand elasticity conditional on location choice is
equal to −1. In addition, there is an extensive margin with people leaving the city in response
to higher costs of living. The aggregate residential housing demand elasticity is given by:
∂ lnHc
∂ ln rHc
=
∂ lnNc
∂ ln rHc
− 1 = −α(1 − δ ) + σ
H
σH
= ϵHD < 0.
1.B.2 Firms
Firms j = 1, ..., J are monopolistically competitive and produce tradable consumption goods.
Each rm produces a dierent variety Yjc using labor Njc and commercial oor space Mjc .
Firms have dierent productivity across places, due to exogenous local production amenities
measured by Bc and idiosyncratic productivity shifters ωjc . Firm j’s prots in city c are then
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given by:
ΠFjc = pjcYjc −wcNjc − rMc (1 + tc )κMjc (1.B.9)
Yjc = BcωjcN
β
jcM
1−β
jc
with Yjc ,Njc ,Mjc ,pjc ,wc , rMc > 0. wc and rMc denote the factor prices of labor and commercial
oor space, respectively. The scale parameter κ > 0 allows property taxes on commercial rents
to dier from residential property taxes. Following Melitz (2003), we substitute the nal good
price pjc by the inverse of product j’s aggregate demand function:
Yjc = Q
(
pjc
p
)− 11−ρ
with price index p = 1 as normalized above and Q > 0 as total product demand in the economy.
The parameter ρ relates to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. We dene
the exponent − 11−ρ as the constant product demand elasticity ϵPD < −1. We can rewrite rm j’s
prots as:
ΠFjc = Q
1−ρY−(1−ρ)jc︸         ︷︷         ︸
=pjc
Yjc −wcNjc − rMc (1 + tc )κMjc .
Using the production function for Yjc we can rewrite this expression as:
ΠFjc = Q
1−ρ
(
BcωjcN
β
jcM
1−β
jc
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
=Yjc
ρ −wcNjc − rMc (1 + tc )κMjc (1.B.10)
with Bc ,ωjc > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
Prot maximizing behavior leads to the following rst-order conditions for labor and oor
space:
∂ΠFjc
∂Njc
= ρβQ1−ρBρc ω
ρ
jcN
ρβ−1
jc M
ρ(1−β )
jc −wc
!
= 0
∂ΠFjc
∂Mjc
= ρ(1 − β)Q1−ρBρc ωρjcN ρβjc Mρ(1−β )−1jc − rMc (1 + tc )κ
!
= 0.
Again, we shorten notation by using τc = (1 + tc ). Taking logs of the second condition we
can derive the oor space demand of rms conditional on labor input, factor prices and local
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productivity:
ln
(
rMc τcκ
)
= ln ρ + ln(1 − β) + (1 − ρ) lnQ + ρ lnBc + ρ lnωjc + ρβ lnNjc
− (1 − ρ[1 − β]) lnMjc
lnMjc =
(
ln ρ + ln[1 − β] + [1 − ρ] lnQ + ρ lnBc + ρ lnωjc + ρβ lnNjc
− ln rMc − ln[τcκ]
)/ (
1 − ρ[1 − β]
)
. (1.B.11)
We can derive log labor demand from the rst rst-order condition using the conditional factor
demand for commercial oor space from equation (1.B.11):
lnwc = ln ρ + ln β + (1 − ρ) lnQ + ρ lnBc + ρ lnωjc − (1 − ρβ) lnNjc + ρ(1 − β) lnMjc
lnNc =
(
ln ρ + ln β + [1 − ρ] lnQ + ρ lnBc + ρ lnωjc + ρ(1 − β) lnMjc − lnwc
)/ (
1 − ρβ
)
=
(
ln ρ + ln β + [1 − ρ] lnQ + ρ lnBc + ρ lnωjc
+ ρ[1 − β]
[
ln ρ + ln{1 − β} + {1 − ρ} lnQ + ρ lnBc + ρ lnωjc + ρβ lnNjc
− ln rMc − ln{τcκ}
] / [
1 − ρ{1 − β}
]
− lnwc
)/ (
1 − ρβ
)
lnN ∗jc =
(
ln ρ + [1 − ρ + ρβ] ln β + ρ[1 − β] ln[1 − β] + [1 − ρ] lnQ + ρ lnBc
− [1 − ρ + ρβ] lnwc − ρ[1 − β] ln rMc − ρ[1 − β] ln[τcκ] + ρ lnωjc
)/ (
1 − ρ
)
(1.B.12)
Using equation (1.B.11) from above and rm j’s labor demand in city c we can also solve for the
commercial oor space demand of rm j:
lnM∗jc =
(
ln ρ + ρβ ln β + [1 − ρβ] ln[1 − β] + [1 − ρ] lnQ + ρ lnBc − ρβ lnwc
− [1 − ρβ] ln rMc − [1 − ρβ] ln[τcκ] + ρ lnωjc
)/ (
1 − ρ
)
(1.B.13)
Equations (1.B.12) and (1.B.13) dene the factor input demand conditional on local productiv-
ity and factor prices. We can now substitute the factor demand in the rm prot equation (1.B.10)
and rewrite prots as a function of factor prices:
ΠFjc = Q
1−ρ
(
BcωjcN
β
jcM
1−β
jc
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
=Yjc
ρ −wcNjc − rMc τcκMjc
ΠFjc (N ∗jc ,M∗jc ) = B
ρ
1−ρ
c ω
ρ
1−ρ
jc w
− ρβ1−ρ
c r
M
− ρ (1−β )1−ρ
c (τcκ)−
ρ (1−β )
1−ρ Qρ
ρ
1−ρ β
ρβ
1−ρ (1 − β) ρ (1−β )1−ρ (1 − ρ)
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The term 1−ρ > 0 at the end of the expression indicates that prots are a markup over costs. As
dened before, this term is equivalent to the inverse of the absolute product demand elasticity,
i.e., 1 − ρ = −1/ϵPD. The more elastic product demand (ϵPD ↓), the lower the markup and the
lower rms’ prots in the tradable good sector. Following Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) we
dene the value of rm j in city c in terms of factor costs and local productivity:
V Fjc =
1 − ρ
ρ
lnΠFjc (N ∗jc ,M∗jc ) = b0 + lnBc − β lnwc − (1 − β) ln rMc − (1 − β) ln(τcκ)︸                                                         ︷︷                                                         ︸
=V Fc
+ lnωjc
with constant b0 = 1−ρρ lnQ + ln ρ + β ln β + (1 − β) ln(1 − β) + 1−ρρ ln(1 − ρ). We assume that
idiosyncratic productivity shifters lnωjc are i.i.d. and follow an extreme value type I distribution
with scale parameter σ F . As before in the context of household location choice, we normalize the
total number of rms to F = 1. Using the log-prot equation and the distributional assumption
on lnωjc we denote the share of rms locating in city c by:
Fc = Pr
(
V Fjc ≥ V Fjk ,∀k , c
)
=
exp
(
V Fc /σ F
)∑C
д=1 exp
(
V Fд /σ F
) . (1.B.14)
The number of rms in city c from equation (1.B.14) (extensive margin) and the rm-specic
labor demand from equation (1.B.12) (intensive margin) dene the aggregate log labor demand
in city c:
lnNDc = ln Fc + Eωjc
[
lnN ∗jc
]
=
1
σ F
lnBc − β
σ F
lnwc − 1 − β
σ F
ln rMc −
1 − β
σ F
ln(τcκ) − ln
(
Cpi F
)
+
ρ
1 − ρ lnBc −
1 − ρ + ρβ
1 − ρ lnwc −
ρ(1 − β)
1 − ρ ln r
M
c −
ρ(1 − β)
1 − ρ ln(τcκ)
+
1
1 − ρ ln ρ +
1 − ρ + ρβ
1 − ρ ln β +
ρ(1 − β)
1 − ρ ln(1 − β) + lnQ +
ρ
1 − ρ Eωjc
[
lnωjc
]
lnNDc =
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
=ϵB
lnBc −
(
1 + β
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
=ϵND
lnwc −(1 − β)
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
=1+ϵMD
ln rMc
−(1 − β)
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
=1+ϵMD
ln(τcκ) + b1 (1.B.15)
as a function of local productivity Bc , wages wc and the (gross) factor price costs of commercial
oor space rMc τcκ with constant term b1 =
(
ln ρ + [1 − ρ + ρβ] ln β + ρ[1 − β] ln[1 − β] +
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ρEωjc
[
lnωjc
] )/ (
1 − ρ
)
+ lnQ − lnC − lnpi F , where we dene the average rm value across
locations dened as pi F = 1C
∑C
k=1 exp
(
V Fk /σ F
)
. The labor demand elasticity is dened as:
lnNDc
lnwc
= − β
σ F︸︷︷︸
Ext. margin
−1 − βρ1 − ρ︸       ︷︷       ︸
Int. margin
= ϵND < 0. (1.B.16)
Labor demand increases in local productivity Bc (i.e., ϵB > 0) and decreases in the (gross) factor
price of commercial oor space dened by rMc τcκ (i.e., 1 + ϵMD < 0).
Floor Space Demand. Analogous to labor demand, we can also derive rms’ demand for
commercial oor space using the intensive margin commercial oor space demand from equa-
tion (1.B.13) and the location choice of rms from equation (1.B.14):
lnMDc = ln Fc + Eωjc
[
lnM∗jc
]
=
1
σ F
lnBc − β
σ F
lnwc − 1 − β
σ F
ln rMc −
1 − β
σ F
ln(τcκ) − ln
(
Cpi F
)
+
ρ
1 − ρ lnBc −
ρβ
1 − ρ lnwc −
1 − ρβ
1 − ρ ln r
M
c −
1 − ρβ
1 − ρ ln(τcκ)
+
1
1 − ρ ln ρ +
ρβ
1 − ρ ln β +
1 − ρβ
1 − ρ ln(1 − β) + lnQ +
ρ
1 − ρ Eωjc
[
lnωjc
]
lnMDc =
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
=ϵB
lnBc −β
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
=1+ϵND
lnwc −
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
=ϵMD
ln rMc
−
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
=ϵMD
ln(τcκ) + b2 (1.B.17)
with constantb2 =
(
ln ρ+ρβ ln β+[1−ρβ] ln[1−β]+ρEωjc
[
lnωjc
] )/ (
1−ρ
)
+lnQ−lnC−lnpi F .
The commercial oor space demand elasticity is dened as:
∂ lnMDc
∂ ln rMc
= −1 − β
σ F
− 1 − ρ(1 − β)1 − ρ = ϵ
MD < 0.
1.B.3 Construction Sector
We assume that a competitive, local construction sector provides both types of housing, res-
idential and commercial oor space. Every municipality has positive supply of residential
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housing Hc and commercial oor space Mc . Following Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), we dene the two
types of oor space in terms of total oor space Sc available in city c:
Hc = µSc Mc = (1 − µ)Sc (1.B.18)
with residential share µ ∈ [0, 1]. This share is exogeneously given, and determined by the
additional regulatory costs of commercial land, denoted ϕ ≥ 1. In equlibrium there must be a
no-arbitrage condition between residential and commericial oor space:
rMc = ϕr
H
c (1.B.19)
In line with Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), we assume that the observed oor price in the data is the
maximum of residential and commercial rents, rMc . This implies that (i) observed residential
rents are higher due existing regulatory costs, and (ii) both types of oor space are oered,
0 < µ < 1.
The construction sector relies on a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale
using land ready for construction Lc and capital Kc to produce total oor space Sc = Hc +Mc
(Epple et al., 2010). In contrast to the capital tax literature, we assume global capital markets
with unlimited supply at an exogenous rate (Oates and Fischel, 2016). Consequently, the price
for capital s is given and constant across municipalities. Prots in the construction industry are
given by:
ΠCc = r
M
c L
γ
cK
1−γ
c︸  ︷︷  ︸
=Sc
−lcLc − sKc (1.B.20)
with inputs and factor prices Lc ,Kc , lc , s > 0 and the output elasticity of land dened asγ ∈ (0, 1).
Prot maximizing behavior yields the following rst-order conditions:
∂ΠCc
∂Lc
= γrMc
Sc
Lc
− lc != 0
∂ΠCc
∂Kc
= (1 − γ )rMc
Sc
Kc
− s != 0.
Treating the supply of capital Kc as innitely elastic and the price of capital s as exogenous, we
can solve for land prices lc as a function of the oor space price rMc . Taking logs of the second
rst-order condition we can derive the capital demand of the construction industry conditional
on factor prices and land input:
ln s = ln(1 − γ ) + ln rMc + ln Sc − lnKc
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ln s = ln(1 − γ ) + ln rMc + γ lnLc + (1 − γ ) lnKc − lnKc
lnKc =
1
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + 1
γ
ln rMc + lnLc −
1
γ
ln s .
Using the capital demand and the rst-order condition with respect to land, we can solve for
the price ratio of land to oor space in city c:
ln lc = lnγ + ln rMc + ln Sc − lnLc
= lnγ + ln rMc + γ lnLc + (1 − γ ) lnKc − lnLc
= lnγ + ln rMc − (1 − γ ) lnLc +
1 − γ
γ
(
ln(1 − γ ) + ln rMc + γ lnLc − ln s
)
= lnγ + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ )︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
=c0
−1 − γ
γ
ln s − 1
γ
ln rMc
ln lc = c0 − 1 − γ
γ
ln s + 1
γ
ln rMc (1.B.21)
where we shorten notation by introducing the term c0 that is constant across municipalities.
Land prices increase in the oor space rent rMc (and equivalently in residential rents rHc ).
1.B.4 Land Supply
While the total land area in each municipality is xed and inelastic, the share of land ready for
residential or commercial construction may be elastic. We model the supply of land ready for
construction in city c according to the following log supply function:
lnLc = θ ln lc (1.B.22)
with land supply elasticity ϵLS = θ > 0. The preparation of new area includes, e.g., clearing and
leveling the site, or building road access and connections to the electrical grid.
1.B.5 Local Governments
Local governments use shareψ ∈ (0, 1) of the property tax revenues to nance the local public
good Gc . All remaining revenues are distributed lump-sum to all workers in the economy
irrespective of location (share 1 −ψ ). The government budget is dened as:
Gc = ψ
(
Hcr
H
c tc +Mcr
M
c [{1 + tc }κ − 1]
)
︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
Total tax revenue
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lnGc = lnψ + ln
(
Hcr
H
c tc +Mcr
M
c [{1 + tc }κ − 1]
)
, (1.B.23)
where total tax revenue is the sum of residential property taxes, HcrHc tc , and property taxes on
rented commercial oor space, McrMc . Increases in city c’s property tax rate tc yield higher tax
revenues and thereby an mechanical increase in local spending on the public good.
1.B.6 Equilibrium
The spatial equilibrium is determined by equalizing supply and demand on the markets for labor,
residential housing, commercial oor space and land in each city as well as the government
budget constraint. Hence, we can summarize the equilibrium conditions using the following
twelve equations:
lnNc =
1 − δ
σH
lnwc − α(1 − δ )
σH
ln rHc −
α(1 − δ )
σH
lnτc +
1
σH
lnAc +
δ
σH
lnGc + a1
lnNc =
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
lnBc −
(
1 + β
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
lnwc − (1 − β)
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
ln rMc
− (1 − β)
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
ln(τcκ) + b1
lnHc = lnNc + lnα + lnwc − ln rHc − lnτc
lnHc = ln µ + ln Sc
lnMc =
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
lnBc − β
(
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
)
lnwc −
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
ln rMc
−
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F
+
ρ
1 − ρ
] )
ln(τcκ) + b2
lnMc = ln(1 − µ) + ln Sc
ln Sc = (1 − γ ) lnKc + γ lnLc
lnKc = lnLc +
1
γ
ln rMc +
1
γ
ln(1 − γ ) − 1
γ
ln s
lnLc = θ ln lc
ln lc = c0 − 1 − γ
γ
ln s + 1
γ
ln rMc
ln rMc = lnϕ + ln rHc
lnGc = lnψ + ln
(
Hcr
H
c tc +Mcr
M
c [{1 + tc }κ − 1]
)
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where we again use τc = 1+ tc to simplify the notation in the following. We further simplify the
equations by using the key elasticities we dened above (see also Table 1.B.1 for an overview):
lnNc = ϵNS lnwc + (1 + ϵHD) ln rHc + (1 + ϵHD) lnτc + ϵA lnAc + δϵA lnGc + a1 (1.B.24)
lnNc = ϵB lnBc + ϵND lnwc + (1 + ϵMD) ln rMc + (1 + ϵMD) ln(τcκ) + b1 (1.B.25)
lnHc = lnNc + lnα + lnwc − ln rHc − lnτc (1.B.26)
lnHc = ln µ + ln Sc (1.B.27)
lnMc = ϵB lnBc + (1 + ϵND) lnwc + ϵMD ln rMc + ϵMD ln(τcκ) + b2 (1.B.28)
lnMc = ln(1 − µ) + ln Sc (1.B.29)
ln Sc = (1 − γ ) lnKc + γ lnLc (1.B.30)
lnKc = lnLc +
1
γ
ln rMc +
1
γ
ln(1 − γ ) − 1
γ
ln s (1.B.31)
lnLc = θ ln lc (1.B.32)
ln lc = c0 − 1 − γ
γ
ln s + 1
γ
ln rMc (1.B.33)
ln rMc = lnϕ + ln rHc (1.B.34)
lnGc = lnψ + ln
(
Hcr
H
c tc +Mcr
M
c [{1 + tc }κ − 1]
)
(1.B.35)
We can solve this system of equations for the equilibrium quantities in terms of population,
residential housing, commercial oor space, use of capital, and developed land, equilibrium
prices for labor, residential housing, commercial oor space, and land as well as public good
provision in equilibrium.
Eective Housing Demand. To solve the model, we rst derive the eective residential
housing demand function, taking into account the extensive margin of people moving across
locations. By combining equations (1.B.24) and (1.B.26), we get the following expression:
lnHDc = a1 + lnα + ϵA lnAc + δϵA lnGc + ϵHD ln rHc + ϵHD lnτc +
(
1 + ϵNS
)
lnw .
By clearing the labor market, i.e., equating expressions (1.B.24) and (1.B.25), we can derive
wages as a function of amenities, public goods, and oor space prices:
lnwc =
(
b1 − a1 − ϵA lnAc − δϵA lnGc + ϵB lnBc −
[
1 + ϵHD
]
lnτc +
[
1 + ϵMD
]
ln [τcκ]
− [1 + ϵHD] ln rHc + [1 + ϵMD] ln rMc )/ (ϵNS − ϵND) . (1.B.36)
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Table 1.B.1: Key Elasticities of the Spatial Equilibrium Model
Key Elasticity Denition
Panel A – Labor Market
Labor Supply
Wages ϵNS = ∂ lnNc∂ lnwc =
1−δ
σH
Exogenous Amenities ϵA = ∂ lnNc∂ lnAc =
1
σH
Local Public Goods δϵA = ∂ lnNc∂ lnGc =
δ
σH
Labor Demand
Wages ϵND = ∂ lnNc∂ lnwc = −
(
1 + β
[
1
σ F +
ρ
1−ρ
] )
Productive Amenities ϵB = ∂ lnNc∂ ln Bc =
1
σ F +
ρ
1−ρ
Panel B – Construction Sector and Land Market
Residential Housing Demand w.r.t. Rents ϵHD = ∂ lnHc
∂ ln rHc
= −α (1−δ )+σHσH
Commercial Floor Space Demand w.r.t. Rents ϵMD = ∂ lnMc
∂ ln rMc
= −
(
1 + [1 − β]
[
1
σ F +
ρ
1−ρ
] )
Panel C – Land Market
Land Supply w.r.t. Land Prices ∂ ln Lc
∂ ln lc = θ
Notes: This table summarizes the key supply and demand elasticities of the spatial equilibrium model.
As the partial derivative of log wages with respect to residential housing costs is posi-
tive (− [1 + ϵHD] /[ϵNS − ϵND] > 0), wages (partly) compensate for higher rents and/or higher
residential property taxes ceteris paribus. Using this intermediate wage equation, we can rewrite
residential housing demand as a function of housing costs, exogenous amenities, and local
public goods:
lnHDc =
( [
1 + ϵNS
]
b1 −
[
1 + ϵND
]
a1 − ϵA
[
1 + ϵND
] [lnAc + δ lnGc ] + ϵB [1 + ϵNS] lnBc
− [1 + ϵNS + ϵHD {1 + ϵND}] ln rHc − [1 + ϵNS + ϵHD {1 + ϵND}] lnτc
+
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
ln rMc +
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
ln[τcκ]
)/ (
ϵNS − ϵND
)
+ lnα
and use the no-arbitrage condition in equation (1.B.34) to rewrite residential housing demand
in terms of residential rents:
lnHDc =
( [
1 + ϵNS
]
b1 −
[
1 + ϵND
]
a1 +
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
lnϕ + ϵB
[
1 + ϵNS
]
lnBc
− ϵA [1 + ϵND] [ lnAc + δ lnGc ] − [ϵHD {1 + ϵND} − ϵMD {1 + ϵNS}] ln rHc
− [1 + ϵNS + ϵHD {1 + ϵND}] lnτc
+
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
ln[τcκ]
)/ (
ϵNS − ϵND
)
+ lnα .
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Residential housing demand is now a function of exogenous parameters and two endogenous
measures, residential rents rHc and public good levels Gc .
Denition 1.B.1 (Eective Housing Demand). The eective residential housing demand elastic-
ity ϵ˜HD captures the response of residential housing demand to changes in residential rents holding
public good levels constant but taking into account equilibrium eects on the labor market and the
commercial oor space market. We dene the eective residential housing demand elasticity as:
ϵ˜HD = −ϵ
HD[1 + ϵND] − ϵMD[1 + ϵNS]
ϵNS − ϵND < 0.
Given that ϵHD < 0, ϵMD < 0, ϵND < 0, and ϵNS > 0, it follows that ϵHD < 0.
We can rewrite residential housing demand accordingly using this denition:
lnHDc =
( [
1 + ϵNS
]
b1 −
[
1 + ϵND
]
a1 +
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
lnϕ + ϵB
[
1 + ϵNS
]
lnBc
− ϵA [1 + ϵND] [lnAc + δ lnGc ] + [1 + ϵMD] [1 + ϵNS] lnκ)/ (ϵNS − ϵND)
+ lnα + ϵ˜HD ln rHc + ϵ˜HD lnτc . (1.B.37)
Eective Housing Supply. To clear the residential housing market, demand needs to equal
oor space supply, which we can rewrite as a function of capital costs and residential rents by
combining equation (1.B.27) and equations (1.B.30)–(1.B.34):
lnHSc = ln Sc + ln µ
= (1 − γ ) lnKc + γ lnLc︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
=ln Sc
+ ln µ
= (1 − γ ) lnLc + 1 − γ
γ
ln rMc +
1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) − 1 − γ
γ
ln s︸                                                                      ︷︷                                                                      ︸
=(1−γ ) lnKc
+γ lnLc + ln µ
= θ ln lc︸︷︷︸
=ln Lc
+
1 − γ
γ
ln rMc +
1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) − 1 − γ
γ
ln s + ln µ
=
θ
γ
ln rMc −
θ (1 − γ )
γ
ln s + θc0︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
=θ ln lc
+
1 − γ
γ
ln rMc +
1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) − 1 − γ
γ
ln s + ln µ
=
1 − γ + θ
γ
ln rMc −
(1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + ln µ
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lnHSc =
1 − γ + θ
γ
(
ln rHc + lnϕ
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
=ln rMc
−(1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + ln µ .
Using these intermediate steps, we can also derive the eective housing supply elasticity.
Denition 1.B.2 (Eective Housing Supply). The eective residential housing supply elastic-
ity ϵ˜HS captures the response of residential housing supply to changes in residential rents taking
into account both the factor substitution in the construction industry and the elasticity of land
supply. We dene the eective residential housing supply elasticity as:
ϵ˜HS =
1 − γ + θ
γ
> 0.
Given that γ ∈ (0, 1) and θ > 0 it follows that ϵ˜HS > 0.
By rewriting residential housing supply, we get:
lnHSc = ϵ˜HS ln rHc + ϵ˜HS lnϕ −
(1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + ln µ . (1.B.38)
Rents. Using equations (1.B.37) and (1.B.38) we can clear the residential housing market and
solve for equilibrium rents for residential oor space in city c as a function of equilibrium public
good provision G∗c and exogenous parameters:
ln rH∗c =
( [
lnα − ln µ − θc0 − 1 − γ
γ
ln{1 − γ } + {1 + θ }{1 − γ }
γ
ln s
] [
ϵNS − ϵND
]
+
[
1 + ϵNS
]
b1 −
[
1 + ϵND
]
a1 +
[{
1 + ϵMD
} {
1 + ϵNS
} − ϵ˜HS {ϵNS − ϵND}] lnϕ
− ϵA [1 + ϵND] [lnAc + δ lnG∗c ] + ϵB [1 + ϵNS] lnBc + ϵ˜HD [ϵNS − ϵND] lnτc
+
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
lnκ
)/ ( [
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD] [ϵNS − ϵND] )
ln rH∗c =
ϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc −
δϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc +
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + drHd0 (1.B.39)
with
d0 = ϵ˜
HS − ϵ˜HD > 0 (1.B.40)
drH = lnα − ln µ − θc0 −
1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + (1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 + ϵ
NS
ϵNS − ϵNDb1
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− 1 + ϵ
ND
ϵNS − ϵNDa1 +
( [
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
ϵNS − ϵND − ϵ˜
HS
)
lnϕ .
Using the no-arbitrage condition in equation (1.B.34) we can solve for the equilibrium price of
commercial oor space, again as a function of equilibrium local public goods:
ln rM∗c =
ϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc −
δϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc +
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + drMd0 (1.B.41)
with
drM = lnα − ln µ − θc0 −
1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + (1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 + ϵ
NS
ϵNS − ϵNDb1
− 1 + ϵ
ND
ϵNS − ϵNDa1 +
( [
1 + ϵNS
] [
1 + ϵMD
]
ϵNS − ϵND − ϵ˜
HD
)
lnϕ .
Wages. Having solved for the price of residential and commercial oor space, we can derive
equilibrium wages in city c by exploiting the intermediate wage equation (1.B.36):
lnw∗c = −
ϵ˜HS
(
ϵHD − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnτc − δϵA
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵHD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc +
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
ϵ˜HS − ϵHD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + dwd0 (1.B.42)
with
dw =
(
θc0 − lnα + 1 − γ
γ
ln[1 − γ ] + ln µ − [1 − γ ][1 + θ ]
γ
ln s
)
ϵHD − ϵMD
ϵNS − ϵND
+
ϵ˜HS
(
1 + ϵHD
) − ϵHD (1 + ϵMD)
ϵNS − ϵND lnϕ −
ϵ˜HS − ϵMD
ϵNS − ϵND a1 +
ϵ˜HS − ϵHD
ϵNS − ϵNDb1.
Land Prices. The construction problem yields the relation between commercial oor space
prices and land prices in equation (1.B.33). Solving for land prices yields:
ln l∗c =
ϵ˜HD
γd0
lnτc −
δϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc +
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + dlγd0 (1.B.43)
with
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dl = lnα − ln µ − 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) − 1 + ϵ
ND
ϵNS − ϵNDa1 +
1 + ϵNS
ϵNS − ϵNDb1 + (γd0 − θ ) c0
+
(1 − γ )(1 + θ − γd0)
γ
ln s +
1 + ϵNS + ϵHD
(
1 + ϵND
)
ϵNS − ϵND lnϕ .
Developed Land. Using equilibrium land prices and the land supply function allows to solve
for equilibrium land use in city c:
lnL∗c =
ϵ˜HDθ
γd0
lnτc −
δθϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − θϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
θϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + θ
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + θdlγd0 . (1.B.44)
Capital Stock. Equilibrium land use and equilibrium oor space prices also determine the
equilibrium capital stock in equation (1.B.31):
lnK∗c =
ϵ˜HD(1 + θ )
γd0
lnτc −
δϵA(1 + θ ) (1 + ϵND)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA(1 + θ )
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB (1 + θ ) (1 + ϵNS)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + (1 + θ )
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + dKγd0 (1.B.45)
with
dK = (1 + θ )
(
[lnα − ln µ] [ϵNS − ϵND] − [1 + ϵND] a1 + [1 + ϵNS] b1)
− θ (1 + θγd0) c0 − (1 − γ )(1 + θ ) − γd0
γ
ln(1 − γ )
+
(1 − γ )(1 + θ )2 − γ (1 + θ [1 − γ ])d0
γ
ln s
+
(1 + θ ) (1 + ϵNS + ϵHD [1 + ϵND] )
ϵNS − ϵND lnϕ .
Floor Space. Land use and the capital stock in equilibrium also determine total oor space
production. Using the production function of the construction sector we can solve for the
equilibrium oor space quantity in city c:
ln S∗c =
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc − ϵ˜
HSδϵA(1 + ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵ˜HSϵA(1 + ϵND)d0 (ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵ˜HSϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + ϵ˜HS
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + dSγd0 (1.B.46)
with
58
1.B Theoretical Model
dS =
1 − γ + θ
ϵNS − ϵND
(
[lnα − ln µ] [ϵNS − ϵND] − [1 + ϵND] a1 + [1 + ϵNS] b1
+
[
1 + ϵNS + ϵHD
{
1 + ϵND
}]
lnϕ
)
+ (1 − γ + θ − γd0)
( [1 − γ ][1 + θ ]
γ
ln s − θc0 − 1 − γ
γ
ln[1 − γ ]
)
.
Using the residential share µ of total oor space we can solve for residential housing in equilib-
rium:
lnH ∗c =
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc − ϵ˜
HSδϵA(1 + ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵ˜HSϵA(1 + ϵND)d0 (ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵ˜HSϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + ϵ˜HS
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + dHγd0 (1.B.47)
with
dH = dS + γd0 ln µ .
Similarly we can solve for equilibrium commercial oor space production:
lnM∗c =
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc − ϵ˜
HSδϵA(1 + ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵ˜HSϵA(1 + ϵND)d0 (ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵ˜HSϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + ϵ˜HS
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnκ + dMγd0 (1.B.48)
with
dM = dS + γd0 ln(1 − µ).
Population. By exploiting the labor supply to city c as a function of rents and wages, we can
also solve for equilibrium population:
lnN ∗c = −
ϵ˜HS
(
ϵND
[
1 + ϵHD
] − ϵNS [1 + ϵMD] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnτc − δϵA (1 + ϵMD + ϵND [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnG∗c
− ϵ
A (1 + ϵMD + ϵND [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnAc + ϵB (1 + ϵHD + ϵNS [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnBc
+
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵHD + ϵNS
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnκ + dN
d0
(1.B.49)
with
dN = −
1 + ϵMD + ϵND
(
1 + ϵ˜HS
)
ϵNS − ϵND a1 +
1 + ϵHD + ϵNS
(
1 + ϵ˜HS
)
ϵNS − ϵND b1
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+
(
ln µ − lnα + θc0 + 1 − γ
γ
ln[1 − γ ] − [1 − γ ][1 + θ ]
γ
ln s
)
×
(
ϵND
[
1 + ϵHD
] − ϵNS [1 + ϵMD]
ϵNS − ϵND
)
+
ϵ˜HSϵND
(
1 + ϵHD
)
+
(
1 + ϵMD
) (
1 + ϵHD + ϵNS
)
ϵNS − ϵND lnϕ .
Public Good Provision. So far, we solved the equilibrium conditional on equilibrium public
good levels G∗c in order to dierentiate between the direct eects of taxes on equilibrium
outcomes and the indirect eects operating through increases in local public goods nanced via
property taxes.
We can now also derive for equilibrium public good provision G∗c . To simplify exposition
and keep the model analytically tractable, we assume that rents for residential housing equal
the prices for commercial oor space (ϕ = 1), which implies that both types of land use are
subject to the same regulations (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015). Moreover, we assume that residential and
commercial oor space are taxed at the same rate, i.e., κ = 1.
Using the no-arbitrage condition from equation (1.B.34), the supply functions for residential
and commercial oor space from equations (1.B.27) and (1.B.29), eective housing supply from
equation (1.B.38), and equilibrium rents for residential housing in equation (1.B.51), we can
solve for equilibrium public good provision:
lnGc = lnψ + ln
©­­­­­­­«
Hcr
H
c tc +Mcr
M
c
{1 + tc }
=1︷︸︸︷
κ −1
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
=tc
ª®®®®®®®¬
= lnψ + ln
©­­­­«
Hcr
H
c tc +Mc
=1︷︸︸︷
ϕ rHc︸    ︷︷    ︸
=rMc
tc
ª®®®®¬
= lnψ + ln
(
µScr
H
c tc + (1 − µ)ScrHc tc
)
= lnψ + ln Sc + ln rHc + ln tc
= lnψ + lnHc − ln µ︸        ︷︷        ︸
=ln Sc
+ ln rHc + ln tc
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= ϵ˜HS ln rHc + ϵ˜HS lnϕ −
(1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + ln µ︸                                                                                         ︷︷                                                                                         ︸
=lnHc
+ lnψ − ln µ + ln rHc + ln tc
=
(
1 + ϵ˜HS
)
ln rHc + ln tc + ϵ˜HS lnϕ︸  ︷︷  ︸
=0
−(1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + lnψ
=
(
1 + ϵ˜HS
) ( ϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc −
δϵA
[
1 + ϵND
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnGc − ϵA
[
1 + ϵND
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnAc
+
ϵB
[
1 + ϵNS
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnBc +
[
1 + ϵMD
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnκ︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
=0
+
drH
d0
ª®®®®®¬
+ ln tc − (1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + lnψ
lnG∗c =
(
ϵ˜HD
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
]
d0
lnτc + ln tc −
ϵA
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
] [
1 + ϵND
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnAc + dHr
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
]
d0
+ dG
+
ϵB
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnBc
)/(
δϵA
[
1 + ϵND
] [
1 + ϵ˜HS
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] + 1
)
(1.B.50)
with
dG = −(1 + θ )(1 − γ )
γ
ln s + 1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + θc0 + lnψ .
Summary. Hence, we arrive at the following spatial equilibrium prices and quantities for city c
(conditional on equilibrium public good levels G∗c and assuming equal tax rates on residential
and commercial oor space, i.e., κ = 1):
ln rH∗c =
ϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc −
δϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + drHd0
ln rM∗c =
ϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc −
δϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + drMd0
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ln l∗c =
ϵ˜HD
γd0
lnτc −
δϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + dlγd0
lnw∗c = −
ϵ˜HS
(
ϵHD − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnτc − δϵA
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵHD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + dwd0
ln S∗c =
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc − ϵ˜
HSδϵA(1 + ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵ˜HSϵA(1 + ϵND)d0 (ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵ˜HSϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + dSγd0
lnH ∗c =
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc − ϵ˜
HSδϵA(1 + ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵ˜HSϵA(1 + ϵND)d0 (ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵ˜HSϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + dHγd0
lnM∗c =
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
d0
lnτc − ϵ˜
HSδϵA(1 + ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵ˜HSϵA(1 + ϵND)d0 (ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵ˜HSϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + dMγd0
lnL∗c =
ϵ˜HDθ
γd0
lnτc −
δθϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − θϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
θϵB
(
1 + ϵNS
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + θdlγd0
lnN ∗c = −
ϵ˜HS
(
ϵND
[
1 + ϵHD
] − ϵNS [1 + ϵMD] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnτc − δϵA (1 + ϵMD + ϵND [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnG∗c
− ϵ
A (1 + ϵMD + ϵND [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnAc + ϵB (1 + ϵHD + ϵNS [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
) lnBc + dN
d0
lnK∗c =
ϵ˜HD(1 + θ )
γd0
lnτc −
δϵA(1 + θ ) (1 + ϵND)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c − ϵA(1 + θ )
(
1 + ϵND
)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc
+
ϵB (1 + θ ) (1 + ϵNS)
γd0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc + dKγd0
lnG∗c =
(
ϵ˜HD
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
]
d0
lnτc + ln tc −
ϵA
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
] [
1 + ϵND
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnAc + dHr
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
]
d0
+ dG
+
ϵB
[
1 + ϵ˜HS
] [
1 + ϵNS
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] lnBc
)/(
δϵA
[
1 + ϵND
] [
1 + ϵ˜HS
]
d0
[
ϵNS − ϵND] + 1
)
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with d0, drH , drM , dl , dw , dS , dH , dM , dN , and dG being constant terms. From here, we can also
derive the log real wage in city c using the equilibrium wage w∗c and the equilibrium rent for
residential housing rH∗c (again conditional on equilibrium public good levels and assumingκ = 1):
ln
w∗c
rH∗c τc
= − ϵ˜
HS (ϵHD − ϵMD + ϵNS − ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnτc − δϵA
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵMD − ϵND − 1)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnG∗c
− ϵ
A (ϵ˜HS − ϵMD − ϵND − 1)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnAc + ϵB
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵHD − ϵNS − 1)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND) lnBc
(1.B.51)
1.B.7 Comparative Statics
Using the equilibrium outcomes derive above we can take a closer look at the comparative
statics in the model. First we analyze the eects of tax increases on equilibrium prices and
quantities. In a second step, we derive comparative statics with respect to the dierent amenities
in the model.
Comparative Statics of Property Tax Increases. In the following, we derive how equi-
librium outcomes respond to changes in property taxes. We derive the following theoretical
predictions:
Lemma 1.B.1 (Public Goods). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium public
good provision in city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct, positive eect through higher revenues
from taxing the existing housing stock at current prices, and (ii) an indirect, countervailing eect
reecting that higher taxes decrease prices and quantities traded on both oor space markets and
thus the tax base.
The higher the property tax rate tc , the more important the second, indirect channel distorting
the tax base relative to the direct revenue eect. The total eect of tax increases on public good
spending will be positive as long as the tax rate is suciently small:
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
> 0 ⇔ tc < − ϵ˜
HS − ϵ˜HD
ϵ˜HS
(
1 + ϵ˜HD
) .
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium public good levels is given by:
d lnG∗c
(
tc , r
H∗
c
[
τc ,G
∗
c {τc }
] )
d lnτc
=
∂ lnG∗c
∂ ln tc︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0
∂ ln tc
∂ lnτc︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂ lnG∗c
∂ ln rH∗c︸   ︷︷   ︸
>0
©­­­­­«
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnτc︸   ︷︷   ︸
<0
+
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnG∗c︸   ︷︷   ︸
<0
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
ª®®®®®¬
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d lnG∗c
d lnτc
=
(1 + tc ) /tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1
+
ϵ˜HD
(
1 + ϵ˜HS
) / (
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD)
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1
where the rst fraction reects the direct eect, the second fraction reects the impact of
property taxes on the housing market volume. While the numerator is positive for the direct
and negative the indirect eect, respectively, the sign of the denominator and thus the sign of
the total derivate depends on the model parameters. 
Lemma 1.B.2 (Rents). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium net rents for
residential and commercial oor space in city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct, negative eect
that is compensating for higher costs of living due to the tax increase, and (ii) an indirect eect
operating through higher local public good provision that is theoretically undetermined. The
indirect eect depends on the capitalization of public goods in rental prices and the degree to which
tax increases raise the public good provision. It will be positive as long as public good spending
increases in the tax rate.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium rents is given by:
d ln rH∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
d ln rM∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ ln rH∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
=
ϵ˜HD
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD︸      ︷︷      ︸
<0
− δϵ
A (1 + ϵND)(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD) (ϵNS − ϵND)︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
>0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct, negative eect, the second fraction reects the
capitalization of public goods into rents, and the third fraction denotes the translation of
property taxes into public good spending, which is theoretically undetermined. 
The statutory incidence of property taxes in our model is on the user of the housing services.
Workers and rms thus have to nance the additional burden of higher property taxes. However,
we assume that both groups of agents are at least somewhat mobile across jurisdictions and
housing demand is thus at least somewhat elastic. As a result, renters are able to shift part of
the additional tax burden onto landlords, which leads to a decrease in net rents for residential
and commercial oor space when holding public good levels constant, i.e., a direct, negative
eect. At the same time, tax increases impact the provision of local public goods in equilibrium.
64
1.B Theoretical Model
Higher property taxes will increase tax revenues holding prices and quantities on the housing
market xed and thus increase the spending on public goods. Capitalization of public goods
would thus reduce the downward pressure on net rents. However, there is a countervailing
eect of property taxes on housing prices and quantities, which potentially lowers tax revenues
and thereby public good spending. As discussed in Lemma 1.B.1, the combined eect of is
theoretically undetermined, as is thus the indirect eect of property taxes on housing costs.
Lemma 1.B.3 (Wages). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium wages in city c
can be decomposed in (i) a direct eect that is potentially compensating for higher costs of living due
to the tax increase, and (ii) an indirect eect operating through higher local public good provision
that is theoretically undetermined. The direct eect depends on the relative strength of residential
and commercial housing demand, i.e., the relative mobility of workers and rms to avoid higher
taxes. The indirect eect depends on the capitalization of public goods in wages and the degree
to which tax increases raise the public good provision. Both the direct and the indirect eect are
theoretically undetermined.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium wages is given by:
d lnw∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnw∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ lnw∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
= − ϵ˜
HS (ϵHD − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND)︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
Q0
−δϵ
A (ϵ˜HS − ϵMD)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND)︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
<0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct eect, the second fraction reects the capitalization of
public goods into wages, and the third fraction denotes the translation of property taxes into
public good spending. 
Tax increases trigger two opposing eects for prot maximizing rms in the city. On the one
hand, higher property tax payments raise the factor price of commercial oor space and rms
thus try to re-optimize by using less oor space relative to labor. On the other hand, property
taxes make it more costly for workers to live in city c and residents demand higher wages to
compensate for increased costs of living. Without compensating wage increases, inframarginal
workers will move to other places. The sign and the magnitude of the two direct eects of tax
increases on wages are determined by the relative strength of the residential and the commercial
oor space demand elasticity, ϵHD and ϵMD , respectively. The indirect eect again operates
through the capitalization of public goods into wages and depends on the extent to which tax
increases yield additional public good spending at the local level.
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Lemma 1.B.4 (Real Wages). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium real wages
in city c , i.e., the wage adjusted for local costs of living, can be decomposed in (i) a direct, negative
eect that reects higher costs of living due to the tax increase even after accounting for potentially
compensating rent decreases, and (ii) an indirect eect operating through higher local public good
provision that is theoretically undetermined. The indirect eect depends on the capitalization
of public goods in wages and rents, and the degree to which tax increases raise the public good
provision, which is theoretically undetermined.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium real wages is given by:
d
w∗c
rH ∗c τc
d lnτc
=
∂ lnw∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ lnw∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
= − ϵ˜
HS (ϵHD − ϵMD + ϵNS − ϵND)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND)︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
<0
−δϵ
A (ϵ˜HS − ϵMD − ϵND − 1)
d0
(
ϵNS − ϵND)︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
<0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct eect, the second fraction reects the capitalization of
public goods into wages and rents, and the third fraction denotes the translation of property
taxes into public good spending. 
As seen before, net rents for residential housing may decrease in reaction to higher taxes
thereby partly compensating for tax increases. The additional property tax burden would thus
be shared between renters and landlords. Similarly, rms may compensate for higher costs of
living in the municipality by paying higher wages. However, even taking together lower net
rents and potentially higher wages does not fully balance the additional property tax burden.
Real incomes in the jurisdiction thus decrease in response to tax increases (direct eect). For
the case of real wages, the indirect eect operating through higher public good provision does
not alleviate the direct eect, but yields additional downward pressure on real wages as long
as the eect of property taxes on public good spending is positive. This mirrors the fact that
workers compensation for higher costs of living may come through local public goods instead
of higher real wages.
Lemma 1.B.5 (Population). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium population
levels in city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct, negative eect that is due to lower real wages,
and (ii) an indirect eect operating through higher local public good provision that is theoretically
undetermined. The indirect eect depends on workers’ (positive) valuation of public goods when
choosing locations and the degree to which tax increases raise the public good provision. This
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indirect eect will be positive as long as public good spending increases in the tax rate.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium population levels is given by:
d lnN ∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnN ∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ lnN ∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
= − ϵ˜
HS (ϵND [1 + ϵHD] − ϵNS [1 + ϵMD] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
)︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
<0
−δϵ
A (1 + ϵMD + ϵND [1 + ϵ˜HS] )
d0
(
ϵNS + ϵND
)︸                                     ︷︷                                     ︸
>0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct, negative eect, the second fraction reects workers’
valuation of public goods when choosing their location, and the third fraction denotes the
translation of property taxes into public good spending, which is theoretically undetermined. 
When property taxes in city c increase, it becomes more expensive to live there – even after
considering compensating eects though lower net rents and potentially higher wages. With
constant local public goods and lower real incomes after the tax reform, the city becomes less
attractive to live in (direct eect). As we assume that workers are at least somewhat mobile
across jurisdictions, inframarginal workers will leave the municipality after the tax increase.
The indirect eect through increases in local public goods works in the opposite direction and
thus reduces the outow of workers as long as public good levels increase in the tax rate.
Lemma 1.B.6 (Housing Stock). The total eect of property tax increases on the residential,
commercial and total housing stock in equilibrium in city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct,
negative eect that reects lower rents and lower demand due to the tax increase, and (ii) an indirect
eect operating through higher local public good provision that is theoretically undetermined. The
indirect eect depends on the impact of public good supply on the local housing stock (positive)
and the degree to which tax increases raise the public good provision. It will be positive as long as
public good spending increases in the tax rate.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on the equilibrium housing stock is given by:
d lnH ∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
d lnM∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
d ln S∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnH ∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ lnH ∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
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=
ϵ˜HSϵ˜HD
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD︸      ︷︷      ︸
<0
− ϵ˜
HSδϵA
(
1 + ϵND
)(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD) (ϵNS − ϵND)︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
>0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct, negative eect, the second fraction reects the impact
of public goods on the housing stock, and the third fraction denotes the translation of property
taxes into public good spending, which is theoretically undetermined. 
With constant public goods and lower real wages, the jurisdiction becomes less attractive to
live in. Population levels decline in response to property tax increase. If less people are willing
to locate in city c , the demand for residential housing declines. The same mechanism works
for rms’ location choice and their demand for commercial oor space. Eventually, both the
residential housing stock and the amount of commercial oor space will be lower compared to
the pre-reform equilibrium. This direct eect is in line with the prediction of the new view on
the property tax. When accounting for endogenous local public goods, this prediction becomes
less clear-cut due to the indirect eect. As long as public good spending increases in the tax
rate, the public good provision alleviates the negative eect on the housing stock as higher
public good levels increase the demand for city c despite the real wage loss.
Lemma 1.B.7 (Land Use). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium land use in
city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct, negative eect that reects lower activity in the construction
sector due to the tax increase, and (ii) an indirect eect operating through higher local public good
provision that is theoretically undetermined. The indirect eect depends on the impact of public
goods on land use and the degree to which tax increases raise the public good provision. It will be
positive as long as public good spending increases in the tax rate.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium land use is given by:
d lnL∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnL∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ lnL∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
=
ϵ˜HDθ
γ
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD)︸            ︷︷            ︸
<0
− θδϵ
A (1 + ϵND)
γ
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD) (ϵNS − ϵND)︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
>0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct, negative eect, the second fraction reects the impact
of public goods on land use, and the third fraction denotes the translation of property taxes
into public good spending, which is theoretically undetermined. 
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With decreasing housing demand and lower levels of oor space production after the tax
reform, the demand of the construction sector for land ready for construction decreases as well.
This reects the direct eect. As before, the indirect eect works in the opposite direction as
long as public good spending increases in the tax rate.
Lemma 1.B.8 (Land Prices). The total eect of property tax increases on equilibrium land prices in
city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct, negative eect that reects lower construction activity and
lower land use in the construction sector due to the tax increase, and (ii) an indirect eect operating
through higher local public good provision that is theoretically undetermined. The indirect eect
depends on the impact of public goods on land prices and the degree to which tax increases raise the
public good provision. It will be positive as long as public good spending increases in the tax rate.
Proof. The eect of property tax increases on equilibrium land prices is given by:
d ln l∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ ln l∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ ln l∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
=
ϵ˜HD
γ
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD)︸            ︷︷            ︸
<0
− δϵ
A (1 + ϵND)
γ
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD) (ϵNS − ϵND)︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
>0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct, negative eect, the second fraction reects the impact
of public goods on land prices, and the third fraction denotes the translation of property taxes
into public good spending, which is theoretically undetermined. 
If population levels, oor space demand and the housing stock decrease, less land is needed
for construction. As a result, land prices decrease as well to balance supply and demand, and
to reach a new equilibrium on the market for land ready for development. This direct eect is
again potentially diminished by an indirect eect operating through increases in local public
goods.
Lemma 1.B.9 (Capital Stock). The total eect of property tax increases on the equilibrium capital
stock in city c can be decomposed in (i) a direct, negative eect that reects lower construction
activity due to the tax increase, and (ii) an indirect eect operating through higher local public good
provision that is theoretically undetermined. The indirect eect depends on the impact of public
goods on the capital stock and the degree to which tax increases raise the public good provision. It
will be positive as long as public good spending increases in the tax rate.
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Proof. The eect of property tax increases on the equilibrium capital stock is given by:
d lnK∗c
(
τc ,G
∗
c [τc ]
)
d lnτc
=
∂ lnK∗c
∂ lnτc
+
∂ lnK∗c
∂ lnG∗c
d lnG∗c
d lnτc
=
ϵ˜HD(1 + θ )
γ
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD)︸            ︷︷            ︸
<0
− δϵ
A (1 + ϵND) (1 + θ )
γ
(
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD) (ϵNS − ϵND)︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
>0
ϵ˜HD(1+ϵ˜HS)
ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD +
1+tc
tc
δϵA(1+ϵND)(1+ϵ˜HS)
(ϵ˜HS−ϵ˜HD)(ϵNS−ϵND) + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
Q0
,
where the rst fraction reects the direct, negative eect, the second fraction reects the impact
of public goods on the equilibrium capital stock, and the third fraction denotes the translation
of property taxes into public good spending, which is theoretically undetermined. 
Lower population levels, lower housing demand and a smaller housing stock reduce the need
for additional construction. Analogous to the demand for developed land, the capital demand
of the construction sector declines as well. Again, this is in line with the capital tax view and
reects the direct eect holding public good provision constant. The indirect eect operates
through the impact of public goods on the capital stock and will alleviate the direct negative
eect as long as tax increases yield additional tax revenues that is spend on public goods.
1.B.8 Welfare Analysis
We assume a utilitarian welfare function that aggregates the utility of all agents in the economy:
W =W H +W F + W C︸︷︷︸
=0
+W L .
We measure worker welfare,W H , by workers’ utility and the welfare of rms owners,W F , by
the rm values dened above. The welfare of construction rm owners,W C , and landlords’
welfare,W L , are measured by their prots. The construction sector is assumed to operate under
perfect competition and makes zero prots, thus, welfare of construction rms is zero. We
assume that the economy is large and a change in city c’s property tax rate does not aect the
utility of workers, rms or landlords in other locations. Following Kline and Moretti (2014) we
dene workers welfare as the inclusive value given by:
W H = σH ln
(
C∑
c=1
exp
[
V Hc
σH
])
.
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To rst order, an increase in city c’s property tax aects workers’ welfare via the incidence of
property taxes on gross rents (1+tc )rH∗c = τcrH∗c , its eect on wagesw∗c , and via the transmission
into local public goods G∗c :
dW H
d lnτc
=
σH∑C
k=1 exp
(
V Hk /σH
) C∑
k=1
d exp
(
V Hk /σH
)
d lnτc
=
σH∑C
k=1 exp
(
V Hk /σH
) C∑
k=1
exp
(
V Hk
σH
)
1
σH
dV Hk
d lnτc
=
C∑
k=1
exp
(
V Hk /σH
)
∑C
m=1 exp
(
V Hm /σH
) dV Hk
d lnτc
=
C∑
k=1
Nk
dV Hk
d lnτc
dW H
d lnτc
= Nc
dV Hc
d lnτc
= −Nc
(
[1 − δ ]
[
α + α
d ln rH∗c
d lnτc
− d lnw
∗
c
d lnτc
]
− δ d lnG
∗
c
d lnτc
)
.
The sign and the magnitude of this welfare eect for residents in city c depends (i) on the extent
to which wages and net rents compensate for the real wage loss due to higher tax payments,
and (ii) on the responsiveness of equilibrium public good spending to changes in the tax rate.
The lower preferences for public goods, δ , the more important the former eect, the higher
public good preferences, the more important the latter eect.
We derive rm values accordingly and again use the inclusive value to measure the welfare
of rm owners (Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016):
W F = σ F ln
(
C∑
c=1
exp
[
V Fc
σ F
])
.
A change in taxes in city c aects rm owners’ welfare via the incidence on wages w∗c and the
impact on the gross price of commercial oor space κ(1 + tc )rM∗c = κτcrM∗c :
dW F
d lnτc
= Fc
dV Fc
d lnτc
= −Fc
(
[1 − β] + [1 − β] d ln r
M∗
c
d lnτc
+ β
d lnw∗c
d lnτc
)
.
The change in the welfare of rm owners depends on the share of the tax burden that can be
passed on to landlords in terms of lower net prices for commercial oor space and the share
that can be shifted to workers by lower wages.
The welfare of rm owners in the construction industry is given by their prots (see equa-
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tion (1.B.20)):
W C =
C∑
c=1
ΠCc =
C∑
c=1
(
rM∗c S
∗
c − sK∗c − l∗cL∗c
)
.
Property tax increases yield lower sales in the construction industry because workers and rms
demand less oor space S∗c and every unit is sold at a lower price rM∗c . Construction rms
react by decreasing their demand for land L∗c and capital K∗c and thus the price of land (l∗c ) will
decrease as well. With some algebra, one can show thatW C evaluates to zero in equilibrium
and construction rms still make zero prots irrespective of the tax.
We summarize the welfare of landlords by their prots as in Kline and Moretti (2014), i.e., the
area between land prices and the inverse of the land supply function dened in equation (1.B.22),
and scale it with the size of the nationwide land market denoted by Λ:
W L =
1
Λ
C∑
c=1
∫ L∗c
0
(
l∗c − u
1
θ
)
du = 1
Λ
C∑
c=1
(
l∗cL
∗
c −
L∗c
1+ 1θ
1 + 1θ
)
=
1
Λ
C∑
c=1
©­­­­­­­«
l∗cL
∗
c −
θL∗c
=l ∗c︷︸︸︷
L∗c
1
θ
1 + θ
ª®®®®®®®¬
W L =
1
Λ
C∑
c=1
l∗cL∗c
1 + θ .
Tax increases in city c reduce the welfare of landlords according to the following expression:
dW L
d lnτc
=
1
(1 + θ )Λ
(
l∗c
dL∗c
d lnτc
+ L∗c
dl∗c
d lnτc
)
=
1
(1 + θ )Λ
(
l∗c
d exp
[
lnL∗c
]
d lnτc
+ L∗c
d exp
[
ln l∗c
]
d lnτc
)
=
1
(1 + θ )Λ
(
l∗c
d exp
[
lnL∗c
]
d lnL∗c
d lnL∗c
d lnτc
+ L∗c
d exp
[
ln l∗c
]
d ln l∗c
d ln l∗c
d lnτc
)
=
1
(1 + θ )Λ
(
l∗cL
∗
c
d lnL∗c
d lnτc
+ L∗cl
∗
c
d ln l∗c
d lnτc
)
=
l∗cL∗c
(1 + θ )Λ
(
d lnL∗c
d lnτc
+
d ln l∗c
d lnτc
)
dW L
d lnτc
=
l∗cL∗c
γΛ
d ln rHc
d lnτc
=
l∗cL∗c
Λ
d ln l∗c
d lnτc
= Λc
d ln l∗c
d lnτc
,
where Λc denotes the share of local land sales l∗cL∗c relative to the nationwide land market Λ.
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The stronger the incidence of property taxes on land prices and the more severe the reduction
in land demand due to higher taxes, the bigger the welfare loss for landlords. As landlords’
welfare is decreasing in the land supply elasticity (see denominator), landlords will only bear
part of the tax burden as long as the supply of land ready for construction is not perfectly elastic.
Otherwise landlords make zero prots and won’t bear any tax burden.
1.B.9 The Property Tax as a Specific Tax
So far we assumed that property is taxed ad valorem, which allows us to derive an analytical
solution for the spatial equilibrium. However, our central incidence prediction of a direct,
negative eect of property taxes on net rents compensating for higher costs of living does not
rely on this assumption but also goes through when we model property taxes as a specic
tax. To see this, consider an alternative formulation of the households’ budget constraint in
equation (1.B.1):
(rHc + tc )hi + pxi = wc
and an alternative prot specication for rms in the tradable good sector (see equation (1.B.9)):
ΠFjc = pjcYjc −wcNjc − (rMc + tcκ)Mjc .
Using these assumptions, we can derive alternative functions for labor supply, residential
housing demand, labor demand, and commercial oor space demand using the key elasticities
dened above:
lnN Sc = ϵNS lnwc +
(
1 + ϵHD
)
ln
(
rHc + tc
)
+ ϵA lnAc + δϵA lnGc + a1 (1.B.52)
lnHDc = lnNc + lnα + lnwc − ln
(
rHc + tc
)
(1.B.53)
lnNDc = ϵB lnBc + ϵND lnwc +
(
1 + ϵMD
)
ln
(
rMc + tcκ
)
+ b1 (1.B.54)
lnMDc = ϵB lnBc +
(
1 + ϵND
)
lnwc + ϵMD ln
(
rMc + tcκ
)
+ b2. (1.B.55)
The equilibrium is now characterized by equations (1.B.27), (1.B.29)-(1.B.35) and (1.B.52)-(1.B.55).
As in the case of an ad valorem tax, we also derive eective residential housing demand and
eective residential housing supply as functions of residential rents and property taxes when
modeling the property tax as a specic tax. Using the alternative expressions for labor demand
and labor supply, we can derive new equilibrium wages conditional on taxes, oor space prices,
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and amenities:
lnwc =
(
b1 − a1 − ϵA lnAc − δϵA lnGc + ϵB lnBc −
[
1 + ϵHD
]
ln
[
rHc + tc
]
+
[
1 + ϵMD
]
ln
[
rMc + tcκ
] )/ (
ϵNS − ϵND
)
.
Using this intermediate step and the equilibrium conditions from above, we can solve for
residential housing demand as a function of residential housing costs rHc , taxes, and amenities
(note that we set ϕ = 1 and κ = 1 again to keep the model analytically tractable):
lnHDc = lnNc + lnα + lnwc − ln
(
rHc + tc
)
=
=lnNDc︷                                                                             ︸︸                                                                             ︷
ϵNS lnwc +
(
1 + ϵHD
)
ln
(
rHc + tc
)
+ ϵA lnAc + δϵA lnGc + a1
+ lnα + lnwc − ln
(
rHc + tc
)
=
(
1 + ϵNS
)
lnwc + ϵHD ln
(
rHc + tc
)
+ ϵA lnAc + δϵA lnGc + lnα + a1
lnHDc = lnα +
1 + ϵNS
ϵNS − ϵNDb1 −
1 + ϵND
ϵNS − ϵNDa1
=ϵ˜HD︷                                     ︸︸                                     ︷
−ϵ
HD (1 + ϵND) − ϵMD (1 + ϵNS)
ϵNS − ϵND ln
(
rHc + tc
)
− 1 + ϵ
ND
ϵNS − ϵNDϵ
A lnAc − 1 + ϵ
ND
ϵNS − ϵNDδϵ
A lnGc +
1 + ϵNS
ϵNS − ϵNDϵ
B lnBc .
We can also write residential housing supply as a function of residential rents and exogenous
model parameters only. It is still given by:
lnHSc = ϵ˜HS ln rHc + θc0 +
1 − γ
γ
ln(1 − γ ) + ln µ − (1 − γ )(1 + θ )
γ
ln s .
In the spatial equilibrium, demand and supply of residential housing must be equal. Using the
above equations we can solve for equilibrium rents for residential oor space. Now consider the
introduction of a property tax in city c and derive the tax incidence dr
H
c
dtc
(ignoring the supply of
public goods):
HSc
(
rHc
)
= HDc
(
rHc + tc
)
dHSc
(
rHc
)
dtc
=
dHDc
(
rHc + tc
)
dtc
dHSc
(
rHc
)
drHc
drHc
dtc
=
dHDc
(
rHc + tc
)
drHc
(
1 +
drHc
dtc
)
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drHc
dtc
(
dHSc
[
rHc
]
drHc
− dH
D
c
[
rHc + tc
]
drHc
)
=
dHDc
(
rHc + tc
)
drHc
drHc
dtc
=
dHDc (rHc +tc )
drHc
dH Sc (rHc )
drHc
− dHDc (rHc +tc )
drHc
=
dHDc
drHc
rHc
HDc
dH Sc
drHc
rHc
H Sc
− dHDc
drHc
rHc
HDc
drHc
dtc
=
ϵ˜HD
ϵ˜HS − ϵ˜HD , (1.B.56)
which corresponds to the direct eect in the case of an ad valorem tax in Lemma 1.B.2. In both
cases – for specic taxes as well as ad valorem taxes – the incidence after introducing a new tax
depends on the relative size of the eective housing supply and the eective housing demand
elasticity with respect to the rental price.
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Appendix 1.C Additional Results
1.C.1 Robustness Checks
Figure 1.C.1: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Business Cycle
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the business cycle using the event study set-up from
equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases), or as an
increase that is greater than or equal to the median of the tax change distribution (big increases). The base
sample includes all municipalities from our housing data set (see Section 1.4.2 for details), the full sample
includes all municipalities for which we have data on the respective outcome. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for
details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.2: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Housing Market By Regional Controls
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the housing market by regional controls using the
event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate
(all increases). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.3: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Land Market By Regional Controls
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the land market by regional controls using the
event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate
(all increases). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.4: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Labor Market By Regional Controls
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State#Year Base: State#Year+ County Trends CZ#Year
Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the labor market by regional controls using the
event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all
increases). Panels C and D are based on a subsample of large municipalities (“urban counties”) as data on
employment and plants are only observed at the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
79
Chapter 1 Property Taxation, Housing, and Local Labor Markets
Figure 1.C.5: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Business Cycle By Regional Controls
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State#Year Base: State#Year+ County Trends CZ#Year
Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the business cycle by regional controls using the
event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate
(all increases). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.6: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Housing Market By Business Tax Controls
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the housing market by business tax controls using
the event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate
(all increases). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.7: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Land Market By Business Tax Controls
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the land market by business tax controls using the
event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate
(all increases). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.8: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Labor Market By Business Tax Controls
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the labor market by business tax controls using
the event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax
rate (all increases). Panels C and D are based on a subsample of large municipalities (“urban counties”) as
data on employment and plants are only observed at the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details
on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.9: The Eects of Property Taxes on the Business Cycle By Business Tax Controls
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
A. Log GDP
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
B. Log Unemployed
Baseline (Incl. Business Tax Controls) No Business Tax Controls
Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on the business cycle by business tax controls using
the event study set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate
(all increases). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence
intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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1.C.2 Heterogeneous Eects
Figure 1.C.10: The Eects of Property Taxes on Quantities by City Size
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on quantities by city size using the event study set-up
from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases). Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1
in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.11: The Eects of Property Taxes on Prices by Density
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on prices by density using the event study set-up from
equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases). Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1 in the
Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.12: The Eects of Property Taxes on Quantities by Density
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on quantities by density using the event study set-up
from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases). Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See Table 1.A.1
in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.13: The Eects of Property Taxes on Prices by Undevelopable Land
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Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on prices by undevelopable land using the event study
set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See
Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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Figure 1.C.14: The Eects of Property Taxes on Quantities by Undevelopable Land
-.0
6
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
A. Log Apartments
-.0
6
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
B. Log Houses
-.1
5
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
C. Log Land
-.0
6
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
E
st
im
at
ed
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years Relative to the Tax Reform
D. Log Population
Low share High share
Notes: This gure shows the eects of property taxes on quantities by undevelopable land using the event study
set-up from equation (1.17). The event is dened as an increase in the local property tax rate (all increases).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, vertical bars indicate 90 % condence intervals. See
Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix for details on all variables.
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1.C.3 Welfare Eects
Table 1.C.1: Reduced Form Elasticities – Dierence-in-Dierence Estimates
Base Sample Full Sample
Outcome Elasticity S.E. Obs. Elasticity S.E. Obs.
Log Net Rent -0.018 (0.032) 37,672 -0.018 (0.032) 37,672
Log House Price -0.038 (0.031) 33,767 -0.038 (0.031) 33,767
Log Apartments 0.010 (0.004)∗∗ 2,780 -0.004 (0.003) 93,192
Log Houses 0.011 (0.005)∗∗ 2,780 -0.003 (0.004) 93,192
Log Land Price -0.070 (0.260) 1,205 0.007 (0.212) 6,987
Log Land -0.025 (0.014)∗ 1,712 -0.011 (0.008) 50,825
Log Wage 0.006 (0.027) 973 -0.024 (0.040) 8,067
Log Population 0.000 (0.011) 5,050 -0.001 (0.008) 189,505
Notes: This table summarizes the reduced-form results for the key medium-run elasticities of our
model for both the house price sample and the full sample. For detailed information on all variables,
see Appendix Table 1.A.1.
Table 1.C.2: Welfare Eects of Property Tax Increases
Housing Share α = 0.2 α = 0.3 α = 0.4
Labor Share β 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A – Marginal Welfare Eects
Worker/Tenant -0.167 -0.167 -0.167 -0.258 -0.258 -0.258 -0.348 -0.348 -0.348
Firm Owner -0.504 -0.414 -0.325 -0.504 -0.414 -0.325 -0.504 -0.414 -0.325
Land Owner -0.512 -0.512 -0.512 -0.512 -0.512 -0.512 -0.512 -0.512 -0.512
Total Welfare Eect -1.183 -1.094 -1.005 -1.273 -1.184 -1.095 -1.364 -1.274 -1.185
Panel B – Welfare Loss Shares
Worker/Tenant 0.141 0.153 0.166 0.202 0.218 0.235 0.255 0.273 0.294
Firm Owner 0.426 0.379 0.324 0.396 0.350 0.297 0.369 0.325 0.275
Land Owner 0.433 0.468 0.510 0.402 0.432 0.468 0.375 0.402 0.432
Notes: This table presents marginal welfare eects and welfare shares based on the following three reduced form elasticites
d ln rH ∗c /d ln τc = −.096, d ln lH ∗c /d ln τc = −.512, d lnwH ∗c /d ln τc = .014 and based on the calibrated housing share
in consumption (α ) and labor share in production (β ) as indicated in the table head. Our preferred specication is given
in column (5).
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Chapter 2
The Long-Term Costs of
Government Surveillance∗
2.1 Introduction
More than one third of the world population lives in authoritarian states that attempt to control
almost all aspects of public and private life (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). To this
end, those regimes create large-scale surveillance systems that inltrate the population and
generate a widespread atmosphere of suspicion reaching deep into private spheres (Arendt,
1951). Such environments of distrust are thought to have adverse economic eects, since they
limit cooperation and the open exchange of ideas (Arrow, 1972, Putnam, 1995, La Porta et al.,
1997, Algan and Cahuc, 2014). However, systematic empirical evidence on the relationship
between government surveillance, trust, and economic performance is missing.
In this paper, we investigate the long-run social and economic consequences of one of
the largest and densest surveillance networks of all time. Using administrative data on the
ubiquitous network of informers during the times of the socialist German Democratic Republic
(GDR), we estimate the long-term, causal eects of government surveillance on measures of
trust and economic performance after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The GDR Ministry for State
Security, commonly referred to as the Stasi, administered a huge body of so-called Inozielle
Mitarbeiter, unocial informers. These informers accounted for around one percent of the East
German population in the 1980s and were regarded as the regime’s most important instrument
to secure power (Müller-Enbergs, 1996, p. 305). Informers were ordinary citizens who kept their
regular jobs but secretly gathered information within their professional and social network, thus
betraying the trust of friends, neighbors, and colleagues (Bruce, 2010). A large body of historical
research deems the eects of the surveillance apparatus to be devastating and long-lasting: “The
oppressive eects of the constant threat of Stasi surveillance [...] can scarcely be overstated.
∗ This chapter is based on a revised version of A. Lichter, M. Löer, and S. Siegloch (2016). “The Long-Term Costs
of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany”. CESifo Working Paper 6042.
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It led to perpetual insecurity in personal relationships, and was to leave a dicult legacy for
post-reunication Germany” (Fulbrook, 2009, p. 221).1
We put these claims to a causal test by exploiting regional variation in the surveillance
intensity across East German counties. We explicitly address the concern that recruitment of
informers across counties might not have been random by adopting a border discontinuity
design that exploits the specic administrative structure of the surveillance state. Stasi district
oces bore full responsibility for securing their territory and supervising their respective
subordinate county oces, which caused surveillance intensities to dier substantially across
GDR districts (Engelmann and Schumann, 1995). Indeed, around 25 percent of the variation
in the spying density across counties can be explained by district xed eects. Important
for our identication strategy, this structure was at odds with the fully centralized political
system of the GDR, where all political powers were held by the central government (Niemann,
2007). This setting allows us to follow Dube et al. (2010) and use discontinuities in surveillance
intensities along district borders as a source of exogenous variation. We corroborate the
identifying assumption of no other discontinuities at district borders by testing the smoothness
of observable characteristics at borders, nding no systematic dierences. In addition, we
tighten identication by combining the border design with an instrumental variables approach.
Using the leave-out average surveillance intensity at the district level as an instrument, we
isolate the part of the variation in the county-level spying density that is explained by dierences
in surveillance strategies across districts.
Overall, the results of our study oer substantial evidence for negative and long-lasting
eects of government surveillance on individuals’ trust and economic performance. Using data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we nd that a higher spying density leads to
lower trust in strangers and stronger negative reciprocity, two standard measures predicting
cooperative behavior (Glaeser et al., 2000, Dohmen et al., 2009). A one standard deviation
increase in the spying density decreases trust (reciprocal behavior) by 0.06-0.09 (0.15-0.17) of
a standard deviation, equivalent to a decrease of about 2 percentage points, respectively. We
further observe negative eects of state surveillance on two standard measures of institutional
trust (Putnam, 2000, Guiso et al., 2004). Individuals in counties with a higher informer density
are less likely to attend elections and more likely to vote for extreme parties (conditional on
participating). The eects on trust are accompanied by negative and persistent eects on
measures of economic performance. We nd that individuals in counties with higher spying
densities experience longer and/or more spells of unemployment. A one standard deviation
increase in the surveillance intensity raises the overall time spent in unemployment by 0.07-
0.11 standard deviations, which is equivalent to an increase of about 2 percentage points. We
1 See also Gieseke (2014, p. 95) or Childs and Popplewell (1996, p. 111).
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further show that more government surveillance signicantly reduces individual labor income
conditional on working: a one standard deviation increase in the spying density decreases gross
labor income by 0.11-0.16 of a standard deviation, or 100-140 EUR per month.
Our empirical results become stronger when tightening identication and moving from
cross-sectional OLS estimates to the border design, exploiting within county-pair variation at
district borders only. Likewise, we see larger estimates when additionally instrumenting the
county-level spying density with the (leave-out) district average, suggesting that endogeneity
biases estimates towards zero. In line with this nding, we further show that eects are larger
when focusing on those county pairs that were part of the same province during the times
of the Weimar Republic but were assigned to dierent districts when the regime dissolved
the provinces after World War II to eliminate the power of all subnational entities. Here, the
identifying assumption of no other discontinuities at district borders is even more likely to hold
as counties should be more similar in unobservable cultural traits. In addition, we provide a wide
range of tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results, such as using dierent measures of
surveillance, an alternative denition of the instrument, or dierent specications of the border
design. We also rule out that other factors, such as socialist indoctrination, drive our eects.
Last, we demonstrate that our inference is robust to clustering standard errors at dierent levels,
including the level of districts while accounting for the small number of clusters using bootstrap
procedures as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008).
Our study is closely linked to the steadily growing literature on the relationship between
institutions, culture (trust), and economic performance (see Algan and Cahuc, 2014, Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015, Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan, 2016, for recent surveys and Section 2.3
for a more detailed discussion of the literature). We conrm the long-term positive eects of
institutional quality on economic performance, highlighting the importance of trust, social
capital, and social ties for economic prosperity. Econometrically, we rene current identication
strategies to estimate causal eects of formal institutions on culture and economic outcomes by
combining within-country variation (Tabellini, 2010, Alesina et al., 2013) with spatial border
designs (Becker et al., 2016, Fontana et al., 2017). In contrast to other studies, our identifying
variation is not generated by deep, historical dierences such as religion, ethnicity, or education,
but induced by a rather recent, yet pervasive political experiment.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature investigating the transformation and legacy of
countries of the former Eastern Bloc after the fall of the Iron Curtain (see, e.g., Shleifer, 1997).
In this regard, two other papers study the eects of Stasi surveillance.2 An older paper by Jacob
and Tyrell (2010) looks at the relationship between surveillance, social capital and economic
2 In addition, Glitz and Meyersson (2016) exploit information provided by East German foreign intelligence spies
in the West to investigate the economic returns of industrial espionage.
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performance. A second paper by Friehe et al. (2015), which was pursued simultaneously but
independently from our project, investigates the eects of Stasi surveillance on personality traits.
Both studies document negative eects of government surveillance, which are in line with our
ndings, given that trust is generally considered a component of social capital, and personality
traits are known to shape beliefs such as trust (Dohmen et al., 2009). Our paper explicitly
investigates the link between state surveillance and economic performance, highlighting the
role of interpersonal trust, which has been identied as an “economic primitive” to explain
growth (see Berg et al., 1995, and Section 2.3 for a more detailed discussion of the literature).
Econometrically, our study advances the literature by explicitly addressing the non-randomness
of the county-level surveillance density. We go beyond cross-sectional correlations by combining
a border discontinuity design with an instrumental variables strategy. Our ndings show that
ignoring the endogeneity of the regional surveillance intensity can lead to a non-negligible bias
in the estimates. Last, our paper also complements evidence from Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2007) by showing that the East German regime did not only aect individual preferences for
redistribution, but also had long-lasting eects on trust and social behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the historical
background, the institutional details of the Stasi surveillance system, and our measure of the
regional surveillance intensity. In light of the GDR surveillance state, Section 2.3 lays out our
conceptual framework, combining theoretical predictions with empirical insights from the
literature on trust and economic performance. Section 2.4 introduces our research design and
describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Results are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 The GDR Surveillance State
After Germany’s unconditional surrender and the end of World War II in May 1945, the country’s
territory west of the Oder-Neisse line was divided among the four Allied Forces – the US, the
UK, France and the Soviet Union. While the Western forces soon established the principles of
democracy and free markets in their respective zones, the Soviet Union implemented a socialist
regime in the eastern part of the country. In May 1949, the ideological division of the nation was
institutionalized when the Federal Republic of Germany was established on the territory of the
three western zones. Five months later, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was constituted
in the Soviet ruled zone, which eventually led to a 40 year long division of the country.
The GDR was an authoritarian regime under the rule of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and its
secretaries general. Its organization closely followed the Soviet example of a highly centralized
state, with all political power being held by the Politburo in East Berlin. To this end, the regime
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abolished existing decentralized political institutions from the times of the Weimar Republic
and eliminated the power of subnational entities shortly after the end of World War II. In a
rst step, the Soviet occupying forces formed the ve intermediate jurisdictions Mecklenburg,
Anhalt, Brandenburg, Thuringa, and Saxony, which were eventually abolished in 1952 and
replaced by 15 administrative districts (Bezirke).3 These districts held no legislative powers.
Instead, “the only task [. . . ] was to execute the decisions made by the central committee. This
was their raison d’être.” (Ulrich Schlaak, Second Secretary of the SED in the district of Potsdam,
as cited in Niemann, 2007, p. 198, own translation).
In the early years, the GDR was under constant internal pressure. Dissatisfaction with
working conditions and the implementation of socialism culminated in the People’s Uprising
on and around June 17, 1953, when an unexpected wave of strikes and demonstrations hit
the country. Another clear indication of discontent with the regime was the massive and
steady out-migration. From 1949 to 1961, roughly 2.7 million citizens (around 20 percent of the
population) managed to migrate to the West by authorized migration or illegal border crossing
(see Figure 2.A.1). Securing the inner-German border in 1952 was not sucient to stop this
exodus, as people could still escape to the West relatively easily via the divided city of Berlin.
Eventually, the regime stopped the substantial population loss by building the Berlin Wall
in 1961, and ordering soldiers to shoot at every person trying to illegally cross the inner-German
border. Between 1961 and 1988 only around 0.1 percent of the population managed to emigrate
(legally or illegally) to the West on an annual basis.
From this point on, East and West Germany increasingly grew apart in their social and
cultural patterns. East Germans “felt they had to try to work with socialism, and to confront and
make the best of the constraints within which they had to operate” (Fulbrook, 2009, p. 174). This
pragmatic attitude led to a situation of relative political stability in the following two decades.
On the evening of November 9, 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the
dissolution of the GDR, which ocially ended with the reunication of West and East Germany
in October 1990.
The Ministry for State Security. In February 1950, just a few months after the proclamation
of the GDR, the Ministry for State Security was founded. The Stasi served as the internal (and
external) intelligence agency of the regime. Its ocial mission was to “battle against agents,
saboteurs, and diversionists [in order] to preserve the full eectiveness of [the] Constitution.”4
Soon after its foundation and the unforeseen national uprising against the regime in June 1953,
the Stasi substantially expanded its activities and turned into an ubiquitous institution, spying
3 Initially, 14 districts were created. In 1961, East Berlin was declared a district of its own.
4 According to Erich Mielke, subsequent Minister for State Security from 1957 to 1989, on January 28, 1950 in the
ocial SED party newspaper Neues Deutschland as quoted in Gieseke (2014, p. 12).
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on and suppressing the entire population to ensure and preserve the regime’s power (Gieseke,
2014, p. 50.).
The key feature of the Stasi’s surveillance strategy was the use of “silent” methods of repres-
sion rather than legal persecution by the police (Knabe, 1999). To this end, the Stasi administered
a dense network of unocial informers, the regime’s “main weapon against the enemy”5, who
secretly gathered detailed inside knowledge about the population. “Informers were seen as an
excellent way of preventing trouble before it started [. . . ]” (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, p. 83).
In the 1980s, the Stasi listed around 85,000 regular employees and 142,000 unocial informers,
which accounted for around 0.5 and 0.84 percent of the population, respectively.6
The organizational structure of the Stasi diered markedly from the otherwise highly central-
ized political system. While the East German surveillance apparatus was decentralized from the
very beginning (Naimark, 1994), the Stasi further increased the responsibilities of its regional
oces in the mid-1950s to extract information more eciently (Engelmann and Schumann,
1995). The Stasi maintained district oces (Bezirksdienststellen) in each district capital. These
oces bore full responsibility for securing their territory and were independent in how to
achieve this goal (Gill and Schröter, 1991, Engelmann and Schumann, 1995, Gieseke, 2014).7
As a consequence of this decentralized structure, surveillance strategies diered substantially
across GDR districts. Overall, district dierences account for a quarter of the variation in
informers across counties.8 The historical literature identies a small number of hard factors
that are believed to have driven dierences in surveillance strategies, such as population size,
the presence of strategically important rms and industries as well as the strength of the
political opposition (Horsch, 1997, Müller-Enbergs, 2008). Besides these systematic drivers,
other, non-systematic factors are thought to have played a role as well. These soft and arguably
more random determinants include eort, zeal or the loyalty of the district leadership to the
regime (Gill and Schröter, 1991, Childs and Popplewell, 1996, Müller-Enbergs, 2008). We exploit
these insights to develop our identication strategy in Section 2.4.1.
5 Directive 1/79 of the Ministry for State Security for the work with unocial collaborators (Müller-Enbergs, 1996,
p. 305).
6 The number of regular Stasi employees was notably high compared to the size of other secret services in the
Eastern Bloc (see, e.g., Albats, 1995, Gieseke, 2014, p. 72, and Harrison and Zaksauskiene, 2015).
7 The Minister for State Security hardly inuenced the activities and directives governed by the heads of the district
oces (Gill and Schröter, 1991). Moreover, according to various accounts, the Politburo did not exert any control
over the Ministry for State Security from the mid-1950s onwards (see Childs and Popplewell, 1996, p. 67).
8 Similarly, there were sharp dierences in other domains of the surveillance system. For instance, around one
third of the constantly-monitored citizens (Personen in ständiger Überwachung) were living in the district of
Karl-Marx-Stadt (Horsch, 1997), which accounted for only eleven percent of the total population. Likewise,
17 percent of the two million bugged telephone conversations were tapped in the district of Magdeburg, which
only made up eight percent of the population.
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Unoicial Informers. Each district oce had authority over the county oces (Kreisdien-
ststellen) and on-site oces (Objektdienststellen) within their territory.9 In total, there were
209 county oces, which executed the commands and orders from their respective district oce
and recruited and administered the Stasi informers. These informers were instructed to secretly
collect information about individuals in their own network. After recruitment it was thus
necessary for informers to pursue their normal lives as friends, colleagues, and neighbors. The
Stasi administered the body of informers in a formalized way, with cooperation being sealed in
written agreements and informers being closely led by a responsible Stasi ocer (Gieseke, 2014,
p. 114.). Informers would secretly meet with their ocer on a regular basis to report suspicious
behavior and provide personal information about individuals in their social networks. Reasons
for serving as a collaborator were diverse. Some citizens agreed to cooperate for ideological
reasons, others were attracted by the personal and material benets that accompanied their
cooperation. However, in rare cases the regime also compelled citizens to act as unocial
informers by creating fear and pressure (Fulbrook, 2005, p. 242f.). With the collected intelligence
at hand, the Stasi was able to draw a detailed picture of anti-socialist and dissident movements
within the society and to exert an overall “disciplinary and intimidating eect” on the population
(Gieseke, 2014, p. 84f.).
Numerous historical accounts suggest that the population was aware of the large network
of informers. “The very knowledge that the Stasi were there and watching served to atomize
society, preventing independent discussion in all but the smallest groups” (Popplewell, 1992).
The consequence was “the breakdown of the bonds of trust between ocers and men, lawyers
and clients, doctors and patients, teachers and students, pastors and their communities, friends
and neighbors, family members and even lovers” (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, p. 111). The
preferred method of the Stasi was “to build up and propagate distorted stories with enough
kernel of truth to sow suspicion and discredit the individual” (Fulbrook, 1995, p. 54), eventually
destroying relationships, reputations, and careers.10
Measuring Surveillance Intensity. Given that the Stasi saw unocial collaborators as their
main instrument of surveillance, we choose the county-level share of informers in the population
as our preferred measure of surveillance intensity. Although the Stasi was able to destroy parts
9 On-site oces were separate entities in seven strategically important public companies or universities. The Stasi
only monitored economic activity but was not actively involved in economic production (Gieseke, 2014).
10 Bruce, 2010 reports that the vast majority of people had direct contact with the Stasi multiple times throughout
their lives; Fulbrook, 1995 states that friendships inevitably had a shadow of distance and doubt; Wolle, 2009
writes that the threat of being denounced caused an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion within a deeply torn
society; and Reich, 1997 more guratively describes that citizens felt the Stasi’s presence like a “scratching T-shirt”.
For less scientic, more popular representations of the impact of the Stasi, see the Academy Award-winning
movie “The Lives of Others” and the TED talk “The Dark Secrets of a Surveillance State” given by the director of
the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Stasi prison memorial, Hubertus Knabe.
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of its les in late 1989, much of the information was preserved when protesters started to
occupy Stasi oces across the country. In addition, numerous shredded les have been restored
since reunication by the Stasi Records Agency (BStU) – a government agency established
in 1990/1991 to safe-keep and secure the Stasi Records and to provide people, researchers, and
media access to these les. Our data on the number of unocial informers in each county are
based on these ocial records. Most of the data have been compiled in Müller-Enbergs (2008).
Until today, the Stasi Records Agency keeps restoring old les and releasing new data and
information. Hence, we extended the data in Müller-Enbergs (2008) with newer data which we
collected from the archives of the Agency. Overall, this allows us to observe the spying density
for around 92 percent of the counties at least once in the 1980s.11
The Stasi ocially dierentiated operative collaborators (IM1) from collaborators providing
logistics (IM2).12 Our baseline measure of the county-level surveillance density is based on the
operative collaborators as these informers (i) were actively involved in spying, (ii) constituted
the largest and most relevant group of collaborators, and (iii) exhibit the best data coverage
across counties.13 If an on-site oce was located in a county, we add the respective number of
unocial informers to the county total and explicitly control for the presence of these on-site
oces in the econometric analysis. As information on the total number of collaborators is
not given for each year in every county, we use the average share of informers from 1980
to 1988 as our measure of surveillance. The spying density was stable across the 1980s, the
within-county correlation being 0.91. For further details on our main explanatory variable, see
Data Appendix 2.B.1.
Hence, our baseline measure of county-level surveillance is the spying density dened as
the number of operative informers divided by the county population in the respective year.
As informers were the central weapon of the system, this measure is arguably the best proxy
to pick up the eect of the Stasi surveillance apparatus as a whole. By denition, this overall
eect also comprises the specic modus operandi of the Stasi, i.e., using informers within social
networks. Likewise, our measure should also account for more persecutive activities such as
arrests. While such measures only played a minor role in the strategy of the Stasi, the regime
occasionally had to make use of physical violence and imprisonment to lend credibility to the
overall surveillance system.
11 Pre-1980 data are only available for a limited number of counties.
12 In some of the Stasi’s informer accounts, there is a third category called “societal collaborators”. These individuals
were publicly known to be loyal to the regime and in the vast majority of cases not involved in spying. Rather,
these collaborators were asked to actively and openly support the Stasi and the regime (Kowalczuk, 2013). In
this sense, they were less secret than ocial Stasi employees who oftentimes disguised their connections to the
regime.
13 Nonetheless, we show that results are robust when combining IM categories 1 and 2, hence using the total number
of spies as the main regressor.
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Figure 2.1: Spying Intensity across Counties
Notes: The gure shows the county-level surveillance density measured by the average yearly
share of operative unocial informers relative to the population between 1980 and 1988.
Source: Data on the number of unocial informers is taken from Müller-Enbergs (2008) and
additionally collected from the Stasi Records at the BStU, see Data Appendix 2.B.1 for details.
Maps: MPIDR and CGG (2011) and EuroGeographics.
Figure 2.1 plots the regional variation of surveillance intensity, darker colors indicating higher
spying densities. The surveillance intensity diers considerably both across and within GDR
districts. The share of operative informers in a county ranges from 0.12 to 1.03 percent, the
mean density being 0.38 percent (see Table 2.B.2 for more detailed distributional information).
The median is similar to the mean (0.36 percent), and one standard deviation is equal to
0.14 informers per capita. In our regressions, we standardize the share of informers by dividing
it by the respective sample standard deviation.
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2.3 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
Theoretically, we expect Stasi surveillance to have long-term negative eects on economic
performance through a persistent deterioration of interpersonal and institutional trust. Author-
itarian regimes establish a system of obedience by instilling fear (Arendt, 1951) and generate
uncertainty in the rewards of individual productive investments, eventually leading to lower
economic activity and a negative eect on growth (Smith, 1776). In line with this rationale, a
large literature has shown the positive association between the quality of political institutions
and economic prosperity (see, e.g., Mauro, 1995, Hall and Jones, 1999, Rodrik et al., 2004).
In this context, lacking trust has been identied as one key factor for linking poor political
institutions and low economic performance. From a theoretical perspective, trust is assumed to
be essential for growth as every economic transaction involves an element of mutual condence
(Arrow, 1972). In this spirit, trust works as social collateral. It reduces transaction costs by
limiting the need for formal institutions to enforce agreements, and triggers investment and
other economic activity as policy pronouncements appear more credible (Knack and Keefer,
1997). This role of trust as an “economic primitive” has been documented in various studies in
experimental economics, which demonstrate that it fosters reciprocal behavior and cooperation,
and thereby leads to more ecient economic outcomes (see, e.g., Berg et al., 1995, Dohmen
et al., 2008, 2009).
Various non-experimental studies have investigated and conrmed this link between trust and
economic performance as well.14 Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) document
a positive correlation between trust and economic indicators across countries. In two related
papers, Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that transatlantic and Indian Ocean
slave trade still has a causal and persistently negative eect on current trust levels and economic
performance in Africa. Algan and Cahuc (2010) isolate the trust that US descendants have
inherited from their forebears who immigrated from dierent countries at dierent dates and
show that time variation in inherited trust impacts economic growth in the respective countries
of origin. In a series of papers, Guiso et al. (2006, 2009) exploit variation in deep cultural aspects,
such as religious aliation, to explain trust levels, which in turn have real economic eects.
Similarly, Tabellini (2010) exploits variation in literacy and political institutions at the end of
the 19th century to explain trust levels and regional economic development across European
countries in the 1990s.
Last, there is evidence that even temporary changes in political institutions can have long-
14 In lieu of trust, some of the these papers use the term social capital, initially coined by political scientists (Putnam,
1993, Fukuyama, 1995). While exact denitions of social capital vary, most of them include trust, cooperative
norms, and association within groups as key components (Knack and Keefer, 1997). As a result, we use the terms
trust and social capital interchangeably.
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term eects. A crucial element for the legacy of short-lived changes in political institutions
is the intergenerational transmission of attitudes. An important literature, drawing on the
work of Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin et al. (2004), has shown that cooperative values
(Tabellini, 2008) and cultural beliefs (Guiso et al., 2008) are transmitted from one generation to
the next. Dohmen et al. (2012) conrm this hypothesis empirically using direct survey measures.
Specically, they show that trust and reciprocity are transmitted from parents to children and
conrm the implicit assumption of Algan and Cahuc (2010). In light of this intergenerational
transmission of attitudes and beliefs, several studies provide further evidence for persistent
economic eects of temporary shocks to political institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) study the
long-term eects of dierences in colonial institutions; La Porta et al. (1998) assess the long-run
eects of nancial legislation; Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) demonstrate the
legacy of slave trade in Africa. Based on these insights, we expect the Stasi to have a persistent
negative eect on trust and social capital, even after the end of the GDR regime and Germany’s
reunication.
2.4 Research Design and Data
In the following, we rst set up the empirical model and lay out the research design (Section 2.4.1).
In Section 2.4.2, we describe the data used for the empirical analysis. Last, we provide evidence
that covariates are smooth at district borders, corroborating the main identifying assumption of
our empirical design (Section 2.4.3).
2.4.1 Empirical Model and Identification
Our identication strategy exploits the administrative structure of the Stasi, where district
oces bore the full responsibility for securing their territory and administered dierent average
levels of the informer density at the county level. As a result, district xed eects explain more
than a quarter of the county-level variation in the spying density. We harness the resulting
discontinuities along district borders as a source of exogenous variation and set up a standard
border design (see, e.g., Holmes, 1998, Dube et al., 2010, Magruder, 2012, for studies applying
similar research designs).
Limiting the analysis to contiguous counties that straddle a GDR district border, we formally
regress outcome Y (see Section 2.4.2 for a detailed list of outcomes) of individual i in county c ,
which is part of a border county pair b and situated in a former Weimar province p, on the
spying density in county c and county-pair dummies νb :
Yicbp = α + β × SPYDENSc +Xiδ +Kcφ + νb + µp + εicbp . (2.1)
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In addition, our baseline model includes sets of covariates at the individual and county level,
denotedXi andKc, respectively. At the individual level, we control for the age and gender of
the respondents. County-level covariates account for the above mentioned systematic factors
determining the surveillance strategy and include controls for dierences in size, industrial
composition, oppositional forces, and long-run political dierences measured pre World War II
(see Section 2.4.2 for a detailed description of control variables). We also include a set of dummy
variables indicating pre-World War II provinces from the Weimar Republic, denoted µp , which
captures long-term cultural dierences, e.g., between Prussia and Saxony (see Figure 2.A.4 for a
mapping of GDR districts into provinces from the times of the Weimar Republic). In addition,
all regressions include a dummy for the presence of an on-site oce (cf. Section 2.2). The error
term is denoted by εicbp .
Identification. Equation (2.1) exploits variation within county pairs that is due to county
characteristics and district-level surveillance strategies. The identifying assumption is that a
given county on the lower-spying side of a district border is similar to its neighboring county
on the higher-spying side in all relevant characteristics except for the spying density. If this
is fullled, the remaining source of variation is district-level variation in surveillance and our
estimates produce the causal eect of the spying density. We test the smoothness of observable
county characteristics at district borders in Section 2.4.3 using a standard covariate-smoothness
test. We nd no signicant dierences in covariates, corroborating the identifying assumption.
However, other potential threats to identication still exist.
First, unobservable confounders within county pairs might drive parts of the county-level
spying density. To account for this potential source of endogeneity, we estimate another
specication in which we isolate the district component of surveillance within county pairs
by replacing the county-level spying density with the leave-out surveillance intensity at the
district level.15
Second, selection eects pre and post-reunication could invalidate our research design. While
out-migration was very limited after the construction of the Berlin Wall (cf. Section 2.2), residen-
tial mobilitywithin the GDR was also highly restricted as all living space was tightly administered
and allocated by municipal housing agencies (Grasho, 2011, p. 13f.). Post-reunication, we
assign treatment based on the county of residence in 1989, and follow individuals over time,
also when they change residency.16
15 The leave-out district average for county A is the average of all counties in the district excluding the spying
density of county A. Results are similar when using the simple mean district-level spying density.
16 We additionally check for dierences in treatment eects for individuals that stayed or moved after the fall of
the Berlin Wall. Estimates are very similar for both groups, which suggests that eects of surveillance persist
even if individuals change their residence and move to other counties. Given that any mobility response post-
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Third, our proxy of surveillance intensity may not translate into dierences in awareness of
the Stasi. While various historical accounts suggest that the population was well aware about
state surveillance (cf. Section 2.2), we can also test this assumption. Since 1992, any citizen can
le a request to view his or her personal Stasi le. Based on ocial data on the total number of
individual requests for disclosure by district and year obtained from the Stasi Records Agency,
we nd a strong positive correlation between the per-capita number of individual requests in a
district and the corresponding district-level spying density (see Panel A of Appendix Figure 2.A.2)
as well as a rather stable pattern over time (see Panel B of Appendix Figure 2.A.2).17 Moreover,
we could face measurement error in the main regressor if (i) informers recruited by one county
collected information on individuals located in the neighboring county within the same county
pair, or (ii) there was a quantity-quality trade-o in terms of unocial collaborators. While we
cannot rule out these mechanisms, both would work against nding large eects and bias our
estimates towards zero.
Last, there may be alternative channels through which the regime could have aected its
citizens. If these channels showed discontinuities at district borders and were highly correlated
with the spying density at the county level, we might wrongly attribute the negative eects on
trust and economic performance to the surveillance system. Given that districts themselves had
no legislative power, the most likely candidate in this respect might be socialist indoctrination,
which has been shown to aect individual preferences and economic outcomes (see, e.g.,
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007, Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella, 2016). We proxy socialist
indoctrination by the share of SED party members among the political and economic elites
in 1988 (see Appendix Table 2.B.1 for details on this variable). We nd that this measure is only
weakly correlated with the intensity of surveillance (see Figure 2.A.5 in the Appendix) and that
estimates remain essentially unchanged when including this variable as a control (see Appendix
Table 2.A.5).
Defining Border County Pairs. As shown in Figure 2.1, several counties face more than
one direct neighbor on the other side of a district border, a feature that is common in border
discontinuity designs.18 We follow the inuential paper by Dube et al. (2010) and duplicate a
county subject to the number of bordering counties. However, this approach might overstate
reunication may in itself be driven by the spying density, these ndings should, however, not be interpreted
causally.
17 Information on the number of requests is not available at the county level. Results shown in Figure 2.A.2 are
robust to the inclusion of controls. One reason for the observed drop in 2003 might be the fact that the Stasi
Records Agency started to reconstruct shredded les and made them available to the public from 2004 onwards.
Figure 2.A.3 plots the annual number of requests led between 1992–2012.
18 We discard East Berlin from our analysis as it was both a county and district on its own. Hence, we cannot
construct the leave-out district-level average spying intensity as an instrument.
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the importance of pairs that only share a very small borderline but are dierent in size or other
relevant characteristics. For this reason, we also propose an alternative specication, in which
we only consider the neighbor that shares the longest border with the respective county. This
will be our preferred specication throughout the paper. As this treatment of border counties
still leads to the duplication of some counties19, we account for this by adjusting standard
errors for clustering (see next paragraph) and dividing individual weights by the number of
duplications. We show below that results are not driven by using dierent denitions of county
pairs (see Appendix Table 2.A.4).
Inference. In our baseline specication, standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-
pair and county level to (i) allow for shocks aecting county pairs, and (ii) account for the
duplication of some counties in our preferred specication. We provide a more detailed discus-
sion of alternative ways to calculate standard errors, such as clustering at the district level, and
demonstrate the robustness of our inference in Section 2.5.2.
2.4.2 Data
To estimate the eect of surveillance on trust and economic performance, we use the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study, a longitudinal survey of German households (Wagner et al., 2007,
SOEP, 2015). Established for West Germany in 1984, the survey covers respondents from the
former GDR since June 1990. This allows us to assign treatment (i.e., the spying density) based
on the respondents’ county of residence in the year before the fall of the Berlin Wall and follow
these respondents over time. Hence, we are able to track individuals even when they changed
residence post reunication.
Outcomes. We proxy individual trust and cooperative behavior by two standard variables
provided in the SOEP: trust in strangers as specied in Glaeser et al. (2000), and reciprocal
behavior (Dohmen et al., 2009). We further operationalize institutional trust by two widely used
measures: participation in federal elections and extreme political orientation (Putnam, 2000,
Guiso et al., 2004). All trust outcomes are observed in two waves (see Tables 2.B.1 and 2.B.2 for
more information); we pool observations from both waves and add year xed eects.
We further focus on three measures of economic performance. First, we use log mean
labor income between 1992–2010. Second, we calculate the total unemployment duration of
19 To give an example, county A in district 1 has two neighbors: county B and county C , both part of district 2. A
shares the longest border with B, but C has only one neighbor, namely A. Hence, there are two county pairs A-B
and A-C , and A is duplicated once.
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individuals over this period. Third, we calculate the individual probability to become self-
employment within the survey period.
Controls. Vectors Xi and Kc in equation (2.1) denote the sets of control variables at the
individual and county level, respectively. At the individual level, we control for the respondents’
age and gender.20 At the county-level, we construct four dierent sets of control variables.
First, we account for the size and demographic composition of the counties in the 1980s. The
corresponding set of controls comprises (i) a county’s surface area (in logs), (ii) the log mean
county population 1980–1988, (iii) the share of children as of September 30, 1989, and (iv) whether
the county is rural or urban (Stadt-/Landkreis). Second, we account for dierences in the
industrial composition of counties. The set of industry controls comprises (i) the 1989 share of
employees in the industrial sector and the share in the cooperative sector, and (ii) the goods
value of industrial production in 1989 (in logs). Third, we control for the strength of opposition
to the regime. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the uprising in June 1953 constituted the most
prominent rebellion against the regime before the large demonstrations in late 1989. The riot
markedly changed the regime’s awareness of internal conict and triggered the expansion
of the Stasi’s informer network. We use dierences in the regional intensity of the uprising
to proxy the strength of opposition. Specically, we construct six indicators measuring the
strike intensity with values “none”, “strike”, “demonstration”, “riot”, “liberation of prisoners”,
and “military intervention” (no strike serves as the baseline). Fourth, we account for historical
and potentially persistent county dierences in terms of economic performance and political
ideology. The set of pre-World War II controls comprises (i) the mean Nazi and Communist vote
shares in the federal elections of 1928, 1930, and the two 1932 elections to measure the level of
political extremism (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012), (ii) the regional share of Jews and Protestants
in 1925 in order to control for religious dierences (Becker and Wößmann, 2009), and (iii) the
share of white-collar and self-employed workers in 1933 as a proxy for persistent productivity
dierences across local labor markets.
Summary Statistics. Summary statistics for all outcomes and controls on the individual and
county level are presented in Table 2.B.2 in the Appendix.
2.4.3 Covariate Smoothness
The identifying assumption of the border design requires that covariates do not vary systemati-
cally at district borders. To test this assumption, we apply a standard smoothness test following
20 We abstain from controlling for additional covariates at the individual level such as marital status, household size
or education as these variables might have been shaped by state surveillance.
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Lee and Lemieux (2010), separately regressing each pre-determined control variable on the
county-level spying density. This provides a direct test of whether each covariate is unrelated
to the informer density.
Table 2.1 reports the results of this test. In column (1), we investigate the smoothness of
covariates in the full sample of all East German counties covered by the SOEP. We see that the
spying density is signicantly correlated with most of our covariates. In column (2), we restrict
the sample to counties at district borders but do not include county-pair xed eects. Hence,
we still compare counties which are far away from each other and might dier in many other
dimensions than the spying intensity. Again, we detect systematic dierences in observables
which are correlated with the spying density. In columns (3)–(6), we implement variants of our
border design by introducing county-pair xed eects, hence explicitly testing the smoothness of
covariates within county pairs at district borders. In column (3), we consider all possible county
pairs, taking into account that counties can have multiple neighbors by duplicating observations
accordingly. We do not nd signicant dierences in covariates anymore. The same is true
for our preferred specication reported in column (4), in which each county is assigned to
the neighboring county with the longest border. In this specication, county pairs that share
only a small segment of a district border, and thus might not be ideal matches, are excluded.
While individual covariates are balanced in both models, the F -test of joint signicance of
all covariates, reported at the bottom of Table 2.1, indeed suggests that our baseline model
performs better in jointly balancing covariates.21 Last, we re-estimate models (3) and (4) while
additionally accounting for potentially persistent historical dierences between the provinces
of the Weimar Republic (as we do in the estimations, see equation (2.1)). As discussed before,
these provinces held large political power prior to World War II and might have persistently
shaped the dierent regions of the country. Covariates remain balanced, both in the full sample
of county pairs (column (5)) and in our preferred sample using those pairs with the longest
border only (column (6)).
2.5 Empirical Results
In the following section, we present our empirical ndings. Section 2.5.1 presents the main
results. In Section 2.5.2, we provide a range of tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
21 The test, suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), assesses if some of the discontinuities are statistically signicant
by random chance, which may happen if the set of covariates is large. While we do not nd any signicant
discontinuity, we nevertheless report the test to assess the overall balancing properties of our estimation samples.
Precisely, we test the null hypothesis that all coecients are jointly equal to zero in a stacked regression.
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Table 2.1: Covariate Smoothness at GDR District Borders
Full County County Longest County Longest
Sample Pairs Pairs Border Pairs Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Mean Population 1980–1988 -0.809∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.282 -0.181 -0.232 -0.107
(0.166) (0.122) (0.175) (0.192) (0.185) (0.222)
Log County Size 0.352∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.007 0.013 -0.000 0.064
(0.088) (0.111) (0.137) (0.132) (0.148) (0.169)
City County -0.462∗∗∗ -0.084 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.148) (0.085) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Share of Population Aged under 15, 1989 0.413∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.092 0.014 -0.004 -0.072
(0.088) (0.133) (0.191) (0.209) (0.190) (0.205)
Log Industrial Output 1989 -0.519∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.189 -0.100 -0.166 -0.094
(0.111) (0.156) (0.191) (0.208) (0.201) (0.223)
Share Industrial Employment 09/1989 -0.213∗∗ -0.343∗∗ 0.003 0.041 0.048 0.068
(0.097) (0.148) (0.162) (0.187) (0.185) (0.209)
Share of Cooperative Workers 09/1989 0.462∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.024 -0.032 -0.075
(0.092) (0.136) (0.156) (0.155) (0.170) (0.176)
Uprising Intensity 1953: None 0.127 0.049 -0.121 -0.147 -0.137 -0.212
(0.082) (0.141) (0.200) (0.203) (0.222) (0.215)
Uprising Intensity 1953: Strike -0.015 -0.156 -0.166 -0.119 -0.132 -0.071
(0.104) (0.103) (0.123) (0.117) (0.149) (0.147)
Uprising Intensity 1953: Demonstration -0.017 -0.153 -0.095 -0.129 -0.068 -0.058
(0.083) (0.140) (0.184) (0.224) (0.141) (0.153)
Uprising Intensity 1953: Riot 0.047 0.149 0.190 0.128 0.229 0.207
(0.113) (0.127) (0.196) (0.218) (0.206) (0.230)
Uprising Intensity 1953: Prisoner Liberation -0.196 0.144 0.282 0.341 0.177 0.201
(0.172) (0.129) (0.220) (0.243) (0.181) (0.203)
Uprising Intensity 1953: Military Intervention 0.027 0.199 0.222 0.269 0.235 0.363
(0.078) (0.121) (0.226) (0.230) (0.244) (0.223)
Mean Vote Share Communist Party 1928–1932 -0.423∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.014 0.005 0.007 -0.009
(0.112) (0.122) (0.134) (0.169) (0.134) (0.150)
Mean Vote Share Nazi Party 1928–1932 0.286∗∗ 0.215∗ -0.040 -0.041 -0.036 -0.091
(0.110) (0.109) (0.200) (0.226) (0.171) (0.183)
Share Protestants 1925 0.158∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.104 0.032 0.100 -0.038
(0.044) (0.118) (0.147) (0.181) (0.148) (0.193)
Share Jews 1925 -0.617∗ -0.049 0.105 0.128 0.170 0.218
(0.333) (0.168) (0.200) (0.239) (0.192) (0.228)
Mean Share of Self-Employed 1925 and 1933 0.376∗∗∗ 0.216 0.174 0.106 0.203 0.187
(0.094) (0.139) (0.151) (0.166) (0.132) (0.156)
Share of White Collar Workers 1933 -0.563∗∗∗ -0.041 0.073 0.057 0.170 0.199
(0.184) (0.169) (0.219) (0.256) (0.188) (0.202)
County-Pair Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weimar Province Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Counties 148 80 80 80 80 80
County Pairs 72 72 53 72 53
Joint F -Test 8.635 3.887 1.758 1.537 1.228 0.936
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.115 0.264 0.543
Notes: This table presents the results of our covariate smoothness test. In column (1), we separately regress each covariate on the
spying density using the full set of counties. Specication (2) is based on the border county-pair sample. Column (3) adds the set of
county-pair xed eects. In column (4), we further restrict the sample to those county pairs with the longest border in case a county
is part of multiple pairs (our baseline). In columns (5) and (6), border denitions are identical to specications (3) and (4), respectively,
but we additionally control for persistent dierences across Weimar Provinces by including the corresponding set of xed eects. All
variables have been standardized. Population weights are adjusted for duplications of counties that are part of multiple county pairs.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and county-pair level. Signicance levels are ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
The reported F -test statistics and the corresponding p-values test the null hypothesis of all coecients being jointly equal to zero in a
stacked regression (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). For information on all variables, see Appendix Table 2.B.1.
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2.5.1 Main Results
In this section, we analyze the eect of spying on various measures of trust and economic
performance, applying the border design as set up in equation (2.1). Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarize
our main ndings. In order to demonstrate the relevance of our identication strategy, we
implement our research design step-by-step and start with a naive OLS estimate, capturing the
correlation between the spying density and our outcomes in the full sample using all counties.
In a second step, we restrict the sample to counties located at district borders. While this
subsample only contains counties straddling a district border, we do not exclusively compare
direct neighbors. In the next step, we implement the border design by including county-pair xed
eects (column (3)). Here, identication is based on dierences within county pairs at district
borders. Specication (4) is our baseline model as described in equation (2.1), including individual
and county-level controls to account for potential dierences in observable characteristics
between counties within county pairs. In a last step, we combine the border design with the
specic institutional feature that Stasi district oces administered dierent average levels of
surveillance intensities (see our discussion in Section 2.2). Econometrically, we use the leave-out
average district-level surveillance intensity as an instrument for the county-level spying density
and estimate the reduced form relationship, reported in column (5). In Appendix Table 2.A.6, we
additionally document the corresponding rst and second-stage relationships and provide IV-
diagnostics. Overall, the instrument proves to be reasonably strong with rst-stage F -statistics
exceeding 10 for all outcomes and second-stage estimates being statistically signicant.22
Overall, Table 2.2 shows signicantly negative eects of the spying density on our measures
of trust in the border design.23 Importantly, we nd that our results become stronger when
implementing the identication strategy step-by-step, i.e., when moving from column (2) to
column (5). This empirical pattern suggests that endogeneity induces an upward bias in the
estimates. We consider this an important insight in light of the current literature using the
same variation in government surveillance (Jacob and Tyrell, 2010, Friehe et al., 2015). In terms
of magnitudes, we nd that a one standard deviation increase in the spying density reduces
trust in strangers by 0.07-0.09 of a standard deviation (Panel A, columns (4) and (5)). Reciprocal
behavior decreases by 0.15-0.17 of a standard deviation (Panel B). Turning to our two measures
of institutional trust, we observe a very similar pattern (cf. Table 2.2, Panels C and D). We nd a
signicant negative eect on the intention to vote in federal elections. A one standard deviation
increase in the spying density decreases the likelihood of attending elections by 0.06-0.12 of a
22 We nd similar eects when including each county’s own contribution to calculate the district-level spying
density, that is, using the overall district average as an instrument (cf. Appendix Table 2.A.6).
23 We obtain similar results for two alternative measures of individual and institutional trust, the number of close
friends and engagement in local politics, see Appendix Table 2.A.1.
108
2.5 Empirical Results
Table 2.2: The Eect of Spying on Interpersonal and Institutional Trust
All Counties Border County Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A – Trust in Strangers
County-Level Spying Density 0.051∗ 0.069∗ -0.030 -0.065∗∗
(0.029) (0.039) (0.041) (0.027)
District-Level Spying Density -0.092∗∗
(0.044)
Number of Observations 3,307 2,007 2,007 2,007 2,007
Adjusted R-Squared 0.006 0.022 0.109 0.143 0.143
Panel B – Reciprocal Behavior
County-Level Spying Density -0.087∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.049) (0.049)
District-Level Spying Density -0.152∗∗
(0.062)
Number of Observations 2,946 1,761 1,761 1,761 1,761
Adjusted R-Squared 0.015 0.025 0.106 0.184 0.179
Panel C – Attend Elections
County-Level Spying Density -0.035 -0.076 -0.081∗∗ -0.060∗
(0.037) (0.058) (0.031) (0.031)
District-Level Spying Density -0.115∗∗∗
(0.039)
Number of Observations 3,041 1,835 1,835 1,835 1,835
Adjusted R-Squared 0.006 0.018 0.128 0.151 0.152
Panel D – Far-Right/Left Orientation
County-Level Spying Density 0.030 0.033 0.053 0.110∗∗
(0.050) (0.064) (0.061) (0.051)
District-Level Spying Density 0.177∗∗
(0.069)
Number of Observations 2,474 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,506
Adjusted R-Squared 0.011 0.018 0.104 0.142 0.144
Border County-Pair Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the eect of state surveillance on dierent measures of interpersonal and institutional trust (see
panels). The underlying econometric model is described in equation (2.1). In columns (1)–(4), the main regressor of interest
is the county-level spying density. In column (5), we combine the border design with an instrumental variables strategy.
Here, the leave-out district-level spying density serves as the regressor of interest. All variables have been standardized. All
specications include dummies for historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, year xed eects, and a dummy variable
indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site oce. As indicated at the bottom of the table, border county-pair xed eects and
control variables are included in some specications. These control variables comprise the individuals’ age and gender, as well
as measures of the size and demographic/industrial composition of the counties in the 1980s, measures for the strength of the
opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, political, and religious composition of the counties
pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). While specication (1) is estimated on the full sample of counties, estimates
in columns (2)–(5) are based on the sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-sectional
weights are adjusted for duplicates of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
county-pair and the county level. Signicance levels are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for
detailed information on all variables.
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standard deviation. Furthermore, we nd that a higher spying density induces voters to endorse
more politically extreme parties, i.e., to move to the far right or far left of the political spectrum
conditional on voting.24
Table 2.3 summarizes the results for our measures of economic performance. In line with the
trust literature, we also nd negative economic eects of Stasi spying. A one standard deviation
increase in the spying intensity raises the individual unemployment duration by 0.07-0.11
of a standard deviation and lowers labor income (conditional on working) by 0.11-0.16 of a
standard deviation. In contrast, we nd small and imprecise eects on the probability to become
self-employment (Panel C).
Our estimates reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are standardized to compare the eect size of
our estimates across measures, and hence test the internal validity of our results. Reassuringly,
estimated eects within types of trust and between measures of trust and economic performance
are of similar magnitudes. To ease the interpretation of the eects, we further transform our
estimates into a more intuitive scale in terms of outcome variables. Our results imply that a
one standard deviation increase in the spying density decreases the probability to trust by 2-
3 percentage points and lowers the likelihood of reciprocal behavior by about 2 percentage points.
Looking at institutional trust, a one standard deviation higher intensity of surveillance decreases
the probability to attend elections by around 2-3 percentage points, while the likelihood to vote
for extreme parties increases by 3-5 percentage points. As regards economic measures, the
individual unemployment exposure increases by 1-2 percentage points, while monthly gross
income – conditional on working – is 100-140 EUR lower.
2.5.2 Sensitivity Checks and Additional Results
We next provide a range of robustness checks to make sure that estimates are not driven by
modeling choices.
Inference. Standard errors of our baseline results are two-way clustered at the county-pair
and county level. As discussed above, we choose this default to account for common shocks
within county pairs as well as the duplication of certain counties. One-way clustering at the
county-pair level yields very similar standard errors. However, parts of the identifying variation
are induced by dierences in surveillance strategies across districts, which would imply that
standard errors should be clustered at the district level. This might, in turn, be problematic due
to the small number of clusters (N = 14). We account for this by implementing the standard
percentile-t Wild cluster bootstrap approach as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008). Panel B in
24 Results are equally driven by moves towards both sides of the political spectrum.
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Table 2.3: The Eect of Spying on Economic Performance
All Counties Border County Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A – Unemployment Duration
County-Level Spying Density 0.026 0.059 0.054 0.072∗∗
(0.028) (0.048) (0.035) (0.030)
District-Level Spying Density 0.113∗∗∗
(0.031)
Number of Observations 2,795 1,739 1,739 1,739 1,739
Adjusted R-Squared 0.007 0.018 0.091 0.131 0.132
Panel B – Log Mean Labor Income
County-Level Spying Density -0.067∗∗ -0.072∗ -0.085∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.043) (0.035) (0.037)
District-Level Spying Density -0.113∗∗
(0.056)
Number of Observations 2,308 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422
Adjusted R-Squared 0.014 0.013 0.069 0.171 0.165
Panel C – Self-Employment Duration
County-Level Spying Density 0.053∗∗ 0.039 -0.005 0.001
(0.024) (0.034) (0.032) (0.019)
District-Level Spying Density -0.004
(0.026)
Number of Observations 2,792 1,739 1,739 1,739 1,739
Adjusted R-Squared 0.007 0.009 0.046 0.070 0.070
Border County-Pair Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the eect of state surveillance on dierent measures of economic performance (see panels). The
underlying econometric model is described in equation (2.1). In columns (1)–(4), the main regressor of interest is the county-
level spying density. In column (5), we combine the border design with an instrumental variables strategy. Here, the leave-
out district-level spying density serves as the regressor of interest. All variables have been standardized. All specications
include dummies for historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, year xed eects, and a dummy variable indicating the
presence of a Stasi on-site oce. As indicated at the bottom of the table, border county-pair xed eects and control
variables are included in some specications. These control variables comprise the individuals’ age and gender, as well as
measures of the size and demographic/industrial composition of the counties in the 1980s, measures for the strength of the
opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, political, and religious composition of the counties
pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). While specication (1) is estimated on the full sample of counties, estimates
in columns (2)–(5) are based on the sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-sectional
weights are adjusted for duplicates of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
county-pair and the county level. Signicance levels are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for
detailed information on all variables.
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Appendix Table 2.A.2 shows that reduced form estimates are at least statistically signicant at
the 10 percent level – with the exception of labor income, which is signicant at the 13 %-level.
As an alternative robustness check, we further conduct randomization inference in the spirit
of Chetty et al. (2009) and Fouka and Voth (2016). We perform 2,999 random permutations
of the dependent variable and re-estimate model (2.1) each time. The corresponding p-values
reported in Table 2.A.2 indicate the share of estimated coecients that are smaller (larger for
the outcomes “far right/left orientation” and “unemployment duration”) than our estimates.
Again, results suggests that our inference is robust.
Deep Historical Dierences. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that accounting for observable his-
torical dierences within county pairs increases the magnitude of the estimates. In addition, we
can exploit an institutional feature of the GDR to further improve the comparability of counties
within pairs. To this end, we draw on the territorial reforms of 1949–1952 that eliminated the
decentralized structure of the Weimar Republic and created 15 purely administrative districts
(cf. Section 2.2). The explicit goal of the reform was to remove the inuence of the formerly
powerful provinces of the Weimar Republic. As a consequence, new borders were often drawn
through former Weimar provinces, separating regions with the same cultural heritage (see
Figure 2.A.4). If unobserved cultural dierences within county pairs at newly drawn borders
are smaller than dierences at historical borders, potential endogeneity bias should be smaller
for the former type of pairs. We assess this hypothesis by estimating an interaction model
dierentiating between historical and newly drawn borders.25 We generally nd larger absolute
eects and more precise estimates for county pairs which share the same cultural heritage (see
Table 2.A.3). We take this as further evidence that endogeneity induces an upward bias and
estimates become larger in absolute terms as we tighten the identication strategy.
County Pairs and Weighting. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, there are various ways to
dene the estimation sample in case of multiple neighboring counties. To limit the number
of duplications and nd pairs that are largely similar in observable characteristics, we only
consider the neighbor that shares the longest borderline with the respective county in our
baseline specication. Nevertheless, we also provide estimates based on the full set of county
pairs. As a third variant, we consider a specication without any duplicates, discarding relatively
smaller pairs that would lead to a duplication of counties. Results are summarized in Appendix
25 Precisely, we interact the spying density of our baseline border design model given in equation (2.1) with a
dummy variable indicating whether counties within a pair are from the same or from dierent Weimar provinces.
We also exclude Weimar province dummies from the regressions to be able to also identify eects of dierences
between former provinces. Dropping these province dummies considerably lowers the power of the instrument,
so we do not report reduced form estimates for this specication.
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Table 2.A.4.
Overall, we nd that results from our baseline model are on average larger in absolute terms
compared to estimates obtained from the full set of possible county pairs. This pattern is in
line with the results from the smoothness test shown in Table 2.1, which indicate that our
baseline specication does better in balancing covariates, thereby lending more credibility to the
identifying assumption of the border design. Results also prevail when avoiding any duplication
despite the much smaller sample. Last, Appendix Table 2.A.4 shows that estimates are also
robust with respect to the duplication adjustment of sample weights.
Other Measures of Surveillance Intensity and Alternative Channels. While the num-
ber of operative informers is arguably the most natural measure of surveillance intensity
(cf. Section 2.2), we show in Appendix Table 2.A.5 that results are robust when using alternative
denitions such as the total number of informers or when additionally including the number
of ocial Stasi employees. Finally, we show that our estimates are robust to controlling for
regional variation in political indoctrination.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the eect of state surveillance on interpersonal and institutional
trust and economic performance. We study the case of the former socialist German Democratic
Republic, one of the largest surveillance systems of all time, and exploit county-level variation in
the density of Stasi informers. To account for the non-random recruitment of informers across
counties, we harness the specic institutional features of the East German surveillance state
and combine a standard border discontinuity design with an instrumental variables approach.
Overall, the results of our study oer substantial evidence for negative and long-lasting
eects of government surveillance. We nd strong and consistent evidence that a higher density
of informers undermines individuals’ interpersonal and institutional trust. In particular, more
intense surveillance causes lower trust in strangers, less positive reciprocity, lower participation
in elections, and more support for extreme political parties. Against this backdrop, we further
nd negative and persistent eects of government surveillance on measures of economic
performance, as measured by individual labor income and unemployment duration.
Our results add to the literature on institutions, trust, and economic performance (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015). First, our study establishes a causal link between formal institutions
(surveillance) and culture (trust). Second, and in line with Tabellini (2010), we provide evidence
that the degree of democratic governance aects economic outcomes. Third, with both trust and
economic performance being impaired by government surveillance, our ndings also provide
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suggestive evidence in favor of a well-established channel: institutions shape people’s trust,
and trust aects economic development (Algan and Cahuc, 2014). In this respect, government
surveillance might have had an eect on economic performance through alternative channels,
such as personality traits or liberal values. While investigating these channels is certainly
interesting, we follow the literature and focus on the broader outcome of trust, which is
predicted to aect economic performance (Berg et al., 1995) and has been shown to be shaped
by personality traits (Dohmen et al., 2008). Last, we show that our eects are persistent and
still detectable two decades after the end of the socialist regime. Given the intergenerational
transmission of trust and beliefs (see, e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011, Dohmen et al., 2012), it
is possible that these eects will be even longer-lasting.
One important question is how our ndings translate to other (contemporary) forms of mass
surveillance in authoritarian states given that surveillance strategies have changed over the
last decades and nowadays rely arguably more on technology than individual informers.26 It is
likely that this shift towards electronic surveillance modes renders the ndings for interpersonal
trust within the social network less important. At the same time, it seems plausible that trust in
institutions could still be aected by modern forms of surveillance. After the revelation of the
NSA wiretapping and the Snowden aair, for example, anecdotal evidence suggests that citizens
did not know which communication companies to trust (see, e.g., Schneier, 2013). Moreover,
a large share of people stated that they had adjusted their use of telecommunications as a
consequence of the aair (Pew Research Center, 2014).
The Snowden aair further points to another conceptual issue when generalizing our ndings.
Are eects of government surveillance dierent in a democracy? Both democratic and autocratic
regimes would justify surveillance with the need to secure the stability of the system – hence
with benevolent motives, while the (perceived) degree of benevolence is, of course, highly
subjective. Separating negative and positive aspects of surveillance is notoriously dicult,
and researchers will most likely only be able to assess the net eect of surveillance. The
ndings of this study show that the net eect of government surveillance on trust and economic
performance was negative in the case of socialist East Germany. Net eects of state surveillance
in other systems and at dierent times may vary and should to be studied case-by-case.
26 Nevertheless, contemporaneous regimes still make use of informers to control their citizens. Various accounts
state that China still heavily relies on a large network of informers (see, e.g., Branigan, 2010, Jacobs and Anseld,
2011, Yu, 2014). Likewise, Russia has been observed to re-implement surveillance strategies in which secret
informers and denunciations play an important role in controlling opposition forces (Capon, 2015).
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Appendix 2.A Further Results and Figures
Table 2.A.1: The Eect of Spying on Alternative Measures of Trust
All Counties Border County Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A – Number of Friends
County-Level Spying Density -0.045 -0.054 -0.084∗∗ -0.089∗∗
(0.051) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
District-Level Spying Density -0.074∗
(0.043)
Number of Observations 3,110 1,903 1,903 1,903 1,903
Adjusted R-Squared 0.012 0.026 0.105 0.123 0.121
Panel B – Engagement in Local Politics
County-Level Spying Density 0.032 -0.005 -0.071∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.037) (0.033) (0.028)
District-Level Spying Density -0.114∗∗∗
(0.039)
Number of Observations 3,555 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166
Adjusted R-Squared 0.006 0.013 0.054 0.071 0.070
Border County-Pair Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the eect of state surveillance on alternative measures of interpersonal and institutional trust (see
panels). Results for the baseline measures of trust are shown in Table 2.2. The underlying econometric model is described
in equation (2.1). In columns (1)–(4), the main regressor of interest is the county-level spying density. In column (5), we
combine the border design with an instrumental variables strategy. Here, the leave-out district-level spying density serves
as the regressor of interest. All variables have been standardized. All specications include dummies for historical provinces
of the Weimar Republic, year xed eects, and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site oce. As indicated
at the bottom of the table, border county-pair xed eects and control variables are included in some specications. These
control variables comprise the individuals’ age and gender, as well as measures of the size and demographic/industrial
composition of the counties in the 1980s, measures for the strength of the opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators
for the economic, political, and religious composition of the counties pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). While
specication (1) is estimated on the full sample of counties, estimates in columns (2)–(5) are based on the sample of contiguous
county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for duplicates of counties that are
part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level. Signicance levels
are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for detailed information on all variables.
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Table 2.A.2: Robustness Checks – Inference
Trust in Reciprocal Attend Extreme Unemploy. Labor Self-Emp.
Strangers Behavior Elections Left/Right Duration Income Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A – County-Level Spying Density
Baseline Estimate -0.065 -0.169 -0.060 0.110 0.072 -0.155 0.001
Cluster on County-Pair and County Level (0.027) (0.049) (0.031) (0.051) (0.030) (0.037) (0.019)
[0.022] [0.001] [0.055] [0.034] [0.020] [0.000] [0.976]
Alternative Cluster Denitions
Cluster on County-Pair Level (0.028) (0.047) (0.031) (0.050) (0.034) (0.037) (0.020)
[0.023] [0.001] [0.055] [0.032] [0.036] [0.000] [0.977]
Cluster on County Level (0.021) (0.039) (0.024) (0.038) (0.022) (0.028) (0.015)
[0.003] [0.000] [0.015] [0.005] [0.001] [0.000] [0.969]
Cluster on County-Pair and District Level (0.025) (0.050) (0.032) (0.040) (0.030) (0.035) (0.020)
[0.023] [0.005] [0.080] [0.017] [0.031] [0.001] [0.978]
Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t (H0 imposed)
Cluster on County-Pair and District Level [0.090] [0.047] [0.161] [0.059] [0.172] [0.019] [0.983]
Randomization Inference
Cumulative Distribution of Estimates [0.082] [0.000] [0.095] [0.023] [0.038] [0.000] [0.522]
Panel B – District-Level Spying Density
Baseline Estimate -0.092 -0.152 -0.115 0.177 0.113 -0.113 -0.004
Cluster on County-Pair and County Level (0.044) (0.062) (0.039) (0.069) (0.031) (0.056) (0.026)
[0.042] [0.019] [0.004] [0.014] [0.001] [0.049] [0.871]
Alternative Cluster Denitions
Cluster on County-Pair Level (0.043) (0.064) (0.040) (0.068) (0.035) (0.054) (0.027)
[0.040] [0.021] [0.006] [0.012] [0.002] [0.043] [0.877]
Cluster on County Level (0.036) (0.049) (0.031) (0.054) (0.022) (0.043) (0.020)
[0.013] [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.011] [0.830]
Cluster on County-Pair and District Level (0.035) (0.068) (0.041) (0.069) (0.027) (0.052) (0.027)
[0.022] [0.045] [0.015] [0.025] [0.001] [0.051] [0.880]
Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t (H0 imposed)
Cluster on County-Pair and District Level [0.080] [0.082] [0.055] [0.041] [0.011] [0.134] [0.919]
Randomization Inference
Cumulative Distribution of Estimates [0.051] [0.007] [0.029] [0.005] [0.013] [0.031] [0.488]
Notes: This table presents robustness checks on inference for our baseline estimates based on the county-level spying density (cf. col-
umn (4) of Tables 2.2 and 2.3) in Panel A and our reduced form estimate using the leave-out spying density at the district level
(cf. column (5) of Tables 2.2 and 2.3) in Panel B. On top of each panel, we present the corresponding point estimate along with our
baseline standard errors that are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level (in parentheses) and the corresponding
p-values in square brackets. Below, we report the corresponding standard errors and p-values for alternative cluster specications,
as well as empirical p-values from a wild cluster percentile-t bootstrap test with H0 imposed (Cameron et al., 2008). In the last row
of each panel, we present p-values based on randomization inference in the spirit of Chetty et al. (2009) and Fouka and Voth (2016).
Empirical p-values from the wild cluster percentile-t bootstrap and randomization inference procedures are both based on 2,999 repli-
cations. All specications include border county-pair xed eects, dummies for historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, year
xed eects, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site oce as well as control variables which comprise the individ-
uals’ age and gender, as well as measures of the size and demographic/industrial composition of the counties in the 1980s, measures
for the strength of the opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, political, and religious composition of
the counties pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). All specications are based on the sample of contiguous county pairs
that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for duplicates of counties that are part of multiple pairs. See
Data Appendix 2.B for detailed information on all variables.
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Table 2.A.3: The Eect of Spying by Weimar Provinces
Trust in Reciprocal Attend Extreme Unemploy. Labor Self-Emp.
Strangers Behavior Elections Left/Right Duration Income Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
County-Level Spying Density
× Dierent Weimar Province -0.065 0.058 -0.054 0.041 -0.023 0.058 -0.031
(0.048) (0.089) (0.067) (0.091) (0.083) (0.107) (0.035)
× Same Weimar Province -0.075∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.050 0.089 0.097∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.034) (0.085) (0.039) (0.069) (0.044) (0.053) (0.027)
Number of Observations 2,007 1,761 1,835 1,506 1,739 1,422 1,739
Notes: This table shows the eect of state surveillance on trust and economic performance when allowing for heteroge-
neous treatment eects for county pairs with similar and dierent cultural heritage. The underlying econometric model
is based on equation (2.1) where the county-level spying density is fully interacted with a dummy variable indicating
whether two counties in a pair belonged to the same state or Prussian province of the Weimar Republic before World
War II. All variables have been standardized. All specications include border county-pair xed eects, year xed ef-
fects, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site oce as well as control variables which comprise the
individuals’ age and gender, as well as measures of the size and demographic/industrial composition of the counties in
the 1980s, measures for the strength of the opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, polit-
ical, and religious composition of the counties pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). All regressions are based
on the sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for
duplicates of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the
county level. Signicance levels are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for detailed information
on all variables.
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Table 2.A.4: Robustness Checks – County-Pair Sample Denition
Baseline All Pairs No Duplicates No Wgt. Adjust.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A – Trust in Strangers
County-Level Spying Density -0.065∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.096∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.027) (0.033) (0.041) (0.031)
District-Level Spying Density -0.092∗∗ -0.014 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.071
(0.044) (0.046) (0.051) (0.045)
Number of Observations 2,007 2,007 2,814 2,814 1,226 1,226 2,007 2,007
Panel B – Reciprocal Behavior
County-Level Spying Density -0.169∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗
(0.049) (0.040) (0.053) (0.050)
District-Level Spying Density -0.152∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.117∗
(0.062) (0.056) (0.068) (0.060)
Number of Observations 1,761 1,761 2,451 2,451 1,075 1,075 1,761 1,761
Panel C – Attend Elections
County-Level Spying Density -0.060∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.055∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032)
District-Level Spying Density -0.115∗∗∗ -0.064∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.034) (0.040) (0.038)
Number of Observations 1,835 1,835 2,569 2,569 1,127 1,127 1,835 1,835
Panel D – Far-Right/Left Orientation
County-Level Spying Density 0.110∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.059 0.104∗∗
(0.051) (0.041) (0.075) (0.048)
District-Level Spying Density 0.177∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.074 0.154∗∗
(0.069) (0.048) (0.113) (0.059)
Number of Observations 1,506 1,506 2,111 2,111 910 910 1,506 1,506
Panel E – Unemployment Duration
County-Level Spying Density 0.072∗∗ 0.015 0.066∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034)
District-Level Spying Density 0.113∗∗∗ 0.065 0.053∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.042) (0.031) (0.029)
Number of Observations 1,739 1,739 2,366 2,366 1,036 1,036 1,739 1,739
Panel F – Log Mean Labor Income
County-Level Spying Density -0.155∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.059) (0.037)
District-Level Spying Density -0.113∗∗ -0.065 -0.209∗∗∗ -0.091∗
(0.056) (0.048) (0.074) (0.048)
Number of Observations 1,422 1,422 1,943 1,943 839 839 1,422 1,422
Panel G – Self-Employment Duration
County-Level Spying Density 0.001 -0.008 0.044∗ -0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018)
District-Level Spying Density -0.004 -0.027 0.008 -0.017
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024)
Number of Observations 1,739 1,739 2,366 2,366 1,036 1,036 1,739 1,739
Notes: This table shows the eects of state surveillance on trust and economic performance when using dierent denitions of
the county-pair sample. The underlying econometric model is described in equation (2.1). All variables have been standardized.
Estimates in columns (1)–(2) print our baseline results shown in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 2.2 and 2.3. These estimates are
based on our preferred county-pair sample and adjusted weights for the duplication of counties. Columns (3) and (4) show
the corresponding results when using all existing county pairs. In turn, estimates in columns (5)–(6) are based on a smaller
sample that excludes all county duplicates. Estimates in columns (7) and (8) are based on our baseline denition of the county-
pair sample but weights are not adjusted if counties are duplicated. All specications use cross-sectional weights and include
border county-pair xed eects, dummies for historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, year xed eects, a dummy variable
indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site oce as well as control variables which comprise the individuals’ age and gender, as
well as measures of the size and demographic/industrial composition of the counties in the 1980s, measures for the strength of
the opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, political, and religious composition of the counties
pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level.
Signicance levels are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for detailed information on all variables.118
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Table 2.A.5: Robustness Checks – Alternative Measures
Baseline IM1 and IM2 IM1, IM2, HAM Control f. Indoctr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A – Trust in Strangers
County-Level Spying Density -0.065∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023)
District-Level Spying Density -0.092∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.055) (0.037)
Number of Observations 2,007 2,007 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 2,007 2,007
Panel B – Reciprocal Behavior
County-Level Spying Density -0.169∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
District-Level Spying Density -0.152∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.154∗∗
(0.062) (0.067) (0.072) (0.063)
Number of Observations 1,761 1,761 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,761 1,761
Panel C – Attend Elections
County-Level Spying Density -0.060∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.059∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
District-Level Spying Density -0.115∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.037)
Number of Observations 1,835 1,835 1,595 1,595 1,595 1,595 1,835 1,835
Panel D – Far-Right/Left Orientation
County-Level Spying Density 0.110∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.053)
District-Level Spying Density 0.177∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.180∗∗
(0.069) (0.076) (0.090) (0.070)
Number of Observations 1,506 1,506 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,506 1,506
Panel E – Unemployment Duration
County-Level Spying Density 0.072∗∗ 0.065∗ 0.063∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030)
District-Level Spying Density 0.113∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.041) (0.032)
Number of Observations 1,739 1,739 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,739 1,739
Panel F – Log Mean Labor Income
County-Level Spying Density -0.155∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.037)
District-Level Spying Density -0.113∗∗ -0.135∗ -0.110 -0.112∗
(0.056) (0.068) (0.080) (0.058)
Number of Observations 1,422 1,422 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,422 1,422
Panel G – Self-Employment Duration
County-Level Spying Density 0.001 0.015 0.012 0.000
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
District-Level Spying Density -0.004 0.010 0.003 -0.005
(0.026) (0.031) (0.034) (0.025)
Number of Observations 1,739 1,739 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,739 1,739
Notes: This table shows the eects of state surveillance on trust and economic performance when using dierent measures of gov-
ernment surveillance and accounting for alternative channels. The underlying econometric model is described in equation (2.1).
All variables have been standardized. Estimates in columns (1)–(2) print our baseline results shown in columns (4) and (5) of
Tables 2.2 and 2.3. These estimates use the share of operative informers (IM1) in the population as our measure of state surveil-
lance. Columns (3) and (4) show the corresponding results when taking the per-capita number of operative informers (IM1)
and informers providing logistics (IM2) as our measure of state surveillance. In columns (5)–(6), the measure of spying density
includes operative informers (IM1), informers providing logistics (IM2), and ocial Stasi employees. Columns (7) and (8) show
the results for our baseline specication when additionally controlling for dierences in the political indoctrination of counties
(measured by the share of SED party members among the local elites). All specications include border county-pair xed eects,
dummies for historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, year xed eects, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi
on-site oce as well as control variables which comprise the individuals’ age and gender, as well as measures of the size and
demographic/industrial composition of the counties in the 1980s, measures for the strength of the opposition to the regime in
the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, political, and religious composition of the counties pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2
for details). All specications are based on the sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-
sectional weights are adjusted for duplicates of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the county-pair and the county level. Signicance levels are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for
detailed information on all variables.
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Table 2.A.6: Instrumental Variables Results
Leave-Out District Mean District-Level Average
First Reduced Second First Reduced Second
Stage Form Stage Stage Form Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A – Trust in Strangers (N = 2, 007)
District-Level Spying Density 0.777∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.231) (0.044) (0.156) (0.035)
County-Level Spying Density -0.118∗∗ -0.095∗∗
(0.051) (0.038)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 11.35 32.32
Underidentication p-Value 0.024 0.010
Panel B – Reciprocal Behavior (N = 1, 761)
District-Level Spying Density 0.816∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.062) (0.144) (0.059)
County-Level Spying Density -0.186∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.069)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 14.86 38.23
Underidentication p-Value 0.016 0.008
Panel C – Attend Elections (N = 1, 835)
District-Level Spying Density 0.821∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.039) (0.143) (0.036)
County-Level Spying Density -0.140∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(0.067) (0.051)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 14.73 39.91
Underidentication p-Value 0.020 0.010
Panel D – Far-Right/Left Orientation (N = 1, 506)
District-Level Spying Density 0.763∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.222) (0.069) (0.153) (0.067)
County-Level Spying Density 0.231∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.125) (0.094)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 11.85 31.61
Underidentication p-Value 0.020 0.009
Panel E – Unemployment Duration (N = 1, 739)
District-Level Spying Density 0.683∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.031) (0.155) (0.029)
County-Level Spying Density 0.166∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.039)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 10.33 26.01
Underidentication p-Value 0.026 0.011
Panel F – Log Mean Labor Income (N = 1, 422)
District-Level Spying Density 0.698∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(0.195) (0.056) (0.145) (0.051)
County-Level Spying Density -0.161∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.046)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 12.78 29.72
Underidentication p-Value 0.020 0.010
Panel G – Self-Employment Duration (N = 1, 739)
District-Level Spying Density 0.683∗∗∗ -0.004 0.789∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.212) (0.026) (0.155) (0.023)
County-Level Spying Density -0.006 -0.004
(0.038) (0.029)
Weak Instrument F -Statistic 10.33 26.01
Underidentication p-Value 0.026 0.011
Notes: This table provides more detailed results on the eects of state surveillance on trust and economic performance when
combining the border design with an instrumental variables strategy. The underlying econometric model is described in
equation (2.1), where we either use the leave-out spying density at the district level as the instrument (columns (1)–(3)) or
the simple district average (columns (4)–(6)). All variables have been standardized. Estimates in column (2) print our baseline
reduced form results shown in column (5) of Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Columns (1) and (4) report rst-stage results as well as test for
the strength and relevance of the respective instruments. Columns (3) and (6) report the corresponding second-stage results.
All specications include border county-pair xed eects, dummies for historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, year
xed eects, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site oce as well as control variables which comprise
the individuals’ age and gender, as well as measures of the size and demographic/industrial composition of the counties in
the 1980s, measures for the strength of the opposition to the regime in the 1950s, and indicators for the economic, political,
and religious composition of the counties pre-World War II (see Section 2.4.2 for details). All specications are based on the
sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for duplicates
of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level.
Signicance levels are ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See Data Appendix 2.B for detailed information on all variables.
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Figure 2.A.1: Out-Migration from East Germany
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Notes: Based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt (1993).
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Figure 2.A.2: Regional Disclosure Requests and Number of Informers
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Notes: This graph plots the correlation between the regional number of disclosure requests and the number
of operative Stasi informers at the level of the 15 GDR districts, relative to a district’s average population
from 1980–1988. Panel A shows the overall correlation, controlling for year xed eects. Panel B shows the
evolution of this relationship over time, regressing the number of disclosure requests per capita on the share
of operative informers in the 1980s separately year-by-year. Both measures are standardized. Standard errors
are heteroscedasticity-robust, Panel B shows 95 % condence intervals. Data on the district-level number of
requests has been provided by the Stasi Records Agency in response to a Freedom of Information request.
Figure 2.A.3: Number of Requests for the Inspection of Stasi Files
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Notes: This graph plots the annual number of requests to inspect Stasi les. It is
based on data from the Agency of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records.
122
2.A Further Results and Figures
Figure 2.A.4: GDR Districts and Provinces of the Weimar Republic
Notes: The gure shows GDR district borders and historical borders of the states of the
Weimar Republic and the Prussian provinces as of 1933. Maps: MPIDR and CGG (2011) and
EuroGeographics.
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Figure 2.A.5: Informer Density and Socialist Indoctrination
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Notes: The graph plots the correlation between the share of operative unocial informers and the intensity
of socialist indoctrination as measured by the share of elites with a SED party membership. Panel A depicts
the unconditional correlation, Panel B the residual correlation after conditioning on county level covariates.
The β coecients report the regression slope, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. For
information on all variables, see Appendix Table 2.B.1.
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Appendix 2.B Data Appendix
2.B.1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.B.1: Denition of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Years Source
Panel A – Stasi Data (See Section 2.2)
Spying Density 1980–1988 The main explanatory variable of interest, the regional spying den-
sity, is calculated as the average spying density at the county level in
the period 1980–1988 (see Section 2.2 for details). Data on unocial
informers are based on ocial Stasi records that were in large part
compiled by Müller-Enbergs (2008). As the Stasi Records Agency keeps
restoring les and releasing new data, we collected additional informa-
tion from the Stasi archives and expanded the data set with informer
gures from ten previously missing county oces (Akteneinsicht zu
Forschungszwecken, BStU Tgb. 15582/15Z ). Population gures were taken
from the Statistical Yearbooks of the GDR.
Our baseline measure of spying density covers unocial informers
for political-operative penetration, homeland defense, or special opera-
tions, as well as leading informers (IM zur politisch-operativen Durch-
dringung und Sicherung des Verantwortungsbereiches, IM der Abwehr mit
Feindverbindung bzw. zur unmittelbaren Bearbeitung im Verdacht der
Feindtätigkeit stehender Personen, IM im besonderen Einsatz, Führungs-
IM). In cases where the Stasi held additional on-site oces (Objektdien-
ststellen) in counties, the number of informers attached to these oces
was added to the number of spies in the respective county.
Stasi Employees 1982 The number of regular Stasi employees (Hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter)
attached to county oces in 1982 was provided by Jens Gieseke.
Panel B – Individual SOEP Data (See Section 2.4.2)
Attend Elections 2005, 2009 Respondents are asked about their willingness to attend the next elec-
tion for the German parliament. The question reads as follows: “If the
next election to the German ‘Bundestag’ (lower house of parliament)
were next Sunday, would you vote?” Response options were given on
a ve-point scale allowing individuals to express varying degrees of
conviction (not) to vote. We re-scaled the original variable such that
higher values indicate a stronger willingness to participate. We discard
individuals that are not eligible to vote.
continued
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Table 2.B.1 continued
Variable Years Source
Far-Right/Left
Orientation
2005, 2009 Respondents are asked to state their political orientation, the underlying
question being: “In politics, people often talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’
when describing dierent political views. When you think about your
own political view, how would you rate them on the scale below?”
Response options were given on a eleven-point scale allowing dierent
placement along the political spectrum. We consider respondents to
be political extreme if they are in the upper/lower four percent of the
distribution.
Labor Income 1992–2010 Information on current monthly gross labor income is provided in ev-
ery wave of the SOEP for East German respondents since 1992. We
calculate real income in 2010 prices using the ocial German CPI (Ver-
braucherpreisindex). We discard individuals with labor income below
100 EUR.
Reciprocal
Behavior
2005, 2010 We use six questions on positive and negative reciprocity to combine
them into one single measure by taking the simple mean. Response
options on each statement vary on a seven-point scale and we re-scale
the responses on the three statements indicating negative reciprocity
such that higher values in our variable indicate more positive reciprocal
behavior.
Self-Employment
Probability
1992–2009 Detailed information on individuals’ type of employment is given in
every wave of the survey. The data set distinguishes between self-
employed farmers, free-lance professionals, solo self-employed and self-
employed individuals with coworkers. We focus on the latter category
and construct our measure as the (mean) probability of being self-
employed over the individuals’ observation period.
Trust in Strangers 2003, 2008 The question on interpersonal trust reads as follows: “If one is deal-
ing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them.”
Response options were given on a four-point scale, allowing the re-
spondents to totally or slightly agree, or totally or slightly disagree
with the given statements. Following Glaeser et al. (2000), we dene a
dichotomous variable by grouping the former and latter two answers.
Unemployment
Duration
1992–2010 In every year, respondents are asked to indicate the number of months
spent in (registered) unemployment. We calculate our measure of unem-
ployment duration as the average number of months in unemployment
per year over the sampling period.
Control Variables The set of control variables includes the respondents’ age and gender.
Panel C – County-Level Data (See Section 2.4.2)
County Size 1990 The area of each East German county is reported in Rudolph (1990).
continued
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Table 2.B.1 continued
Variable Years Source
Demographics 12/1989 Information on age-specic population shares are obtained from infas
(DDR-Kreisstrukturdaten).
Industry Controls 09/1989 Information on the goods value of production is collected from infas
(DDR-Kreisstrukturdaten). Data on the industrial composition of the
workforce as of September 1989 is reported in Rudolph (1990).
Opposition 1953 We use cartographic statistics published by the former West German
Federal Ministry of Intra-German Relations (Bundesministerium für
gesamtdeutsche Fragen) to construct our measures of regional opposition
to the regime. The map was taken from the archives of the Federal
Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship (Bundesstiftung
zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur), signature: EA 111 1889.
Political Ideology 1928–1932 We proxy historic political ideology by the mean vote shares for the
Communist party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) and the
Nazi party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) in
the federal elections in 1928, 1930, 07/1932 and 11/1932 to construct
two distinct measures of political ideology. Data on Weimar Republic
election results are taken from King et al. (2008).
Population 1925–1933 Population gures for the Weimar Republic were obtained from King
et al. (2008) and Falter and Hänisch (1990).
1980–1989 Data were collected from the Statistical Yearbooks of the German Demo-
cratic Republic (Statistische Jahrbücher der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik).
Religious
Composition
1925 The respective population shares of Protestants and Jews is based on
information from the 1925 census of the Weimar Republic (Volkszählung
1925). Our data stems from King et al. (2008).
Socialist
Indoctrination
1988 We proxy regional socialist indoctrination by the share of political and
economic elites that were members of the Socialist Unity Party (SED).
We calculate this measure using data from the Central Cadre Database
(Zentraler Kaderdatenspeicher, ZKDS). This large administrative data
set was used for planning purposes and contains information on all
political and economic executives of the GDR (except for employees of
the Ministry for State Security, the Ministry of National Defence and
the Ministry of Internal Aairs). The dataset was obtained from the
Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv), signature: DC 20 MD/1.
Workforce
Composition
1925, 1933 County-level self-employment shares are based on the 1925 and 1933
censuses of the Weimar Republic (Volks- und Berufszählung 1925 und
1933). Data for 1925 are obtained from Falter and Hänisch (1990); data
for 1933 from King et al. (2008). The share of white-collar workers is
based on data from the 1933 census.
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Table 2.B.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Min Max N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A – Spying Intensity
County-Level Spying Density 0.37 0.13 0.26 0.35 0.45 0.12 0.78 148
District-Level Spying Density 0.37 0.07 0.30 0.38 0.42 0.27 0.50 147
District-Level Spying Density (Leave-Out) 0.37 0.07 0.31 0.38 0.43 0.26 0.52 147
Panel B – Dependent Variables
Trust in Strangers (2003, 2008) 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,307
Reciprocal Behavior (2005, 2010) 0.77 0.12 0.69 0.76 0.86 0.36 1.00 2,946
Attend Elections (2005, 2009) 0.78 0.27 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.20 1.00 3,041
Extreme Left/Right Voter (2005, 2009) 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,062
Unemployment Duration 1992–2010 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 2,795
Log Mean Labor Income 1992–2010 7.38 0.50 7.12 7.40 7.68 4.92 9.32 2,308
Self-Employment 1992–2010 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2,792
Panel C – Control Variables
Age (in 1990) 42.44 15.81 30.00 40.00 54.00 16.00 95.00 3,229
Male 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3,229
Stasi On-Site Oce 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 148
Log Mean Population 1980–1988 11.13 0.55 10.74 11.09 11.42 9.94 13.22 148
Log County Size 5.92 0.80 5.57 6.12 6.52 3.26 7.14 148
City County 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 148
Share of Population Aged under 15, 1989 19.64 1.76 18.68 19.57 20.74 15.56 24.74 148
Log Industrial Output 1989 21.11 1.33 20.37 21.30 22.03 16.99 23.73 148
Share Industrial Employment 09/1989 46.75 12.75 37.70 48.05 56.25 16.80 74.50 148
Share of Cooperative Workers 09/1989 12.91 8.90 5.97 11.01 18.16 1.20 35.91 148
Uprising Intensity 1953: Strike 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 148
Uprising Intensity 1953: Demonstration 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 148
Uprising Intensity 1953: Riot 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 148
Uprising Intensity 1953: Prisoner Liberation 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 148
Uprising Intensity 1953: Military Intervention 0.76 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 148
Mean Vote Share Communist Party 1928–1932 14.11 6.08 9.64 13.72 17.08 3.13 36.41 148
Mean Vote Share Nazi Party 1928–1932 26.19 3.99 23.47 26.01 28.53 10.19 37.99 148
Share Protestants 1925 91.35 7.68 90.69 92.76 94.23 16.44 97.10 148
Share Jews 1925 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.22 0.01 1.32 148
Mean Share of Self-Employed 1925 and 1933 18.46 2.95 16.59 18.14 20.51 11.91 26.90 148
Share of White Collar Workers 1933 7.26 2.33 5.69 6.87 8.24 3.31 15.60 148
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on outcome and control variables as well as our main explanatory variable. Measures
of the spying intensity as well as most of the control variables vary at the county level, whereas outcomes vary at the individual level,
which is reected in the respective numbers of observations. For detailed information on all variables, see Appendix Table 2.B.1.
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2.B.2 Redrawn County Boundaries and Data Harmonization
We combine county-level data from various sources and decades in this study. Since 1925, the
rst data year in our analysis, county borders have been redrawn multiple times. To account for
these territorial changes, we harmonize all county-level data to boundaries as of October 1990.
Note that this procedure only applies to county-level data. It is not necessary to harmonize
county borders in the individual-level SOEP data as we select respondents based on their
reported county of residence in 1990 and track these people over time.
As regards data from the time of the GDR, we have to account for minor territorial reforms
only. In ten cases, neighboring counties were merged. In ve cases, bigger cities became
independent counties (Stadtkreise) from the surrounding rural county. We manually account for
these administrative changes using detailed maps and other historical sources. When merging
two counties, we use the maximum value of the observed opposition variables measuring the
strike intensity. In the cases where new counties were constituted, we assign historical values
of the emitting county to the created one.
When harmonizing data from the Weimar Republic with the county boundaries as of 1990,
greater territorial reforms have to be taken into account. Due to the lack of adequate population
weighting factors, the harmonization is based on geospatial area weighting factors as described
in Goodchild and Lam (1980). We overlay the corresponding GIS shapeles from the Weimar
Republic with the shapele from 1990 and calculate area weighting factors that allow for
adjusting the historical data to county borders as of 1990. MPIDR and CGG (2011) provide
a rich set of historical shapeles for the German territory. Given that most of our outcomes
and control variables refer to people and not space, it needs to be stressed that this procedure
is subject to some degree of imprecision. Given the long time span, the numerous territorial
reforms, and the lack of population weighting factors, this procedure is, however, the most
accurate harmonization strategy we can apply.
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Labor-Supply Responses
to Wage-Rate Changes∗
3.1 Introduction
Because the labor-supply literature typically focuses on marginal wage changes, a common
prediction of theoretical models is that labor supply responds symmetrically to wage increases
and decreases. In other words, wage increases and wage decreases of equal magnitude have the
same eect (though with opposite signs) on labor supply decisions, implying that labor-supply
elasticities with respect to wages do not depend on the sign of the wage variation. However, it
is not dicult to show that non-marginal wage changes, which are the more relevant types of
wage changes in the real world and therefore for empirical analysis, can lead to asymmetric
responses.1 Although this result has important implications for the empirical estimation of
labor-supply responses, there is little empirical evidence regarding the symmetricity of the
eect of wages on labor-supply.
This paper contributes to the literature by estimating the symmetricity of labor-supply
responses to non-marginal wage changes. Our precise research question is: do wage increases
and decreases of equal magnitude have symmetric eects on labor supply? Answering this
research question requires a set-up that introduces (quasi-) randomly assigned wage increases
and decreases at the same time for comparable individuals. Finding such types of experiments in
‘natural’ settings is dicult, if not impossible, and thus may partly explain the sparse literature
on the symmetricity of labor supply responses to nominal wages.
We address these empirical challenges using a eld experiment on labor supply where we
randomly assign wage increases and decreases of equal magnitude to workers. Specically, we
set-up a real labor task and invite workers to work on this task in an actual online-labor-market,
∗ This chapter is based on a revised version of P. Doerrenberg, D. Duncan, and M. Löer (2016). “Asymmetric
Labor-Supply Responses to Wage-Rate Changes: Evidence from a Field Experiment”. IZA Discussion Paper 9683.
1 We show below that several models predict asymmetric responses to non-marginal wage increases and decreases;
in particular, a standard labor-supply model and a model of loss aversion would predict asymmetry.
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namely Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (henceforth mTurk). The labor task is advertised on the
mTurk website as any other labor task and workers receive wages that are comparable to other
wages on mTurk. In addition, the labor task is designed to be perceived as realistic as possible; it
requires workers to transcribe scanned German-language documents. Importantly, the workers
in our experiment do not know that they are participating in an academic experiment. We
announce a certain wage per transcribed picture in the advertisement of our task on mTurk
and workers complete a batch of six transcriptions for the wage announced in the mTurk
advertisement.2 After transcribing the rst batch of images, all workers are randomly assigned
to one of three groups: (i) the wage remains constant (control group), (ii) the wage increases
by 20 %, (iii) the wage decreases by 20 %. After the updated wages have been presented to
workers, they can select to either stop working on our labor task or keep working as much as
they wish. We identify the symmetricity of the labor-supply response by comparing labor-supply
behavior between the three randomly assigned groups.
The results show that wage increases have a positive eect on labor supply while wage
decreases reduce labor supply, providing clear support for a positive relationship between labor
supply and wages. However, the labor-supply response to wage increases and decreases is
asymmetric. This asymmetry is especially strong on the extensive margin, dened as the share
of workers who quit our task conditional on seeing the treatment information. The estimated
extensive-margin treatment eect for workers who experience a wage decrease is approximately
twice that of workers who experienced a wage increase. Estimates of the intensive margin
response are also suggestive of an asymmetric response where increases have smaller eects
than decreases; dierences in intensive-margin responses to wage increases and decreases are
large, but imprecisely estimated. Our results further show that the wage changes did not have
any eect on the quality of transcriptions, which is above 96 percent in all groups.
We discuss several mechanisms that help to rationalize our results regarding the asymmetry
of labor-supply eects of wages. First, our results are consistent with standard labor-supply
preferences. For example, there might be a positive number of workers in our task with a
reservation wage that is between the initially announced wage and the wage in the decrease
group; workers in this part of the distribution of reservation wages would quit the task once they
learn about the wage decrease. Concurrently, the labor-supply curve might have a particular
shape which induces asymmetric responses to non-marginal wage-rate changes. Second, the
empirical ndings are also consistent with a model of loss aversion where the reference wage
is equal to the expected wage of $ 0.15 and the labor supply curve is kinked at this reference
2 As a result of this design feature, we induce an exogenously determined expectation regarding the per-unit wage
throughout our labor task; workers expect the wage to stay constant at the wage which is advertised on the
mTurk website and paid for the rst six transcriptions. The eld experiment therefore allows us to study the
labor-supply responses to unanticipated wage changes.
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wage. In such a model, wage decreases are predicted to have a larger labor-supply eect than a
wage increase of equal magnitude. Third, previous research by Kube et al. (2013) shows that
asymmetric labor-supply responses can be explained by reciprocity (see below). We argue that
this is an unlikely explanation for our results; since workers are paid per-unit wages, shirking (as
a punishment for wage decreases) or supplying extra hard eort (as a reward to wage increases)
is not possible in our context. We also rule out treatment induced skill-composition changes
across the three groups due to skill-based exits as a possible explanation for our results. In
particular, we do not observe that unskilled workers are more likely to exit in the wage-decrease
group than unskilled workers in the other groups.
Our paper contributes to the literature on labor-supply eects of wage changes. Economists
have explored the eect of wages on labor supply for several decades (see Keane, 2011, for a
survey). Many of these studies use panel-data sets and exploit positive and negative variation in
wages to estimate the wage elasticity of labor supply.3 Because the elasticity estimated by these
studies represents roughly an average of wage-increase-induced and wage-decrease-induced
elasticities, our results suggest that existing estimates likely overestimate the eect of wage
increases while underestimating the eect of wage decreases. Relatedly, our results further
raise questions about the comparability of labor-supply elasticities across studies that dier
in the sign of the wage changes used for identication. Our ndings suggest that it cannot be
concluded from the estimated elasticities that workers are more responsive in the one setting
relative to another without knowing whether the sign of the wage changes is the same.4
Our nding that the largest asymmetry is along the extensive margin is especially important
for understanding the labor-supply eects of wages since it is generally accepted that labor-
supply elasticities are mainly determined by the extensive margin response (Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999, Meghir and Phillips, 2010, Bargain et al., 2014). Our results highlight one possible
reason for the downward rigidity in nominal wages (Kaur, 2018). Among the explanations for
this rigidity are the potentially detrimental eects on productivity and labor supply. We nd
large negative extensive margin responses, which suggest that nominal wage cuts could be
damaging for rms – one potential reason for the reluctance of rms to reduce wages.
3 It is sometimes argued that nominal wage cuts are rare and therefore not relevant. While we acknowledge
that nominal wage cuts occur less often than increases (see the literature on nominal wage rigidities, e.g., Kaur,
2018), it has been shown that wage cuts do happen; for example during recessions and bankruptcies, and for
the self-employed and salary earners (Kahn, 1997). In addition, many studies on labor-supply elasticities use
upward and downward variation in tax rates to instrument for wages (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996, Rothstein,
2010). This generates downward variation in wages even in the absence of nominal wage cuts. Our study is also
relevant for decreases in real wages, which occur more frequently than nominal wage cuts. Our results suggest
that ination-induced decreases of real wages have larger labor supply eects than previously thought.
4 This is especially important for meta-analysis studies on labor supply (e.g., Evers et al., 2008). Our ndings
imply that in such meta-analyses one should carefully distinguish between labor supply estimates based on wage
increases and those based on wage decreases.
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We further add to the experimental literature on the eect of wages on eort and labor supply.
These studies provide credible randomized evidence in the absence of (discrete) work-time
constraints, something which is dicult to obtain using observational data. Papers based on
laboratory experiments provide robust evidence that labor eort and wages are characterized
by a positive relationship (see the survey by Charness and Kuhn, 2011), which is consistent
with our ndings. However, laboratory experiments are subject to the usual concern that they
cannot easily be generalized to real-world situations. Field experiments with higher external
validity nd mixed eects regarding the relationship between wages and eort. While some
eld experiments nd a positive eect of wages on eort/labor supply (Fehr and Goette, 2007,
DellaVigna and Pope, 2018), other studies nd either no relationship (Hennig-Schmidt et al.,
2010), short-run temporary eects which do not make a dierence for nal work outcomes
(Gneezy and List, 2006), or (positive) eects for only certain types of workers (Cohn et al., 2015).
Our results add to the (ongoing) discussion on the wage-eort relation in eld experiments,
and provide evidence of a positive relationship between wages and labor eort in online labor
markets.
To the best of our knowledge, no (lab or eld) experimental study explores the potentially
dierential eects of wage increases and decreases on labor supply.5 An exception is Kube
et al. (2013), which is the study most closely related to ours. They conduct a eld experiment
with students working in a library for a given period of time (six hours). They generate an
exogenous reference wage by announcing a projected hourly wage to all workers when the job
is advertised. Immediately before the task starts, they announce a higher wage to workers in
one treatment group and a lower wage to workers in another group. Workers in the control
condition receive the initially announced wage. The study nds that the wage cut decreases
work eort (i.e., output generated during the given period of time) whereas the wage increase
does not have any eect relative to the control group. In line with our ndings on transcription
accuracy, their study also does not nd any eects on quality of work.
While these results are broadly consistent with our ndings, our paper diers from theirs in
the design of the labor market institution, which has important implications for the interpre-
tation and application of our ndings. The institutions dier in that we pay workers for each
transcribed picture instead of for a predetermined number of hours, and we allow workers to
quit the labor task whenever the choose to do so. Furthermore, our analysis is based on a much
larger sample of workers from a real-world labor market. Therefore, our design is representative
of labor markets where workers receive piece-rate payment and have tremendous labor supply
exibility, whereas Kube et al. (2013) focus on labor markets where workers are required to
5 Wage cuts are generally understudied in this literature; note that none of the experimental papers referenced
above examines wage cuts. Also see footnote 3 regarding the prevalence of wage cuts.
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work a predetermined number of hours for a xed hourly wage rate. One advantage of our
design is that workers are able to respond on two additional margins that are not included in
Kube et al. (2013); the extensive margin and the intensive-time margin.6 As a result, we are
able to study asymmetric responses to wage changes on both margins. Additionally, because
our workers receive a piece rate, subjects who reduce output earn a lower pay-o and have
less scope to punish their employer through shirking. This implies that we do not study ’work
morale’ and it reduces the likelihood that our ndings are driven by reciprocity as in Kube et al.
(2013). Therefore, we are able to show that labor supply asymmetry exists even in the absence
of a motive to reciprocate. The institutional frame-work of our study – large sample of workers
in their natural labor-market environment – also implies that our ndings can be generalized
to similarly situated labor markets; large crowd-sourcing labor markets characterized by low
wage and high exibility.7
To the extent that our ndings can (partly) be explained by a model of loss aversion, our paper
further makes a contribution to the behavioral-economics literature on loss aversion following
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).8 There is a large empirical literature showing that individuals
indeed have preferences consistent with loss aversion and that individual expectations determine
the reference point (e.g., Dunn, 1996, Post et al., 2008, Abeler et al., 2011, Card and Dahl, 2011,
Ericson and Fuster, 2011, Pope and Schweitzer, 2011), but there is scarce evidence regarding the
role of loss aversion for labor-supply responses. We add to this literature in that we provide
evidence that individuals may have preferences that are consistent with loss aversion in the
context of labor supply. This nding is consistent with Ahrens et al. (2014) who derive the
theoretical prediction that labor supply responds asymmetrically to wage rate changes in a
framework with reference-dependent utility functions.9
6 The participants in Kube et al. (2013) work for a pre-specied time period, thus precluding the possibility to
study a time response. In our experiment, the participants can choose for how long they work, allowing us to
study the intensive-time margin.
7 The ndings of two additional papers are relevant in the context of asymmetries in labor markets. Falk et al.
(2006) nd in a laboratory experiment that reservation wages respond asymmetrically to the introduction and
removal of minimum wages. The results show that the introduction of a minimum wage has larger eects than
the removal. Chemin and Kurmann (2014) study how reciprocal behavior of 12 eldworkers responds to wage
increases and decreases. Consistent with Kube et al. (2013), they nd that wage increases had no eect while
wage decreases had a negative eect on eort, and attribute this eect to reciprocity.
8 This literature pursues the idea that individuals evaluate outcomes relative to reference points. These types of
preferences are commonly termed reference-dependent preferences and have been formalized by Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009). Loss aversion describes the notion that individuals weight negative deviations (losses)
from the reference point more than gains of equal magnitude.
9 Our paper also relates to several studies showing that individual labor supply decisions are aected by target
incomes. In a survey of the literature, Goette et al. (2004) show how empirical results on labor-supply behavior
are consistent with reference-dependent preferences where workers provide high eort if they are below a
target income, whereas they provide less eort if they have surpassed a target (also see Camerer et al., 1997,
Crawford and Meng, 2011 and Fehr and Goette, 2007). Empirical evidence also suggests that loss aversion aects
job searches (DellaVigna et al., 2018). While these studies demonstrate that workers have target incomes and
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the real labor task and its implemen-
tation in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Section 3.3 describes the data and our empirical approach
and we present the results in Section 3.4. We discuss the potential economic mechanisms
behind our ndings, as well as their implications and generalizability, in Section 3.5. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 The Experiment
This section describes the eld experiment used to estimate the impact of wage rate changes on
labor supply. We begin by describing the labor task, the treatment design and the implementation
in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
3.2.1 Design
Labor Task. We selected an online labor task that requires subjects to transcribe German text
shown in a series of images. The German texts are taken from a recent publication, but each
page of the document is rued so that the scanned versions appear much older than they really
are. The advantage of changing the appearance of the images is that subjects are more likely to
believe that the texts were scanned from old books for which a digital copy is not available. The
task then, is to digitize these “old” German books.10 Each image has approximately ve lines
and 43 words (344 characters). Figure 3.1 shows an example. Subjects are randomly shown one
of 128 images at a time and are instructed to hit “save picture” when they are done transcribing
the text in the image. A new image is shown after the subject hits “save picture”.
Figure 3.1: Image of Text to be Transcribed
Notes: This gure depicts a screenshot of an image of text that was to be transcribed by the subjects.
Subjects were randomly shown one of 128 images. All images are comparable to the image depicted
in the gure. All images are in German and taken from a recent policy-report publication.
loss-aversion preferences in the context of labor supply, they do not allow conclusions about the asymmetric
eects of wages.
10 Horton et al. (2011) use a similar task and motivate it with the following advantages: transcribing text (i) is
tedious, (ii) requires eort and attention, and (iii) has a clearly dened quality measure.
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Treatment Groups. We use a between-subjects design in order to identify the eect of wage
changes on labor supply. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of three groups: one control
group and two treatment groups. Subjects in all three groups work on the labor task described
above and are paid a piece rate for each image that is transcribed. The piece rate11 is set at $ 0.15
for each of the rst six transcribed images in all three groups. Subjects receive a notication
thanking them for transcribing the images after the rst six images have been transcribed. They
are then told that they can transcribe additional images and that the piece rate for the additional
images is either $ 0.18, $ 0.15 or $ 0.12, for the wage-increase, control, and wage-decrease groups,
respectively (see Figure 3.2 for an explanatory treatment notication). Notice that the wage rate
remains xed at $ 0.15 for the control group, and that the wage rate change is the same for both
treatment groups; in each case the rate changes by $ 0.03 or 20 %. We did not provide workers
with a reason for their wage changes in order to keep a neutral framing (Kube et al., 2013). In
addition, the reasons for the wage changes would have had to be dierent for wage increases
and decreases, which would have complicated the comparability between the treatment groups.
Figure 3.2: Treatment Variation
Notes: This gure depicts a screenshot of the treatment notication in the “wage decrease” group.
The treatment notications for the “control” and “wage increase” groups were identical except for
the information regarding the piece-rate wage for the subsequent images. The treatment notication
popped up after a subject transcribed six images.
Wage Expectations. The experiment is designed to establish an exogenous and salient
expectation regarding the per-unit wage in the our mTurk task. Potential workers are told that
the wage per transcribed picture is $ 0.15 in the job announcement. Additionally, workers who
start working on our task face the announced wage of $ 0.15 for the rst six transcribed pictures,
after which the wage rate either increases or decreases. We argue that this design generates
the expectation that the per-unit wage will remain constant at $ 0.15 throughout the entire
11 The piece rate is called bonus in the experiment. This is the usual wording if one is to implement per-piece
payment within the same task in the mTurk labor market.
137
Chapter 3 Asymmetric Labor-Supply Responses to Wage-Rate Changes
task. Our experimental design therefore allows us to study how unexpected wage increases and
wage decreases aect labor supply. If we had initially told subjects that the wage would either
increase or decrease, they could have adjusted their expectations and the labor supply response
to varying wages would not have been comparable to real-situations where workers experience
unanticipated wage changes. This design feature is also in accordance with Kube et al. (2013)
who, following Bewley (2005), argue that deviations from an exogenous expectation capture the
key aspects of wage changes (for example, disappointment and the break of trust relation in the
case of wage cuts).
One potential drawback of our experimental design is that it may raise concerns of deception
since the job description does not notify subjects of the possibility that the wage may increase
or decrease after a certain number of transcribed pictures. This was a deliberate choice in an
eort to establish a clear and salient wage expectation.12 We avoid deception by including the
following pieces of information in the treatment notication (see Figure 3.2). First, we thank
the workers for completing the transcription task and remind them that, as promised in the
introduction of the task, they will be paid $ 0.15 for each of the pictures they transcribed so
far. Next, we inform them that they have the option to transcribe additional images and that
the piece rate for these additional transcriptions is dierent from that for the rst batch of
transcriptions. Finally, we make it clear that they can stop and exit the task at this point if they
wish and instruct them on what to do next to ensure we are able to process their payment.13
We argue that these design features make it clear to workers that they rst transcribe pictures
based on the piece rate announced in the introduction to the task, and that they can transcribe
additional pictures at a new rate. The design of the task gives the impression to workers that
the task consists of two parts and ensures that we did not deceive the workers regarding the
wage in the second task.
3.2.2 Implementation
Labor Market and Recruitment. The experiment is implemented in the eld using workers
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. mTurk is an online labor market where job oers are posted and
workers choose jobs for payment. It has numerous benets for running experiments, including
12 Informing subjects about the possibility of a wage change would have generated uncertainty about the eventual
wage and the wage expectation would not have been as clear.
13 The notication reads: “Thank you for transcribing these pictures. As written in the introduction, we will grant a
bonus of $ 0.15 for each of these pictures. There are additional pictures that you can transcribe. However, the
bonus payment for each additional picture will be $ 0.12/$ 0.18 from now on. You will receive $ 0.15 bonus for
each of the six pictures you transcribed so far, though. If you want to stop and exit, just copy your Personal ID to
the Amazon Turk Website and submit the HIT.” Instead of the wage change, we include the following message
for the control group: “There are additional pictures that you can transcribe. Just as before, the bonus for each
additional picture will be $ 0.15.”
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access to a large stable subject pool, diverse subject background, and low cost.14 Furthermore, the
behavior of online workers has been shown to be comparable to those of subjects in laboratory
studies (Horton et al., 2011). Additionally, experimenter eects are avoided because subjects
do not know that they participate in an experiment (Paolacci et al., 2010, Horton et al., 2011,
Buhrmester et al., 2011, Mason and Suri, 2011). Importantly for us, we are able to identify
the eect of wages changes in a naturally occurring labor market. In general, experiments on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk therefore combine internal and external validity since it is a real
labor market with actual workers where randomized trials can be conducted (Horton et al.,
2011).15
Although we recruit workers through mTurk, they complete the labor task on an external
website that we created for the purposes of the experiment. We rst create a human intelligence
task (HIT) that is advertised on mTurk. The HIT includes a description of the labor task
and compensation. It also includes instructions for how to complete the task; see Figure 3.3.
Particularly, subjects are told to accept the HIT and click on the weblink if they are interested
in completing the task. Subjects who click on the link are taken to our external website where
they are randomly assigned to one of three groups and shown the instructions in Figure 3.4.
Subjects are instructed to click continue if they wish to work on the task, and those who do are
shown images of scanned German text that they must transcribe for payment. Each page of
our website shows the subjects their personal ID, number of pictures transcribed so far, and the
current piece rate. We implement treatment after six images have been transcribed and limit
the total number of images that each subject can transcribe to 50. However, subjects are not
aware of either of these limits until they reach them. In other words, subjects do not know that
the HIT has six images, that they will have the opportunity to continue working after the rst
six images, that the piece rate might be dierent if they continue working, or that they can only
transcribe up to 50 images if they chose to continue working. Subjects in wage-decrease group
who complete six transcriptions are shown the treatment information illustrated in Figure 3.2.
A similar text is shown to subjects in the wage-increase group and the control group; the only
dierence is the piece rate for the additional images.
Transcribing text from an image can be a tedious task. However, given that the text in the
images is short, the task could be perceived as mostly costless for German speakers. In order to
reduce this possibility and ensure that the labor costs are non-zero, we restrict the subject pool
to workers with a US IP address. The idea here is that the labor cost of transcribing German text
is much higher for non-Germans than for Germans. Of course, our restriction does not preclude
14 According to Amazon, there are over 500,000 workers from 190 countries in the mTurk labor market: https:
//requester.mturk.com/tour.
15 Kuziemko et al. (2015) and DellaVigna and Pope (2018) are recent examples of economics papers using Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.
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Figure 3.3: Human Intelligence Task Shown on mTurk
Notes: This gure depicts a screenshot from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website. It shows how
the labor task used for the eld experiment was advertised on mTurk. Subjects are taken to our
external website once they click the “Accept Hit” button.
Figure 3.4: Instructions Shown on Our Website
Notes: This gure depicts a screenshot of the external website that we set up for the purpose of the
eld experiment. Subjects were taken to this website once they decided on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk website that they would like to work on the task. The depicted screenshots provides subjects
all information relevant for the task.
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the possibility that German speakers participated in the task. However, any Germans who
participated in our experiment are randomly distributed across our treatments and therefore
have no eect on our outcome of interest.
The experiment is programmed on mTurk to expire after 750 workers accept the HIT or
10 days have passed, which ever comes rst. Our initial run of the experiment, which started on
June 15, 2015, expired after 10 days with only 418 workers. Therefore, we initiated a second run
on July 20, 2015, and this run expired after hitting the 750 worker threshold six days later. In
total, 1,168 workers participated in the two runs. Note that the HIT is designed such that workers
cannot work on the task more than once. We also excluded workers who participated in the rst
run from participating in the second run. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that individuals have
multiple worker accounts to avoid these constraints: First, when registering for mTurk, Amazon
requires workers to conrm in the Participation Agreement that they “may not use multiple
Amazon Accounts to register with Mechanical Turk”. Second, the Participation Agreement
further requires workers to provide “true and accurate” information on a worker’s name, email
address, phone number and physical address.16 Third, workers are required to provide a tax
identication number (Social Security Number or Individual Tax Identication Number) after
their mTurk lifetime earnings have exceeded a set threshold. Workers who fail to provide this
number are not allowed to accept additional HITs on mTurk.
Payment. The experiment ends for each subject when she decides to stop or when she
transcribes 50 pictures, whichever comes rst. In either case, each subject is instructed to copy
her personal ID number, which is shown in the top right corner of each page, and paste it
in the entry box on the mTurk website. This process is necessary for us to match subjects
to their mTurk worker ID and thus process their payments. Subjects receive a participation
reward of $ 0.10, which is paid as long as a subject accepts the HIT and completes at least
one transcription. Additionally, subjects are paid a piece rate of $ 0.15 for each of the rst
six transcribed pictures, and depending on treatment group, $ 0.12, $ 0.15 or $ 0.18 for each
transcribed image above the rst six transcriptions. Given the payment restrictions imposed by
the mTurk platform, we frame the piece rate as a bonus in all communications to the subjects.
For example, subjects in the control group are told they will be paid $ 0.10 for participating in
our HIT and a bonus of $ 0.15 for each transcribed picture.
We chose this payment structure based on a small test of the real eort task that we imple-
mented with English-speaking students in a class at a major public university in the US before
we started the eld experiment.17 This test revealed that it takes about 4 minutes on average to
16 The Participation Agreement is online at: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse.
17 This test did not include any wage variations. The sole purpose was to test the functionality of the website and
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transcribe foreign-language text paragraphs that have the same size as the paragraphs in our
experiment. This suggests that approximately 15 pictures can be transcribed per hour, resulting
in an hourly wage of about $ 2.35 (= 0.1 + 6 × 0.15 + 9 × 0.15) in the control group, $ 2.62
(= 0.1 + 6 × 0.15 + 9 × 0.18) in the increase group, and $ 2.08 (= 0.1 + 6 × 0.15 + 9 × 0.12) in the
decrease group. In light of a median reservation wage of between $ 1.12 and $ 1.38 per hour for
mTurkers, according to Horton and Chilton (2010) and Horton et al. (2011), this payment struc-
ture seemed adequate from an ex-ante perspective. From an ex-post perspective (see results),
it turns out that the average time needed per picture in our small test was an appropriate, if
not even too conservative, predictor of the transcription speed in our actual experiment. We
observe that participants in our sample (across all groups) needed about 3.7 minutes per picture
(i.e., about 16.22 pictures per hour), which results in hourly wages of $ 2.53, $ 2.84, $ 2.23 in the
three groups, respectively. That is, both the per-hour wages that we expected before we ran
the experiment and the per-hour wages that we observe for the workers in our experimental
sample are considerably higher than the hourly median reservation wage reported in Horton
and Chilton (2010) and Horton et al. (2011).
3.3 Data and Empirical Approach
This section describes our outcome variables, details on the sample, and the empirical strategy
used to identify the symmetry of wage eects.
3.3.1 Outcome Variables
We construct several outcome variables that measure dierent aspects of labor supply in order
to identify the eect of wage changes on labor supply. These include the quit rate, number of
transcribed pictures, time spent transcribing, transcription rate, and accuracy. Each of these
variables is described in greater detail below.
Transcriptions and Hours. Because workers are paid for each transcribed image, we expect
that they will respond to the wage changes by changing the number of images they transcribe.
Therefore, one variable of interest is the total number of transcribed images per worker. We
further explore the total time spent working on the task and the time per transcribed text
(transcription rate). Because we do not have an exact measure of the time workers actually
spent working on a picture, we proxy the transcription rate by counting the time between the
submission of two transcriptions. We acknowledge that this likely overstates the transcription
to infer the average time it takes to transcribe one of the images.
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time for any given image. However, the dierence in transcription rate between groups should
still be instructive of the impact of wage changes.
Extensive Margin. Recall that workers are notied of treatment after transcribing six images.
The notication makes it clear that the worker has completed the HIT, but that there are
additional (optional) images to transcribe. Workers are also informed that they can quit the task
at this point or continue transcribing the additional images at the newly announced wage rate.
Given these features of the treatment notication, we interpret the decision to stop working
at this point as an extensive margin decision. Therefore, one of our key outcome variables is
the share of workers who quit the task immediately after receiving the notication. Because
the treatment notication has a modest nudge to quit, we expect that the share of quitters
will be reasonably high in the control group despite the fact that the wage remains constant.
The important question for us is: does the wage increase/decrease have any eect beyond this
modest nudge.
An important feature of online-labor markets such as mTurk is that they facilitate almost
instantaneous switching of labor tasks. In other words, a worker can quit one job this second
and start a new job the next second. This is not unlike what one would observe in traditional
labor markets where a worker secures a new job before quitting her existing job. Unfortunately,
we do not observe what subjects do when they quit our task. Therefore, the extensive margin
response in our study simply means that the worker quits our task. We cannot say whether or
not they quit working online or switch to a more protable task.
Accuracy. Recall that the transcriptions are based on text for which we have the original
digital copy. This makes it possible for us to measure accuracy by comparing the transcribed
text for each worker to the actual text.
3.3.2 Sample
Our HIT was accepted by 1,168 mTurk workers. We restrict the sample to those workers
who completed at least one picture, and therefore received the participation fee; this leaves
us with 1,158 workers. We observe in the data that a few workers worked on the task for
an unreasonable number of time, e.g., several days. To avoid this source of noise, we drop
the top 0.05 % of workers in the distribution of minutes worked; these are six workers who
worked for more than 385 minutes on the task. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for our
sample of workers (N = 1, 152) with regard to our main variables: number of transcribed
pictures, accuracy of transcription, and total time worked. We observe that, on average, workers
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD P10 P50 P90
Pictures Transcribed 1,152 12.81 13.23 2.00 7.00 33.00
Total Time 1,152 39.79 50.25 3.17 19.64 104.35
Accuracy 1,151 0.97 0.02 0.96 0.97 0.98
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for outcome variables. The sample is
all subjects who started working on the task (i.e., including those who did not nec-
essarily get to see the treatment notication after six transcribed pictures). Pictures
Transcribed is the average number of images that subjects transcribed. Total Time is
the average time (in minutes) that subjects totally spent on working on the labor task.
Accuracy the average share of characters that is transcribed correctly. N is the num-
ber of observations. SD is the standard deviation. Px indicates the x-th percentile.
transcribed 12.8 pictures18 over an average time span of 39.79 minutes. The transcription quality
was very high with an average accuracy of 96.97 %. This is reassuring as it suggests that workers
take the task seriously and provided high-quality transcriptions. Note that we intended to avoid
giving the impression that subjects are participating in an experiment, and therefore did not
survey any demographic characteristics.
Because the treatment variation in wages only appears after the rst batch of six transcriptions,
only a share of the total 1,152 participants are exposed to the treatment condition. Table 3.2
shows that 62.5 % (720) of the 1,152 workers completed at least six pictures and therefore saw
the treatment notication. This share ranges from 59 % in the wage-increase group to 65 % in the
wage-decrease group. The number of observations in each treatment group is summarized in
Table 3.2. In total, we have 248, 215, and 257 workers who saw the treatment notication in the
control, increase and decrease groups, respectively. Because workers did not know they were
in an experiment or that the wage rate would change, self-selection into the treatments was
impossible. We therefore argue that the groups are balanced with respect to the characteristics
that predict the probability of quitting before seeing the treatment, and thus we mostly restrict
the empirical analysis that follows to the sample of 720 participants who saw the treatment
(see Section 3.4.1 for data-based evidence that there is no dierence between groups before
treatment notication).
A common feature of mTurk is that workers discuss HITs on forums. This can raise issues
for experimenters as those workers who have completed the experiment will unknowingly
share the details of treatments with other workers who have yet to complete the experiment.
We followed the forums on mTurk in order to determine if our HIT was being discussed and
discovered that our HIT did in fact show up on one of the forums.19 The rst mention of our
HIT occurred on July 24 during the second run of the experiment. We noticed the mention on
18 Appendix Figure 3.A.1 provides the distribution of completed pictures for all workers in the sample.
19 See https://www.reddit.com/r/HITsWorthTurkingFor/comments/3eg39l/us_transcribe_texts_from_
an_image_payment_bonus/.
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Table 3.2: Number of Observations
Seen
Treatment
Group No Yes Total
Control Group 143 248 391
Wage Increase 149 215 364
Wage Decrease 140 257 397
Total 432 720 1,152
Notes: Number of observations by treatment
group who (i) started working on the task but
did not see the treatment notication, i.e., they
transcribed ve images or less (column No) and
(ii) who transcribed at least six pictures and there-
fore saw the treatment notication (column Yes).
the 26th when the HIT had already expired. The discussion on the forum was favorable towards
our HIT, but workers discussed the fact that the wage rate changed as well as the magnitude
of the changes. They also discussed potential reasons for rate changes, and mostly speculated
that the wage variation must be due the quality of work. Nobody speculated that this task is an
experiment; people therefore still did not know they were part of an experiment.
The forum post led to a signicant spike in acceptance of our HIT; approximately 58 % of the
workers accepted the HIT after the forum discussion began. Because some of these subjects
knew of a potential wage variation before accepting the HIT, self-selection might be a problem.
For example, it is possible that only workers who are willing to work for our lowest wage rate
accepted our HIT. If this is the only source of selection, then our analysis produces a lower
bound estimate in both groups. A more troubling source of selection is a case where workers
sign up with the hope of receiving a wage increase. These subjects would eectively have the
expectation that the wage will be $ 0.18, and would be more likely to quit the task if assigned
to the wage decrease group. This source of selection would lead to a downward bias in the
wage-decrease group and upward bias in the wage-increase group. Because of this potential
problem, we present estimates with and without the post-forum sample. There is no evidence
that the forum had an eect on the results (see Appendix Figures 3.A.7–3.A.11).
3.3.3 Empirical Strategy
Random assignment to treatment groups ensures that our empirical approach is straight forward.
The empirical analysis proceeds as follows. First, for each experimental group, we plot the
share of subjects in each ’period’,20 relative to the total number of subjects who initially started
20 We use the term ’period’ to indicate the number of the picture which is to be transcribed. For example, the
treatment notication occurred after 6 periods; i.e., after subjects transcribed 6 pictures.
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the working task. We use all available subjects (i.e., not only those who saw the treatment
notication) for this exercise. This descriptive analysis sheds light on dierential drop out rates
across the experimental groups before and after treatment.
Second, for each outcome variable, we compare the means of the respective outcome across
treatment groups and use non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for dierences in distri-
butions between the groups (Wilcoxon, 1945, Mann and Whitney, 1947). In addition, we run
simple OLS regressions of the outcome variables on the treatment dummies.
Yi = α + βIncrease1(i ∈ Increase) + βDecrease1(i ∈ Decrease) + ϵi (3.1)
whereYi is an outcome of interest for subject i , e.g., the number of transcribed pictures. Indicator
functions 1(i ∈ Increase) and 1(i ∈ Decrease) evaluate to one if worker i is part of the increase
group or the decrease group, respectively, and zero otherwise. α is a constant, ϵi denotes the
unexplained error term. These empirical analyses allow us to identify the eect of wage increases
and decreases on our outcome variables. These parametric and non-parametric analyses are
restricted to the subjects who saw the treatment notication (this is sucient because there
is no selection prior to the treatment notication – as discussed before and shown below in
Section 3.4.1).
To test for symmetry of these responses, we use the β̂ coecients of the above OLS regressions
for each outcome and t-tests to test the null that the sum of the estimated coecients for the
wage-increase group and wage-decrease group (both relative to the control group) is zero:
H0 : βIncrease = −βDecrease . (3.2)
We then use the estimated regression-based treatment eects to calculate implied elasticities
separately for each treatment group. Using the control group as a counterfactual, we derive the
elasticity of an outcome variable Y with respect to wages for each treatment group д (either
wage increase or decrease) as follows:
ϵд =
(Yд − Yc )/Yc
(wд −wc )/wc ϵ̂д =
β̂д/α̂
(wд − 0.15)/0.15 , (3.3)
where subscript c indicates the control group,w is the wage per transcribed picture, (wд −wc ) is
the change in wages in group д (either +3 or -3), and (Yд − Yc ) is the dierence between the
outcome variable in group д and the control group. Specically, (Yд − Yc ) is the dierence in
means between the relevant treated group and the control group or, equivalently, the regression
coecient βд of the respective treatment dummy.
Finally, to shed more light on the dynamics of the eects, we regress the probability of working
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in a given period on a full interaction of an increase-group dummy and period dummies as well
as a full interaction of a decrease-group dummy and period dummies (standard errors clustered
on individual level). Formally, this regression reads:
Di,t =
50∑
t=1
γ tIncrease1(i ∈ Increase) +
50∑
t=1
γ tDecrease1(i ∈ Decrease) + νt + ϵi,t (3.4)
where Di,t equals one if worker i transcribed picture t and zero otherwise. We normalize
coecients of the last pre-treatment period – γ̂ 6д – for both the increase and the decrease
group to zero. The coecients from this regression, which we present in an event-study type
gure, provide insight about the dierential dynamics of our treatment eects between the
wage-increase and wage-decrease groups (always relative to the control group). Interested in
the asymmetry of treatment eects between groups, we then use these regression results to
sum up the estimated coecient for the wage-increase group γ̂ tIncrease and the corresponding
estimate for the wage-decrease group γ̂ tDecrease for each period t . These results are also shown
in an event-study type gure and provide insights about the dynamics of asymmetric eects.
3.4 Results
In this section we present the empirical results of our experiment. We start by analyzing
workers’ drop-out rates by looking at the full sample with all subjects to check that there are no
pre-treatment trends in outcomes in Section 3.4.1. This descriptive exercise also allows to check
for rst indications of asymmetric responses across the three groups. In a second step, we study
the treatment eects at the extensive margin restricting our sample to workers who transcribed
at least six pictures and saw the treatment (Section 3.4.2). Third, we analyze intensive margin
responses regarding the time spent working and the transcription rate in Section 3.4.3, and on
the number of transcribed pictures and the quality of transcriptions (see Section 3.4.4).
3.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
We begin the analysis by calculating the drop-out rate in each ‘period’ by control and treatment
groups. Using all workers who completed at least one picture, Figure 3.5 shows that around
7-8 percent of those subjects who started working in our experiment quit the task in each
pre-treatment period. Importantly, Figure 3.5 shows that pre-treatment drop-out rates are equal
across groups, suggesting that there is no dierential selection across groups before treatment.
After seeing the treatment, the exit-rate in the increase group decreases to three percent, while
the exit rate for the decrease group rises to 21 percent. These dierential exit-rates are a rst
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indicator of asymmetric eects between wage increases and decreases.
Figure 3.5: Share of Workers over Periods by Treatment Group
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
S
ha
re
 o
f S
ub
je
ct
s 
in
 S
am
pl
e 
(in
 P
er
ce
nt
)
1 6 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of Transcribed Picture
Control Increase Decrease
Notes: This gure depicts the share of subjects in each period, relative to the total number of subjects
who initially started the task, by experimental group. For example, the value in period ten indicates
the share of subjects who complete ten pictures in a given experimental group as a fraction of all
subjects who started working on the labor task in this experimental group. Treatment occurred
after period six. The sample includes all participants who started working on the task. Number of
observations is 1,152.
3.4.2 Extensive Margin
We now turn to the statistical analysis of our results. Because we nd no evidence of self
selection into treatment – as illustrated by non-dierential pre-treatment trends – all following
analyses are based solely on the sample of workers who saw the treatment notication.21
Figure 3.6 displays the treatment eects on the extensive margin, i.e., the share of workers
who quit immediately after having seen the treatment. We observe that 14.1 % of the workers in
the control group quit the labor task after receiving the treatment notication. Relative to the
control group, the share of quitters is 8.5 percentage points lower in the wage-increase group
and 17.8 percentage points higher in the wage-decrease group. These group-wise dierences
between means are all statistically signicant at the 1 % level according to non-parametric
21 Note that this implies that all subjects in this sample have transcribed at least six pictures and we are left with
around 60 % (N = 720) of the original sample at this point.
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ranksum tests, and suggest that wage increases induce workers to keep working while wage
decreases increase the likelihood of quitting. These results are also demonstrated in OLS
regressions (based on equation (3.1)) of the extensive-margin indicator variable on the treatment
dummies; see Model I of Table 3.3.
Figure 3.6: Extensive Margin by Treatment Group
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Notes: This gure depicts the share of subjects in each group who quit the labor task immediately
after seeing the treatment notication (i.e., share of subjects who transcribed six pictures but
not a seventh one), along with 95 % condence bands. The number of observations is 720 with
248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 257 subjects in the
“wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
An important observation is that the extensive margin response is asymmetric; the treatment
eect for the wage-increase group is economically and statistically dierent from that for the
wage-decrease group (p-value: 0.094, calculated based on equation (3.2)). The asymmetry is also
evident in the implied elasticities (as calculated by equation (3.3)), which is 3.0 in the increase
group and 6.3 in the decrease group.
We further investigate the dynamics of the treatment eects in Figure 3.7, which graphically
presents the coecients from regression equation (3.4). The left panel shows that our treatment
aects subjects throughout the entire experiment until the maximum number of transcribed
pictures is reached. In each period after the treatment notication, individuals in the increase
group are more likely to still participate in our experiment relative to the control group. Similarly,
workers in the decrease group are less likely to continue working compared to the control
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Table 3.3: Regression Estimates and Implied Elasticities
Extensive Pic- Total Mean Accu-
Margin tures Time Time racy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference Group: Control
Wage Increase -0.085*** 3.309** 6.078 -0.344 -0.000
(0.027) (1.298) (4.985) (0.264) (0.001)
Wage Decrease 0.178*** -3.795*** -10.556** 0.175 0.000
(0.037) (1.166) (4.832) (0.358) (0.001)
Constant 0.141*** 19.040*** 60.916*** 3.778*** 0.971***
(0.022) (0.870) (3.399) (0.210) (0.001)
N 720 720 720 720 719
R2 0.082 0.044 0.016 0.003 0.001
p (βInc = −βDec ) 0.094 0.820 0.596 0.752 0.906
Elast. Increase -3.02 0.87 0.50 -0.45 0
Elast. Decrease -6.30 0.99 0.87 -0.23 0
Notes: OLS regressions based on equation (3.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses (* signif-
icant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant at 1 %). The explanatory variables of interest
are dummies indicating the Wage Increase and Wage Decrease group, respectively. The coe-
cients are relative to the omitted Control group. The outcome variables in columns (1) to (5) are:
(1) Extensive Margin is the extensive margin measured as a dummy variable indicating whether
a subject quit the task immediately after seeing the treatment notication. (2) Pictures is the
number of images transcribed. (3) Total Time is the time (in minutes) that a subject totally spent
on working on the labor task. (4) Mean Time is the time (in minutes) that a subject spent work-
ing on one image. (5) Accuracy is the share of characters that is transcribed correctly. N is the
number of observations. R2 denotes the R-squared. p(Inc = −Dec ) is the p-value from a t -test
testing whether the coecients for the Increase and Decrease group add up to zero. Elast. In-
crease and Elast. Decrease are the implied elasticities in the treatment groups that indicate how
the respective outcome variable responds to the wage change, using the control group as the
counterfactual (see equation (3.3) in Section 3.3.3).
group. Both eects are signicantly dierent from zero for each period until the end of the
experiment in t = 50. As expected, treatment eects at the extensive margin are especially
strong immediately after the treatment and become less important the longer subjects continue
working. The right panel of Figure 3.7 investigates the asymmetry of this eect, i.e., the sum
of the estimated coecients γ̂ tIncrease and γ̂
t
Decrease from equation (3.4). We nd that the
asymmetry in the extensive margin response mainly occurs immediately after the treatment
notication and we cannot reject symmetry ve or more periods after treatment notication.
3.4.3 Time Responses
This section describes results for time related outcome variables, again using the subsample of
workers who saw the treatment notication. We show means along with medians to account
for potential outliers in the time participants spent working.
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Figure 3.7: Dynamics of Treatment Eects
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Notes: This gure shows the dynamics of the estimated treatment eects. The left panel shows
coecients that are based on regressions of the probability of working in a given period on a full
interaction of an increase-group dummy and period dummies as well as a decrease-group dummy
and period dummies (see equation (3.4) in the main body of the paper). The outcome variable
is a dummy indicating if an individual works in the respective period (for example, this dummy
takes value one in period ten if the respective individual transcribed the 10th picture). All eects
are relative to the control group without wage change. The right panel shows the dierence in
left-panel regression coecients between the Wage Increase and the Wage Decrease treatment group.
All coecients are shown along with 95 % condence bands. The number of observations is 720
with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 257 subjects
in the “wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
Time Spent Working. Figure 3.8 shows that, on average, subjects in the control group spent
about 61 minutes working on the labor task with a median of 44 minutes. Relative to the
control group, workers who experienced a wage increase worked on the task for 6 additional
minutes on average (11 minutes dierence at the median) while those who experienced a wage
decrease spent on average 11 fewer minutes (16 minutes at the median) working on the task. A
non-parametric test shows that the treatment eect is statistically dierent from zero for the
wage-decrease group, but not for the wage increase group. The non-parametric results are also
reected by the regressions; see Model III of Table 3.3. Again, these results indicate that labor
supply and wages are positively related.
The dierences indicate an asymmetric eect; the treatment eect is larger in the wage-
decrease group than in the wage-increase group. This is also evident by the implied elasticities,
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Figure 3.8: Total Time Worked by Treatment Group
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average and median time (in minutes) that subjects
totally spent on working on the labor task, along with 95 % condence bands. The number of
observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the “wage increase” group
and 257 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at
least six images.
which are 0.50 in the increase group and 0.87 in the decrease group. However, we cannot reject
the null that the dierence between the treatment eects is zero. In other words, though the
relative magnitude of the treatment eects is indicative of an asymmetric response, we cannot
rule out symmetry in a statistical sense.
The eect on the total time spent working described above can be decomposed into two
parts; the rst due to the extensive margin response and the second due to the intensive margin
response. We identify the contribution of the intensive margin response in Appendix Figure 3.A.2,
which plots the mean and median of the total number of minutes worked conditional on not
quitting right away after the treatment. The gure shows that, conditional on transcribing at
least one picture after the treatment notication, workers in the control group spent an average
of 68 minutes on the task (with a median of 50). Relative to the control group, workers in the
wage-increase group worked for one additional minute on average (7 additional minutes at the
median) while workers in the wage-decrease group spent on average 4 fewer minutes on the
task (median 8). Subtracting these average intensive-time-margin treatment eects from the
total treatment eects implies that the extensive margin response explains the overwhelming
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majority of the eect on time spent working on the task. In fact, the extensive margin response
explains 83 % (= (6 − 1)/6) and 64 % (= (11 − 4)/11) of the time margin response in the wage
increase and decrease groups, respectively.
Transcription Rate. The results for the transcription rate are shown in Figure 3.9. Workers
on average spent 3.8, 3.4 and 3.9 minutes for one picture in the control, increase and decrease
groups, respectively. The dierences between groups are not statistically signicant (also see
Model IV in Table 3.3). We further separate this total eect into its intensive and extensive
margin components and nd that there is no statistically signicant eect on either margin (see
Appendix Figure 3.A.3 which reports the transcription rate conditional on completing at least
one transcription after the treatment notication).
Figure 3.9: Average Time per Transcription by Treatment Group
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average and median time (in minutes) that subjects
spent working on one image, along with 95 % condence bands. The number of observations is 720
with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 257 subjects
in the “wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
3.4.4 Number and ality of Transcriptions
This section describes the treatment eects on the number of transcribed pictures and the
quality of transcription. All analyses are again based on the subsample of workers who saw the
treatment notication.
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Number of Transcribed Pictures. Figure 3.10 shows that the treatment variation clearly
aected the number of transcribed pictures per worker. While the average worker transcribed
19.04 images in the control group, the average worker completed 22.35 and 15.25 pictures in
the wage-increase and wage-decrease groups, respectively. All group-wise dierences between
groups are distinguishable from zero at the 1 %-level according to non-parametric rank-sum
tests. The relationship between labor supply and wages is therefore again positive. These results
are conrmed in Model II of Regression Table 3.3, which also shows that we cannot reject the
null that the wage eect on total output is symmetric.
Figure 3.10: Number of Transcribed Pictures by Treatment Group
14
16
18
20
22
24
M
ea
n
Control Increase Decrease
Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average number of images that subjects transcribed,
along with 95 % condence bands. The number of observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the
control group, 215 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 257 subjects in the “wage decrease”
group. All 720 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
As in Section 3.4.3, we decompose the total eect on number of transcribed pictures into
its intensive and extensive margin components. We begin with the contribution of the inten-
sive margin response by calculating the per-worker number of transcriptions for each group
conditional on completing at least one picture after seeing the treatment information. These
results, which are presented in Appendix Figure 3.A.4, show that output is higher when wages
rise and lower when wages fall. While the non-parametric tests reveal that the dierence
between the control and increase group is statistically signicant, the dierence between con-
trol and decrease is not signicant (p-value: 0.15). More importantly, the magnitude of these
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intensive-time-margin eects is not asymmetric in a statistical sense.
We next identify the contribution of the extensive margin response by subtracting the
intensive-time-margin eect from the total eect. For example, the total treatment eect for the
wage-increase group is 3.3 transcriptions. From Appendix Figure 3.A.4, we know that 2.14 of this
eect is due to the intensive-time-margin response. Therefore, the balance of 1.17 (= 3.31−2.14)
is due to the extensive margin response. A similar calculation for the wage-decrease group
reveals that the contribution of the extensive margin is 2.19.
ality of Transcriptions. Figure 3.A.5 in the Appendix depicts that the wage-rate changes
did not have any eects on the quality of transcription. The dierences are tiny and indistin-
guishable from zero, which conrms that workers in all groups paid careful attention to the
task. This result is in line with the eld experiment of Kube et al. (2013) who do not nd any
eects of wages on work quality either.
3.4.5 Robustness
Because the workers discussed our task on the mTurk forum, it is possible that our ndings
are driven by selection into the HIT. We explore this by performing the analyses separately on
the sample of workers who worked on our task before it was discussed online and the sample
of workers who worked on it afterwards. These results, which are presented in Appendix
Figures 3.A.7–3.A.11, show no evidence that our results are driven by selection among workers
who participated in the post-forum period. In addition, we regress each outcome variable on a
dummy variable indicating whether the subject worked on the task before or after the forum
post; we do not nd any signicant eects of working on the task after the forum post (results
not reported).
3.5 Discussion of Results
In this section, we rst discuss the potential economic explanations behind our results, and
then describe the policy implications and generalizability of our ndings.
3.5.1 Mechanisms
Our results show that the extensive margin response to wage changes is strongly asymmetric.
We also nd evidence of an asymmetric intensive-time-margin response, but this eect is
not statistically distinguishable from zero. Similarly, the wage-induced eect on number of
transcribed images is marginally asymmetric, though not statistically signicant. How can these
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results be rationalized? In the following, we discuss several channels that help to understand
the economic mechanisms behind our results.
Standard Labor Supply. One possible explanation of our extensive-margin results is that
they are driven by a rational response to the dierence between reservation wages and the
newly announced wage: A worker’s decision to work or not is determined by the wage rate
relative to the worker’s reservation wage, and the worker chooses to work if the wage rate
is greater than her reservation wage. Since participation in our experiment is voluntary, it
is reasonable to assume that the reservation wage for our workers has a distribution that is
bounded between $ 0 and $ 0.15. This raises the possibility that some workers have reservation
wage between $ 0.12 and $ 0.15. If true, this would make the observed responses consistent with
a rational calculus of reservation wages. In particular, we would expect all rational workers with
reservation wage between $ 0.12 and $ 0.15 to quit the labor task when the wage rate decreases
to $ 0.12. In contrast, workers whose wages stay constant or increase keep working because the
new wages are at least as large as their reservation wage. As a result, the response to the wage
decrease is larger than to the wage increase.
There are two potential reasons why it is not immediately clear that our results can be
explained by this story of reservation wages. First, previous studies by Horton and Chilton
(2010) and Horton et al. (2011) nd that mTurkers have a median reservation wage between $ 1.12
and $ 1.38 per hour,22 which is substantially lower than the implied hourly wage of $ 2.10 in our
wage decrease group.23 However, although the median hourly reservation wage is considerably
lower than the hourly wage in our decrease group, it is likely that the number of workers with
reservation wage between $ 0.12 and $ 0.15 is not zero, suggesting that we should see a response
to the wage decrease at the extensive margin even in light of a very low average reservation
wage.
Second, we observe a statistically signicant extensive margin response in the wage-increase
group, which, at rst glance, appears inconsistent with the reservation-wage argument since
every worker in this group would have been paid above her reservation wage from the beginning
of the experiment. However, the reservation-wage story might explain this result if workers
have imperfect information about the disutility of the labor task before they start working on
22 Horton et al. (2011) estimate a median reservation wage of $ 1.12 using data generated from an mTurk task that
is similar to our task. This task required mTurk workers to transcribe paragraph-sized chunks of text that are
written in Tagalog, a language of the Philippines. That is, as in our task, subjects are required to transcribe
foreign language (workers in their task were not from the Philippines) and are paid per transcribed text.
23 The implied hourly wage in the decrease group is calculated based on the observation that workers in the decrease
group transcribe about 15.18 pictures per hour: 2.10 = 0.1 + 6 × 0.15 + 9.18 × 0.12. Note that this hourly wage is
a lower bound because our measure of the time it takes to transcribe one picture overstates the actual time per
picture; see Section 3.3.1.
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our task. Because workers make their decision to start working on our task based solely on
our description on the mTurk website, they are only able to form an expectation regarding the
disutility of the labor task. Once workers transcribe the rst batch of six pictures, they are able
to update their estimate of the costs of working and the decision to continue working after
this rst batch of transcriptions is based on this updated estimate. Some subjects may have
underestimated the disutility of working on the task and will quit the task after the rst pictures
even in the absence of any wage changes. This is consistent with our observation of positive
quit-rates in the control group.24 This mechanism additionally suggests that the share of workers
who quit after a wage decrease is larger than in the control group without wage changes. It also
suggests that the share of workers who quit in the wage-increase group is smaller than in the
control group, but potentially still positive. As a result, this argument of updated beliefs about
the disutility of the labor task, along with a non-zero number of workers whose reservation
is between $ 0.12 and $ 0.15, provides a rationale for an asymmetric labor supply response to
wage increases and decreases, which is consistent with a standard labor-supply model with
reservation wages.
So what about the intensive-margin results? Could these results be due to the standard
model? Notice that the intensive margin response is based on the dierence between the
marginal disutility of transcription and the wage rate. Assuming the disutility of transcription
is increasing in the number of transcriptions, we would expect workers in the wage-increase
group to work longer and faster, relative to the control group. On the other hand, because the
wage-decrease group faces a lower wage than the control group, we would expect workers in
this group to spend less time working and to do so at a slower rate. This is exactly what we
nd, implying that we can conrm a positive relation between labor supply and wages. We
further nd indications that the economic magnitude of these responses is asymmetric; e.g., the
intensive-margin treatment eect for the time spent working in the wage-decrease group is
four times that in the wage-increase group. The standard neoclassical labor supply model may
yield such asymmetric labor supply responses if the labor supply function has a particular shape
where an increase triggers a smaller response than a decrease.25 Even then, asymmetry would
only arise for non-marginal wage changes. Although our absolute change in the wage rate
of $ 0.03 is small, the relative change is 20 % and therefore unlikely to be perceived as marginal.
This implies that our ndings regarding the intensive margin are also consistent with a standard
model of labor supply.
24 Note that another reason for quits in the control group is that we intentionally nudge workers to quit after six
pictures; see the notication that we display to workers in all groups after the rst six transcribed pictures.
25 For example, a CRRA utility function 11−γ (wL)1−γ with linear costs aL yields asymmetric labor supply responses
for non-marginal wage changes.
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Loss Aversion. Our ndings can also be rationalized by a model of loss aversion where the
reference wage is equal to the expected wage of $ 0.15 and the labor supply curve is kinked at
this reference wage (a model of this type has for example been put forward by Ahrens et al.,
2014; see Section 3.B in the Appendix).26 In such a model, workers are loss averse with reference-
dependent utility functions; workers’ labor-supply functions are kinked at at a reference wage
and have steeper slopes in the gain domain than in the loss domain. As a result, workers are
less willing to supply an additional unit of labor when the wage is above the reference wage
than when it is below, and a wage decrease is predicted to have a larger labor-supply eect than
a wage increase of equal magnitude.
The main insight from this potential mechanism is sketched in Figure 3.11, which relates
leisure and wages. A worker who is located at the reference wage, denoted wr , will respond
dierently to wage increases and decreases of equal magnitude. In particular, a worker at the
reference point weights wage decreases more heavily than wage increases. As a result, she
will respond more strongly to a wage decrease (by working less) than an equally sized wage
increase (to which she will respond through more labor supply). This result implies that labor
supply elasticities identied from wage increases are predicted to be smaller than labor supply
elasticities identied from wage decreases. Our ndings are consistent with this prediction.
Reciprocity. Another potential explanation of our ndings is reciprocity; workers interpret
the wage changes as punishment or reward, and respond accordingly. Workers who receive
a wage decrease feel punished and thus lower their labor supply in an eort to punish the
employer, while workers who receive a wage increase feel rewarded for their eort and thus
work harder to return the favor to their employer. To the extent that the degree of induced
reciprocity is asymmetric, this explanation is potentially consistent with our ndings. Although
we have no way of ruling out this motivation behind our results, we argue that this is an unlikely
explanation based on our experimental design. Recall that subjects are paid for each completed
transcription and not per unit of time. This implies that workers in our experiment have little
scope for punishing the employer through shirking. Reducing the number of transcription
implies that a worker punishes herself in the form of lower pay-o, and potentially lower
performance rating, which aects her prospects of being allowed to work on other mTurk
tasks.27 One strategy to punish the employer without incurring a cost is to continue to work
26 It is reasonable to assume that workers in our eld experiment expect the per-unit wage to remain constant
at $ 0.15. The literature typically nds that reference points depend on expectations (e.g., Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006,
Abeler et al., 2011, Ahrens et al., 2014), suggesting that $ 0.15 would constitute the reference wage if a model of
loss aversion was applied to our context.
27 Workers on mTurk receive ratings for each task they complete. Employers often use workers’ performance rating
to screen out low performers from their tasks. Therefore, a worker who decides to punish us because their wage
has been reduced, runs the risk of limiting the number of tasks she will qualify to work on in the future.
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Figure 3.11: Labor Supply under Loss Aversion
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Notes: This gure displays the relationship between leisure and wages under loss aversion. The
indierence curve is kinked at the reference wage wr . Individuals who currently face the reference
wage respond stronger to a wage decrease (by supplying less labor) than to a wage increase of equal
magnitude (by supplying more labor).
hard, but submit transcriptions that are of low enough quality to be mostly useless to the
employer, but high enough quality to avoid a negative performance review. Because we have
the transcriptions and the actual texts, we can check to see if workers used this strategy; there
is no evidence that they did (see Section 3.4.4).
Similarly, as opposed to settings where workers are paid per hour, transcribing more pictures
is not a reward for the employer in our experiment since this increases the costs to the employer.
Workers are also likely to know that employers can easily recruit other workers to transcribe
pictures and that employers therefore do not face the risk that pictures remain untranscribed.
Treatment-Induced Heterogeneous Skill Composition. One could think that the skill
composition (i.e., the ability to transcribe pictures) of workers in the three experimental groups is
aected by the treatment variations. For example, it might be plausible that the least productive
workers drop out of the labor task once they are faced with a wage decrease, whereas similar
unskilled workers stay after a wage increase. This would then imply that the share of unskilled
workers in the decrease group would be smaller after treatment notication than in the increase
group. As a result, dierences across groups might simply be a result of heterogeneous attrition
due to the treatments.
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Using all individuals in our work task (thus not only those who saw the treatment), Figure 3.12
and Appendix Figure 3.A.6 show that transcription skills do not aect drop-out rates. Figure 3.12
shows the median time per transcribed picture over the course of all periods.28 We use me-
dian time per transcribed picture as a measure of transcription skills. The gure shows that
average transcription skills in the three experimental groups are not aected by the treatment
notication; the lines evolve similarly over the periods in all three groups. Figure 3.A.6 in the
Appendix shows the estimates of a regression of a ’Last-picture-transcribed’ dummy (i.e., a
dummy indicating if the respective period is the last period of the respective individual) on
a full interaction of period dummies and the transcription time in the respective period. The
gure shows that transcription skills (as measured by transcription time) do not determine
exit rates. In other words, being talented or not in transcribing pictures does not predict if a
participant drops out of the labor task.
Figure 3.12: Time Worked per Picture Over Periods, by Experimental Group
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Notes: This gure depicts the median time it takes to transcribe a picture in each period by experi-
mental group. For example, the value in period ten indicates the median time it took subjects in a
given experimental group to transcribe the 10th picture. Treatment occurred after period six. The
sample includes all participants who started working on the task. Number of observations is 1,152.
28 For example, in period 10 the gure shows the median time that it took workers in the experimental groups to
transcribe the 10th picture.
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3.5.2 Implications
The existing labor-supply literature often identies labor supply elasticities by exploiting panel
data comprised of both wage increases and decreases. This approach makes sense in the context
ofmarginal wage changes where the elasticity is shown to be symmetric. However, this approach
becomes problematic when on considers that wage changes are generally non-marginal. The
reason is that both the standard and behaviorally-inspired models can be used to show that
labor supply responses to non-marginal wage changes need not be symmetric. Consistent with
the theoretical nding of Ahrens et al. (2014) and the empirical results of Kube et al. (2013), we
show that labor supply responds asymmetrically to non-marginal wage changes.
Our ndings suggest that ignoring the direction of wage changes when estimating labor supply
elasticities leads to biased own-wage labor-supply elasticities; elasticities are overestimated
when wages rise and underestimated when wages fall. Importantly, and as an addition to the
previous literature, we nd that the asymmetry of labor supply w.r.t. wages is more pronounced
on the extensive margin relative to the intensive margin. This renement of the asymmetry
is especially important since it is generally accepted that labor supply elasticities are mainly
determined by the extensive margin response (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, Meghir and Phillips,
2010, Bargain et al., 2014). Our ndings are also practically useful, since labor supply elasticities
play an important role in quantifying the economic impacts of policy changes that aect wages;
e.g., minimum wage polices.
Additionally, our results highlight one potential reason for the downward rigidity in wages.
In particular, it is widely observed that nominal wages tend to move in one direction only.
Prominent explanations for downward nominal rigidities include institutions such as minimum
wages and collective bargaining. Recent evidence by Kaur (2018), however, shows that wages
are downward rigid even in the absence of such institutions. Among the many potential
explanations for this observed rigidity are the potentially signicant eects on productivity and
labor supply. However, the scarcity of nominal wage cuts makes it challenging to determine if
the labor supply and production impacts of nominal wage cuts are indeed large and negative.
Our study adds to the small literature that have explored this question. As mentioned before,
we nd large negative extensive margin responses, which suggest that nominal wage cuts could
be potentially damaging for rms. This is one reason behind the reluctance of rms to reduce
wages.
A policy area where our ndings are likely to be particularly useful is taxation. First, tax
reforms generally result in either tax increases or tax decreases, which translate into changing
after-tax wages. In fact, upward and downward changes are more prominent for tax rates
than for wages. We know that the tax elasticity of labor supply is generally larger than the
wage elasticity; e.g., due to tax aversion (Kessler and Norton, 2016). This suggests that the
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labor-supply asymmetry with respect to tax-rate changes is likely to be more pronounced
than what our ndings for labor supply responses to wage changes suggest. This makes the
distinction between rate increases and decreases particularly important in the context of tax
rate. Second, our ndings also raise questions about the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) which
plays a crucial role in our understanding of the eciency costs of taxation and which is often
estimated based on panel-data exploiting multiple variations in tax rates (e.g., Saez et al., 2012).
In particular, our results suggest that failure to distinguish between ETI estimated with tax rate
increases and ETI estimated with tax rate decreases is likely to lead to an underestimation of
the eciency cost of tax rate increases. This problem is likely to be even more important than
with wage changes since tax rates generally move freely in both directions. Of course, the labor
supply response to wage changes is not necessarily identical to the response to tax rate changes.
Therefore, we are cautious in generalizing our results to the case of tax rate changes.29
3.5.3 Generalizability
The results described above are obtained using an experimental design in a large real-world
labor market. Importantly, workers did not know they participated in an experiment and thus
behaved as they would in their natural occurring environment. At least two aspects of our
empirical results suggest that workers took the task seriously and supplied labor in a “plausible”
way. First, the overall quality is very high with an accuracy rate of more than 97 % in all three
groups. Second, we nd evidence for an upward sloping labor supply curve – that is, workers
work more as wages increase and less when wages go down –, which is consistent with the
empirical labor supply literature (e.g., Keane, 2011, Bargain et al., 2014). These two points also
indicate that labor-supply behavior in our online task has some implications for labor-supply
behavior in other, more traditional labor markets.
Due to randomization, our experimental design also guarantees internal validity. Though our
ndings are based on an actual real-world labor market, we are careful not to generalize our
results to all types of labor markets. Nonetheless, we argue that the ndings are applicable to
labor markets with piece rate, exibility and multiple outside options. One example of such labor
markets is on-line crowd-sourcing labor markets, which are becoming increasingly common
in the current technological age.30 A common feature of these labor markets is that workers
tend to work for relatively low wages and have extremely high levels of labor supply exibility.
Because the labor supply eects are predominately on the extensive margin, we argue that the
29 We are not aware of any evidence on the asymmetric eects of tax increases and decreases on labor supply or
taxable income. Benzarti et al. (2017) show that increases in Value Added Taxes (VAT) have a larger eect on
prices than VAT reductions.
30 See https://sites.google.com/site/johnjosephhorton/miscellany/online-labor-markets for a list of
crowd-sourcing online labor markets.
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results are also likely to be equally applicable to traditional labor markets where workers face
greater restrictions on labor hours.
3.6 Conclusion
We estimate the eect of (non-marginal) wage changes on labor supply using data generated
in a eld experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Our ndings show that the labor-supply
curve for workers on mTurk is upward sloping; the relationship between wages and labor
supply is positive both for the case of wage increases and wage decreases. We further nd
strong evidence of an asymmetric response on the extensive margin; the extensive-margin
response for wage decreases is twice as large as for equally sized increases. The magnitude
of the intensive-time margin responses is also indicative of an asymmetric response, but we
cannot rule out symmetry in a statistical sense. These results are consistent with a standard
labor-supply model as well as reference-dependent preferences. Importantly, they are not driven
by treatment-induced heterogeneous skill compositions.
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Appendix 3.A Additional Figures
Figure 3.A.1: Histogram of Transcribed Pictures
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Notes: This gure plots the histogram of pictures described for all workers who worked on the task.
The number of observations is 1,152. Subjects saw the treatment notication after transcribing six
pictures (indicated by the vertical line).
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Figure 3.A.2: Total Time Worked by Treatment Group – Intensive Margin
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average and median time (in minutes) that subjects
totally spent on working on the labor task, along with 95 % condence bands. The underlying sample
is restricted to subjects who did not quit the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment
notication (i.e., restricted to subjects who have transcribed at least seven images). The number of
observations is 591 with 213 subjects in the control group, 203 subjects in the “wage increase” group
and 175 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All 591 subjects in the sample have transcribed at
least seven images.
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Figure 3.A.3: Average Time per Transcription by Treatment Group – Intensive Margin
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average and median time (in minutes) that subjects
spent working on one image, along with 95 % condence bands. The underlying sample is restricted
to subjects who did not quit the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment notication (i.e.,
restricted to subjects who have transcribed at least seven images). The number of observations is 591
with 213 subjects in the control group, 203 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 175 subjects
in the “wage decrease” group. All 591 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least seven images.
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Figure 3.A.4: Number of Transcribed Pictures for Workers Who Completed at Least
One Picture After the Treatment Notication
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average number of images that subjects transcribed,
along with 95 % condence bands. The underlying sample is restricted to subjects who did not quit
the labor task immediately after seeing the treatment notication (i.e., restricted to subjects who
have transcribed at least seven images). The number of observations is 591 with 213 subjects in the
control group, 203 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 175 subjects in the “wage decrease”
group. All 591 subjects in the sample have transcribed at least seven images.
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Figure 3.A.5: Accuracy by Treatment Group
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average transcription accuracy, i.e., the average share
of characters in each image that is transcribed correctly, along with 95 % condence bands. The
number of observations is 720 with 248 subjects in the control group, 215 subjects in the “wage
increase” group and 257 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All 720 subjects in the sample have
transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 3.A.6: Eect of Performance on Probability to Quit
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Notes: This gure depicts coecients which are based on a regression of a “Last-picture-transcribed”
dummy on a full interaction of period dummies and the time used to transcribe the respective
picture. “Last-picture-transcribed” dummy is one if the picture in this respective round is the last
transcribed picture of the respective participant. Coecients are shown along with 95 % condence
bars. Standard error clustered by individual. Treatment occurred after period six and we normalize
the coecients to the pre-treatment period. The sample includes all participants who started
working on the task. Number of observations is 1,152.
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Figure 3.A.7: Extensive Margin – Before vs. After Forum Post
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Notes: This gure depicts the share of subjects in each group who quit the labor task immediately
after seeing the treatment notication (i.e., share of subjects who transcribed six pictures but not a
seventh one). Before and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the
task was discussed online (see Section 3.3.2). The number of observations sampled before the forum
post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the “wage increase” group and
117 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after the forum
post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the “wage increase” group and
140 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six
images.
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Figure 3.A.8: Number of Transcribed Pictures – Before vs. After Forum Post
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average number of images that subjects transcribed.
Before and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the task was discussed
online (see Section 3.3.2). The number of observations sampled before the forum post is 318 with
102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 117 subjects in
the “wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after the forum post is 402 with
146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 140 subjects in the
“wage decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Figure 3.A.9: Total Time Worked – Before vs. After Forum Post
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects totally spent on
working on the labor task. Before and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or
after the task was discussed online (see Section 3.3.2). The number of observations sampled before
the forum post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the “wage increase”
group and 117 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after
the forum post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the “wage increase”
group and 140 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at
least six images.
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Figure 3.A.10: Average Time per HIT – Before vs. After Forum Post
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average time (in minutes) that subjects spent working
on one image. Before and After indicate whether the observation was sampled before or after the
task was discussed online (see Section 3.3.2). The number of observations sampled before the forum
post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control group, 99 subjects in the “wage increase” group and
117 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. The number of observations sampled after the forum
post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control group, 116 subjects in the “wage increase” group and
140 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six
images.
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Figure 3.A.11: Accuracy – Before vs. After Forum Post
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Notes: This gure depicts for each group the average transcription accuracy, i.e., the average share
of characters in each image that is transcribed correctly. Before and After indicate whether the
observation was sampled before or after the task was discussed online (see Section 3.3.2). The
number of observations sampled before the forum post is 318 with 102 subjects in the control
group, 99 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 117 subjects in the “wage decrease” group.
The number of observations sampled after the forum post is 402 with 146 subjects in the control
group, 116 subjects in the “wage increase” group and 140 subjects in the “wage decrease” group. All
subjects in the sample have transcribed at least six images.
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Appendix 3.B A Model of Labor Supply under Loss Aversion
This section presents a theoretical framework that allows us to predict the impact of wage
increases and decreases on labor-supply. The outline is informed by Ahrens et al. (2014) who
incorporate loss aversion into a standard labor-supply model.
Ahrens et al. (2014) develop a model where workers with reference-dependent preferences
maximize the following utility function:
U (C,L) = UC (C) − θi L
ϑi
ϑi
,
where C is consumption, L is labor supply (hours worked or eort), and θi is a parameter
to ensure preference continuity at the reference wage. UC (C) is utility from consumption
and the term Lϑiϑi indicates disutility from working. ϑi is a measure of loss aversion, which is
characterized by the following piece-wise function:
ϑi =

ϑ1 if w > wr
ϑ2 if w < wr .
In this equation,w is the current wage (per unit of L supplied) andwr is the reference wage.31
If w is above the reference wage, the worker is in the so-called gain domain, and if w is below
the reference wage, she is in the loss domain. A subject is loss averse if ϑ1 > ϑ2, implying that
the marginal utility loss from working is higher in the gain domain than in the loss domain.
This means that workers are less willing to supply an additional unit of labor when the wage
is above the reference wage than when it is below. Maximizing with respect to the budget
constraint C = wL gives the following kinked labor-supply curve:32
L =

(wθ1 )
1
ϑ1−1 if w > wr
(wθ2 )
1
ϑ2−1 if w < wr
Because of loss aversion with respect to the reference wage wr (and hence ϑ1 > ϑ2), we get
that 1ϑ1−1 <
1
ϑ2−1 . This implies that subjects whose current wage is the reference wage w
r are
more responsive to wage decreases than to wage increases.33
31 It is plausible to argue that $ 0.15 constitutes the reference wage wr in our set-up (see Section 3.5.1).
32 We only discuss the main implications of the model here since Ahrens et al. (2014) has all of the derivations.
33 We assume an upward sloping labor supply curve where the substitution eect dominates the income eect.
That is, subjects work more when wages go up and they work less when wages fall. This assumption is also
supported by our empirical ndings.
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Chapter 4
The Sensitivity of Structural Labor Supply
Models to Modeling Assumptions∗
4.1 Introduction
Knowing the size of labor supply responses to wage or policy changes has important impli-
cations for welfare analysis (Eissa et al., 2008) and optimal taxation (Diamond and Saez, 2011,
Immervoll et al., 2011). Despite a long and comprehensive empirical literature on labor supply
behavior, there is still substantial variation in the estimated elasticities (see, e.g., Heckman,
1993, Evers et al., 2008, Chetty et al., 2011, Keane and Rogerson, 2012). Potential reasons include
dierences in preferences, norms, and institutions across countries and over time. But even for
the same country, the same period, and the same estimation approach there is still considerable
heterogeneity in individuals’ estimated responsiveness to wages (Bargain and Peichl, 2016).
One explanation for these remaining dierences is the use of dierent and/or wrongly specied
empirical models.
In this paper, we aim to investigate this channel by thoroughly scrutinizing state-of-the-art
micro labor supply models and their functioning.1 Structural models are repeatedly criticized
for the large number of assumptions and the even larger number of possible combinations
of these assumptions (Keane, 2010, Manski, 2014). We test whether the numerous modeling
choices actually aect estimated elasticities. More specically, we check the internal validity of
such models by running controlled experiments: we set up and estimate 3,456 dierent models,
each representing a dierent (plausible) combination of commonly made assumptions. We
use two dierent micro data sets – one for Germany and one for the US – and estimate these
dierent models for ve distinct population groups, leading to 17,280 maximum likelihood
∗ This chapter is based on a revised version of M. Löer, A. Peichl, and S. Siegloch (2014b). “Structural Labor
Supply Models and Wage Exogeneity”. IZA Discussion Paper 8281.
1 We focus on structural labor supply models which can be used for policy simulations. In addition, several
reduced-form approaches are used in the literature to estimate labor supply responses (see Chetty et al., 2011,
and Bargain and Peichl, 2016, for recent surveys).
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estimations for each data set. Based on the estimation results, we gather insights into how
robust the statistical t of the models and the estimated labor supply elasticities are with respect
to the underlying assumptions.
The modeling assumptions can be categorized in three broad areas. First, researchers need
to specify the utility function. This concerns the functional form, its exibility with respect
to observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity, and the inclusion of stigma costs from
welfare participation. Second, there are dierent ways to construct the choice set and to model
the availability of job or hours alternatives and xed costs of working. The third area relates
to the treatment of the underlying wage distribution, namely, the imputation of wages for
non-workers, whether to use predicted wages for non-workers only or to impute wages for the
full sample, and the handling of the wage prediction error when imputing wages. While the
second issue has been surveyed in Aaberge et al. (2009), the literature is rather silent on the
rst and the last area, which is were this paper intends to break new ground. In particular, the
treatment of wages has received hardly any discussion in many existing studies.
Our results show that the models’ predictions are strongly driven by the treatment of wages
in the estimation. For instance, the choice between predicting wage rates for non-workers
with missing wage information only or for the full sample – both procedures are often used
in the literature – may double the estimated labor supply elasticities, raising the average own-
wage elasticity in our meta-analysis from 0.23 to 0.46. While the former option presumes that
individuals optimize with respect to their current wage, the latter specication assumes that all
individuals base their labor supply decision on expected wages as derived from the Mincerian
wage equation. The handling of wage prediction errors is equally important. Using predicted
wages for all individuals but ignoring the forecast error yields an average elasticity of 0.65
as opposed to 0.35 when accounting for the prediction error. In contrast, it turns out that
other modeling choices hardly aect the estimated results. Elasticities are largely robust to
the specication of the functional form of the utility function, the inclusion of observed or
unobserved preference heterogeneity, as well as the modeling of hours restrictions or stigma
costs of welfare participation.
We conclude that the attention of previous sensitivity analyses has been mainly concentrated
on less important factors while the main driving forces have been neglected, i.e., the interactions
between wages, working hours, and preferences. This nding is even more relevant given that
most existing models (implicitly) assume exogeneity between the wage equation and the labor
supply decision.2 Our ndings have important policy implications as labor supply elasticities
2 Only little eort has been made thus far in the context of discrete choice labor supply models to overcome this
assumption. Aaberge et al. (1995), Breunig et al. (2008), and Blundell and Shephard (2012) estimate preferences
and wages simultaneously, in part also allowing for correlation.
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are key parameters when evaluating or designing optimal tax benet policies. For instance,
Diamond and Saez (2011) use an elasticity of 0.25 to derive an optimal top marginal tax rate
of 72.7 percent. However, an elasticity of 0.65, as often found when using alternative wage
imputation procedures, reduces the optimal tax rate to 50.6 percent, bringing it closer to actually
observed values.
Our analysis makes two important contributions to the literature on labor supply estimation.
First, there is little evidence on the functioning of structural labor supply models in general.
Moreover, if such studies exist, dierent models are not estimated on the same data set. Existing
surveys and meta-analyses focus on either the principles of alternative estimation strategies
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, Evers et al., 2008) or cross-country comparisons of empirical
ndings (Bargain et al., 2014). Robustness checks in previous studies usually limit themselves
to small deviations in one or only few of the numerous modeling assumptions. In that respect,
we run a controlled meta-analysis, isolating the impact of the model assumptions on estimation
outcomes. Second, our analysis points to a hitherto neglected factor that strongly inuences the
estimated labor elasticities: we show that the treatment of wages in labor supply estimations,
which is rarely theoretically motivated nor subject to robustness checks, crucially aects the
estimation results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the modeling
framework and a short overview of the existing literature. Section 4.3 provides information on
the used data and the modeling of the tax and benet system. In Section 4.4 we conduct our
analysis of modeling assumptions and present the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model and Existing Literature
The use of structural discrete choice labor supply estimations has become a standard procedure
in the empirical analysis of labor supply for both econometricians and policy makers (see, e.g.,
the overview in Bargain and Peichl, 2016). The rst generation of labor supply models relied on
the assumption that the household’s utility is maximized over a continuous set of working hours
– known as Hausman approach (see Hausman, 1981). This approach has been criticized for three
reasons: (i) because the consistent estimation relies on rather restrictive a priori assumptions
(see, e.g., MaCurdy et al., 1990, or Bloemen and Kapteyn, 2008, for details); (ii) the procedure
has proven cumbersome when the budget set is non-convex, which will often be the case in
presence of complicated tax and benets systems in most countries; (iii) it has been shown that
the estimated elasticities are very sensitive to the underlying wages (Ericson and Flood, 1997,
Eklöf and Sacklén, 2000).
Partly motivated by these shortcomings, it has become increasingly popular to model the
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labor supply decision as the choice between a (nite) set of utility levels instead of deriving
the marginal utility. Starting with the works by Aaberge, Dagsvik, and Strøm (1995), van Soest
(1995), and Hoynes (1996), a wide range of dierent empirical specications of these discrete
choice models has been applied. For many institutional settings, the assumption of a discrete
choice between dierent working hours or job oers may even be more plausible than assuming
a continuous choice set (Dagsvik et al., 2014). Comparing dierent levels of utility avoids also
the cumbersome maximization process of Hausman-type models. We focus our analysis on the
discrete choice approach, given that it has become the standard procedure in the literature.
4.2.1 General Model
Structural labor supply estimations build on the assumption of the well-known neoclassical
labor supply model that decision makers maximize their utility by choosing the optimal amount
of working hours (or, more generally, the optimal job) subject to a budget constraint. Utility is
dened as a function of consumption Cnj , leisure Lj , and idiosyncratic preferences for certain
jobs, which we denote by ϵnj . Individual n faces the decision between a set of jobs j ∈ Jn with
working hours hj and wages wnj , including non-participation,3 and maximizes her utility over
job alternatives:
max
j ∈Jn
U
(
Cnj ,Lj , ϵnj
)
= max
j ∈Jn
U
(
f
[
wnjhj , In
xnj ] ,T − hj , ϵnj ) (4.1)
where leisure Lj is denoted as dierence between the total time endowment T and working
hours hj . Consumption Cnj depends on working hours, the hourly wage rate wnj , non-labor
income In , household and job characteristics xnj , and the tax benet system f [·]. We assume a
static model, which implies that consumption equals disposable income.
Individuals’ true utility is only partly observable to the researcher while idiosyncratic com-
ponents captured in ϵnj are latent. We rewrite the utility of individual n choosing job type j
accordingly as:
U
(
Cnj ,Lj , ϵnj
xnj, βn, γj ) = φ (Cnj ,Lj xnj, βn, γj ) + ϵnj (4.2)
The rst part φ
(
Cnj ,Lj
xnj, βn, γj ) is determined by consumption and leisure, characteris-
tics xnj , individual preferences βn, and labor market conditions γj that capture the availability
of job type j. One may think of these labor market characteristics γj as measuring xed costs
of working, search costs for part-time jobs or rigidities regarding working hours, for example.
The unobserved taste variation ϵnj is assumed to be i.i.d. and follow the extreme value type I
3 We denote non-participation as job alternative j = 0 with h0 = 0 and wn0 = 0.
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distribution with cumulative distribution function F (ϵ) = exp (− exp(−ϵ)). McFadden (1974) has
shown that the probability of individual n choosing a job of type i is subsequently given by:
P
(
Uni > Unj ,∀j , i
xn, βn, γ) = exp (φ [Cni ,Li xni , βn, γi] )∑
s ∈Jn exp
(
φ
[
Cns ,Ls
xns , βn, γs] ) (4.3)
Assuming that individuals take labor market conditions as given, we can rewrite:
P
(
Uni > Unj ,∀j , i
xn, βn, γ) = exp (v [Cni ,Li xni , βn] ) д (ixni , γi)∑
s ∈Jn exp
(
v
[
Cns ,Ls
xns , βn] ) д (s xns , γs) (4.4)
with v(Cnj ,Lj ) as systematic utility function and д(j) as frequency of feasible jobs with type j.
Hence, the individual choice probability is given as the systematic utility part weighted by the
availability of jobs with type j. In the following, we discuss the specication of v(·) and д(·) as
well as the estimation procedure.
4.2.2 Identification
Econometrically, the discrete choice approach boils down to the representation of the labor
supply decision in a random utility model. In the very basic model, the theoretical set-up
implies that the household’s decision satises the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property (Luce, 1959). In other words, the preference between two alternatives does not depend
on the presence of a third one. While this assumption may seem rather restrictive at rst glance,
Dagsvik and Strøm (2004) and Train (2009) show that it is well in line with economic intuition
and even less restrictive than the necessary assumptions to estimate continuous hours models.
However, the IIA assumption is no longer needed as soon as additional random eects are
incorporated in the model (see Section 4.2.3).
It is crucial to impose a specic functional form for both v(Cnj ,Lnj ) and д(j) to obtain consis-
tent estimates of βn and γj . van Soest et al. (2002) show that semi-parametric specications
also yield consistent results. As consumption is a function of working hours and thus leisure,
identication of preference parameters relies on (i) the variation in working hours hj , hourly
wages wnj , non-labor income In , and other characteristics xnj , and (ii) the fact that the tax
function f (wnjhj , In) is highly non-linear in hj and wnj . This also implies that labor market
conditions γj can only be separated and identied on the assumption of a specic functional
form (Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006).
In addition to this, the vast majority of the literature also assumes that preferences βn and
labor market conditions γj may depend on individual characteristics, but are independent of
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the wage rate wnj . Thus, it is commonly assumed that:
E
[
βnwnj
xnj ] = 0 E [γjwnj xnj ] = 0 (4.5)
The main reason for this assumption is that it reduces the computational burden substantially
and makes the estimation more convenient.
In order to estimate the preference coecients, one has to evaluate both functionsv(·) andд(·)
for every household n = 1, . . . ,N and every choice category within the choice set Jn . Given the
dierent income levels, the model can be estimated via maximum likelihood. The derivation of
the (log)-likelihood function is straightforward (McFadden, 1974). However, some modeling
assumptions have to be made, as well as several possible extensions to this simple set-up.
4.2.3 Modeling Decisions
Choice Set. The rst modeling decision relates to the construction of the choice set. Most
authors simply pick a set of representative levels of hours of work and assume (small) identical
choice sets for the whole population. In our analysis, we follow this literature and assume that
households with a single decision maker face seven possible labor supply states, i.e., either
non-participation or working 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 or 60 hours per week. Couple households are
assumed to face 72 alternatives. The results are generally not sensitive to the number of choices
(e.g., 4 vs. 7 vs. 13) or the exact value assigned to each category (see, e.g., Bargain et al., 2014).
As noted before, we focus on other aspects of the model set up, namely the specication of the
utility function and the treatment of wages. See Aaberge et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion
of alternative representations of the choice set.
Functional Form of the Systematic Utility. As the discrete choice approach relies on the
comparison of dierent utility levels, it is crucial to determine the form of the systematic utility
function. In theoretical terms, the function v(·) represents the direct utility function of the
household. Most applications rely on either a translog, a quadratic or a Box-Cox transformed
utility specication. However, several other choices are possible.
Heterogeneity in Preferences. Heterogeneity in the labor supply behavior along observable
characteristics can be rather easily introduced in the context of structural labor supply models
by extending the utility specication. The preference coecients of the direct utility function
are usually interacted with some observed household characteristics, such as age or the presence
of children, as taste shifters.
Additionally accounting for unobserved heterogeneity overcomes the IIA assumption as it
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allows for unobservable variation in preferences between choice alternatives. There are two
main ways to do so: in most applied works, either a random coecient model (van Soest, 1995) or
a latent class model (Hoynes, 1996) is assumed. The former typically assumes a set of preference
coecients to be (multivariate) normally distributed, whereas the latter allows a set of discrete
mass points for the estimated coecients. Keane and Wasi (2012) discuss the performance of
both approaches. We focus on the random coecient approach as it has become standard in the
literature.
Welfare Stigma and Benefit Take-Up. While the model as described thus far assumes that
households only build their preferences with respect to the levels of consumption and leisure,
their utility may also depend on the source of income. For example, the participation in welfare
programs may be connected to an unobservable stigma that aects the household’s utility and
prevents some households from taking up benets (Mott, 1983). In the discrete choice context,
this can be incorporated by accounting for the potential disutility from welfare participation and
expanding the choice set such that the household explicitly chooses between benet take-up
and non-participation (Hoynes, 1996, Keane and Mott, 1998).
Fixed Costs and Hours Restrictions. Moreover, van Soest (1995) argues that working part-
time could also be connected with an unobservable disutility, because part-time jobs may exhibit
higher search costs. Euwals and van Soest (1999) extend this idea by introducing xed costs of
work, which have since been used in several applications. While both approaches help to explain
the observed labor market outcomes, their rationale remains rather ad hoc. Aaberge et al. (1995)
provide a micro foundation that allows a structural interpretation of xed costs and the utility
connected to certain hours alternatives. In their model, households choose between (latent) job
oers that dier not only regarding the working hours, but also in terms of availability, wages,
and non-monetary attributes.
4.2.4 Wage Imputation Procedure
In addition to the specication of the utility function, there are important modeling assumptions
regarding the wage imputation. In order to calculate the disposable income for the dierent
choice alternatives, one needs information on the hourly wage rates. While for actual workers
the wage rate can be calculated by gross earnings and hours of work (we use standardized
working hours to reduce the potential division bias, see Borjas, 1980, and Ziliak and Kniesner,
1999, for a discussion), the wage information is typically missing for non-workers. The rst
decision is how to deal with missing wages in the estimation process. In practice, wages are
either estimated beforehand and treated as given within the estimation of the labor supply
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model or wages and preferences are estimated jointly. In addition, one has to decide whether
the estimated wage rates are used only if wages are not observed or for the full sample (see
MaCurdy et al., 1990, for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches).
In either case, one can ignore or explicitly account for potential sample selection issues in
observed wages.
After tting the wage equation, another important question is whether the potential errors
in the wage rate prediction are incorporated in the labor supply estimation. Especially when
using predicted wages for the full sample, the “new” distribution of wages will typically have a
signicantly lower variance and the predicted wage will dier considerably from the observed
one, at least for some workers. Thus, ignoring the error when predicting wage rates, which is
still done in practice, leads to inconsistent estimates. The standard procedure to incorporate
wage prediction errors is to integrate over the estimated wage distribution and thus integrating
out the wage prediction error during the estimation (van Soest, 1995). One approximation used
in some applications is to simply add a single random draw to the predicted wage rates (Bargain
et al., 2014). While this procedure lacks a theoretical rationale, it substantially reduces the
computational burden of the estimation.
4.2.5 Estimation Approach
The named extensions – especially regarding the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity and
the incorporation of wage prediction errors – complicate the estimation procedure and lead to
the more general representation as mixed logit model (Train, 2009). Taking the most general
specication as reference, the likelihood function can be written as:
L =
N∏
n=1
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
exp (vni [·|wˆni ,βn])д (i |γi)∑
j ∈Jn exp
(
vnj
[·|wˆnj ,βn] ) д (j |γj ) f (βn, γ)f (wˆn) dβndγdwˆn
(4.6)
where i ∈ Jn denotes the alternative chosen by individual n. The likelihood contributions
not only depend on the systematic utility function, but also on the availability of the choice
alternatives, denoted by д(i). This set-up implies that the availability of choice alternatives
can be separated from the systematic utility, which is a reasonable assumption at least for
labor markets in industrialized countries. As the preferences may also include unobserved
heterogeneity, the probability that household n maximizes its utility at choice alternative i has
to be integrated over the distribution of coecients (βn, γ). Similarly, the individual likelihood
contributions have to be integrated over the range of possible wage predictions wˆnj . As both
variables will typically not be uniformly distributed, the choice probability has to be weighted
by the probability density of the random components.
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The model as shown in equation (4.6) is very general and less restrictive than the conditional
logit set-up. In turn, it is no longer possible to nd an analytical solution. Train (2009) proposes
the use of maximum simulated likelihood methods instead. In order to retrieve the simulated
likelihood, the double integral has to be approximated and averaged over r = 1, . . . ,R random
draws from the distributions of (βn, γ) and wˆnj . The simulated log-likelihood is given by:
ln(SL) =
N∑
n=1
ln
©­­«
1
R
R∑
r=1
exp
(
vni
[
·
wˆ (r )ni ,β(r )n ] ) д (iγ(r )i )∑
j ∈Jn exp
(
vnj
[
·
wˆ (r )nj ,β(r )n ] ) д (jγ(r )j )
ª®®¬ (4.7)
When the number of draws goes to innity, the simulated log-likelihood in (4.7) converges to
the log-likelihood of the model denoted in (4.6). Instead of relying on conventional random
draws, we approximate the likelihood function using pseudo-random Halton sequences. This
reduces the number of draws needed to ensure stable results as Halton sequences cover the
desired distribution more evenly (Train, 2009).4
4.2.6 Common Specifications in the Literature
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide an overview on the empirical specication of several popular models
that have been applied in recent years and that are used as key references in the literature.
Mainly three utility functions have been used, i.e., either a translog, a quadratic or a Box-Cox
transformed specication. As the Stone-Geary function can be interpreted as a simplication of
the translog or the Box-Cox utility function, only the higher-degree polynomials used in van
Soest et al. (2002) stand out from the list. Their approach can be seen as approximation to a
non-parametric specication of the utility function. The inclusion of observed heterogeneity
shows a similar picture. All studies allow for observed heterogeneity in the preferences for
leisure, whereas fewer studies allow for preference heterogeneity regarding consumption. The
evidence on unobserved heterogeneity is somewhat more mixed, just like the inclusion of
heterogeneity in xed costs and the potential stigma from welfare participation.
As working hours are typically concentrated in only few hours categories, most authors
include xed costs of working, hours restrictions, or both in their models. Fixed costs and hours
restrictions can also be loosely interpreted as measures for the availability of the respective
choice alternatives (Aaberge et al., 2009). Less than half of the models explicitly allow for stigma
eects and non-take-up of welfare benets. This is interesting due to the common nding that
the actual benet participation rate deviates substantially from full take-up. Thus, models that
do not account for the potential disutility are expected to over-predict the number of recipients.
4 Details on the estimation procedure can be found in Löer (2013).
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Table 4.1: Model Specications
Utility Heterogeneity* Welfare
Paper Function Observed Unobs. Stigma Constraints
Aaberge et al. (1995, 2009) Box-Cox L — — FC,HR
Aaberge et al. (1999) Box-Cox L, FC — — FC,HR
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) Box-Cox L, FC — — FC,HR
Dagsvik et al. (2011) Box-Cox L, FC — — FC,HR
Blundell and Shephard (2012) Box-Cox L,C, S, FC C, S Yes FC
van Soest (1995) Translog L —/L† — —/HR
Euwals and van Soest (1999) Translog L, FC L — FC
van Soest and Das (2001) Translog L, FC L — FC
Flood et al. (2004) Translog L,L2, S L,L2, S Yes —
Haan (2006) Translog L,C —/C — HR
Flood et al. (2007) Translog L,C, FC, S L,C, FC, S Yes FC
Hoynes (1996) Stone-Geary L, S L, S Yes —/FC
van Soest et al. (2002) Polynomial L L — FC
Keane and Mott (1998) Quadratic L, S L, S Yes —
Blundell et al. (1999, 2000) Quadratic L,C, FC C, S Yes FC
Bargain et al. (2014) Quadratic L,C, FC C — FC
* L andC denote heterogeneity in preferences for leisure and consumption, respectively. S denotes the disutility
from welfare participation. FC refers to xed costs of working and HR to hours restrictions.
† Robustness checks and alternative model specications are separated by slashes.
Table 4.2: Wage Imputation Methods
Estimation Sample Prediction
Paper Approach Selection Imputation Error
Aaberge et al. (1995, 2009) Simultaneous — Full sample —
Aaberge et al. (1999) Simultaneous — Full sample —
Keane and Mott (1998) Simult./Two step* — Non-workers —
van Soest et al. (2002) Simultaneous — Non-workers Integrated out
Blundell and Shephard (2012) Simult./Two step — Non-workers Integrated out
van Soest (1995) Two step Yes Non-workers —/Integrated out
Euwals and van Soest (1999) Two step Yes Non-workers Integrated out
Blundell et al. (1999, 2000) Two step Yes Non-workers Integrated out
van Soest and Das (2001) Two step Yes Non-workers Integrated out
Haan (2006) Two step Yes Non-workers —
Flood et al. (2007) Two step Yes Non-workers —/Integrated out
Dagsvik et al. (2011) Two step Yes Non-workers —
Hoynes (1996) Two step Yes Full sample —
Flood et al. (2004) Two step Yes Full sample —
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) Two step Yes Full sample Integrated out
Bargain et al. (2014) Two step Yes Full sample Random draw
* Robustness checks and alternative model specications are separated by slashes.
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Less variation can be found in terms of the model’s treatment of wages. While most studies
estimate wages and the labor supply decision separately in a two-step procedure, only the
models of Aaberge et al. (1995, and follow-ups), Keane and Mott (1998), van Soest et al. (2002)
and Blundell and Shephard (2012) apply a simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation. In
turn, these models neglect potential sample selection issues when estimating wages. There is no
consensus in the literature whether predicted wages should be used only for individuals whose
wages are unobserved or for the full sample. Regarding the handling of the wage prediction
errors, it becomes increasingly common practice to incorporate and integrate out the errors
during the estimation.
4.3 Data
The baseline estimations in this paper are performed on the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), a representative household panel survey for Germany (Wagner et al., 2007). SOEP
includes now more than 24,000 individuals in around 11,000 households. We use the 2008 wave
of the SOEP, which provides household data from 2008, as well as data on the labor supply
behavior and incomes from the preceding year (i.e., the year before the Great Recession). We
rely on the tax and transfer system of 2007, focusing our analysis on the working age population
and thus excluding individuals younger than 17 or above the retirement age of 65 from our
estimations. Our sample is further restricted to those households where at least one decision
maker can freely adjust her labor supply. Therefore, we exclude households where all decision
makers are self-employed (since it is dicult to measure true hours and wages for those), civil
servants5 or in the military service. Moreover, our subsample includes some households with
more than two adults, which mainly includes adult children living with their parents. We
exclude these young adults from the estimation as it is unclear how their consumption and
utility are determined (Dagsvik et al., 2011).
As labor supply is known to be rather heterogeneous across population subgroups, we split
the sample into ve distinct demographic subpopulations (“labor supply types”). The rst two
groups are dened as single men and single women with or without dependent children. Our
estimation sample contains 779 households with single males and 1,065 households with single
females. In addition, we specify three dierent kinds of couple households. First, we dene
688 couple households in which the male partner has a exible labor supply but the female
partner is inexible (e.g., due to self-employment or exclusion restrictions regarding the age).
Second, we have 1,042 couple households in which the male partner has an inexible labor
5 Tenured civil servants cannot freely adjust the weekly working hours. Note that we keep all other public sector
employees.
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supply but the female partner is exible. In order to model the household labor supply decision
of these “semi-exible” couple households, we assume that the exible partner faces his or her
labor supply decision conditional on the labor supply behavior of the inexible partner. Third,
our sample includes 3,099 couple households in which both partners are exible with respect to
their labor supply behavior.
For the computation of consumption levels for the dierent choice categories, we rely on IZA’s
policy simulation model IZAΨMOD (v3.0.0), which incorporates a very detailed representation of
the German tax and benet system (see Löer et al., 2014a, for a comprehensive documentation).
Some of the estimated models would require applying the tax and benet system for every
possible wage rate for every household in every step of the numerical likelihood maximization.
To avoid this cumbersome procedure, we approximate the tax and benet system by using a
highly exible second-degree polynomial that transforms monthly gross earnings into disposable
income while controlling for a rich set of household characteristics, as well as all available
sources of non-labor income. The resulting R2 shows a very good t of more than 99 percent
for all population subgroups but single women (only 97 percent for them), which conrms that
our approximation performs rather well.6 The results are very much in line with those taking
advantage of the full representation of the tax and transfer system, we are thus condent that
the approximation does not aect our ndings.
As a robustness check, we compare our results obtained with German data to results for
the US. For this, we use data from IPUMS-CPS which is an integrated data set of the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) for 2007. In order to calculate income and payroll taxes, we
use NBER’s simulation model TAXSIM.
4.4 Meta-Analysis of Labor Supply Models
Robustness checks in the applied labor supply literature usually narrow down to a small deviation
in just one of the modeling assumptions (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Evers et al. (2008) and Bargain
and Peichl (2016) perform meta-analyses of labor supply models comparing estimated labor
supply elasticities for dierent countries and explain them mainly by study characteristics.
In either case, it is dicult to draw general conclusions on the exact specication of discrete
choice models from the reported results. We overcome these diculties by estimating a large
variety of dierent modeling assumptions in a controlled environment using the same data.
The estimation results allow us to determine how sensitive the estimated outcomes are with
respect to the specication and the wage imputation procedure used in the model.
6 We combine the predicted amounts of consumption with a single random draw for each household; otherwise,
we would mistakenly reduce the variance in the consumption variable.
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4.4.1 Set Up of the Analysis
For our analysis, we combine frequently used modeling assumptions and estimate all sensible
combinations of these specications. We estimate 3,456 dierent model specications for the
ve distinct population groups (see Section 4.3), which leads us to 17,280 maximum likelihood
estimations. However, the sample of estimation results is reduced because not all models did
converge to a global maximum in a reasonable time span. We drop those estimation results
from our analysis that did not converge after 100 iterations of Stata’s maximum likelihood
implementation. Depending on the labor supply group we lose up to six percent of our sample
and end up with 16,730 dierent estimation results.7
Table 4.3 shows the dierent specications and the number of converged estimation results.
The table reads as follows. We estimate 1,152 distinct models with a Box-Cox transformed utility
specication for each of the ve labor supply groups. Because few models did not converge
to a global maximum in a reasonable amount of time, only 1,022 estimation results for single
males and 1,132 for single females are included in our sample. Regardless of the functional form
of the utility function, 1,152 of the estimated models neglect any kind of hours restrictions or
xed costs, 1,152 models include part-time restrictions and 1,152 models account for xed costs
of work.
To make the estimation results comparable across the dierent labor supply groups, we
standardize the statistical t and the estimated elasticities within population groups. We
subsequently pool the data and regress the estimation results on indicators for the dierent
modeling assumptions (mainly represented as dummy variables). We measure the statistical t
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of the models. To retrieve (uncompensated) labor
supply elasticities, we increase the own-wage rates by ten percent and simulate the labor supply
reaction to this wage change.8
4.4.2 Empirical Results
The results of these meta-regressions can be found in Table 4.4. Coecients have to be com-
pared to the simple reference model using a translog utility function, neglecting observed and
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences as well as xed costs of working, hours restrictions or
any stigma from welfare participation. In this reference model, we use observed wage rates for
actual workers and predict wages for non-workers without incorporating the wage prediction
error in the labor supply estimation. All outcomes are standardized, i.e., coecients relate to
changes in terms of standard deviations, and thus only large estimates (in absolute values) are
7 Of course, more complex models take longer to converge. Apart from that, we do not nd systematic eects of
dierent types of assumptions on the probability to converge.
8 Results are robust to dierent ways of computing own-wage labor supply elasticities, see below for details.
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Table 4.3: Estimated Model Combinations
Number of Converged Models
Singles Couples
Model Parameter Option All Male Female Male Female Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Utility Function Box-Cox 1,152 1,022 1,132 951 1,148 1,029
Quadratic 1,152 1,152 1,151 1,152 1,133 1,152
Translog 1,152 1,125 1,144 1,148 1,148 1,143
Welfare Stigma No 1,728 1,642 1,701 1,607 1,713 1,664
Yes 1,728 1,657 1,726 1,644 1,716 1,660
Hours Restrictions — 1,152 1,091 1,141 1,040 1,131 1,109
Fixed Costs 1,152 1,064 1,137 1,061 1,149 1,063
Part-Time 1,152 1,144 1,149 1,150 1,149 1,152
Number of Halton Draws — 288 288 288 283 288 286
10 Draws 1,584 1,440 1,564 1,429 1,559 1,456
5 Draws 1,584 1,571 1,575 1,539 1,582 1,582
Observed Heterogeneity — 864 835 864 822 860 834
In βC Only 864 827 862 834 861 822
In βL Only 864 827 858 798 859 836
In βL , C 864 810 843 797 849 832
Unobserved Heterogeneity — 576 574 571 566 570 574
In βC Only 864 863 853 846 862 863
In βL Only 576 520 574 523 569 541
In βL , βC 864 804 856 795 854 791
With Correl. 576 538 573 521 574 555
Wage Imputation Full Sample 1,728 1,652 1,708 1,635 1,710 1,655
Non-Workers 1,728 1,647 1,719 1,616 1,719 1,669
Wage Prediction Error — 1,296 1,217 1,293 1,219 1,291 1,245
1 Random Draw 1,296 1,236 1,291 1,203 1,284 1,239
Integrated Out 864 846 843 829 854 840
Total 3,456 3,299 3,427 3,251 3,429 3,324
Notes: This table shows the number of estimated models over the dierent model parameters and population subgroups.
Column (1) shows the number of possible model combinations for each choice of parameters. Columns (2)-(6) report
the number of converged models by population subgroup. Column (2) refers to single male households, column (3) to
households with a single female adult (both also including lone parents). Columns (4)-(6) refer to couple households
where only the male partner is exible in his labor supply behavior, where only the female partner is exible, or where
both partners are exible in their labor supply, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Marginal Impact of Modeling Assumptions (SOEP)
Fit 10 % Own Wage Elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility Function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.015 0.004
(0.023) (0.028) (0.062) (0.053)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.116∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.026) (0.040) (0.035) (0.034)
Welfare Stigma 0.968∗∗∗ 0.045 0.065 0.065
(0.076) (0.062) (0.047) (0.042)
Number of Halton Draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours Restrictions
Part-Time Restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.070) (0.039) (0.042)
Fixed Costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.067) (0.040) (0.041)
Observed Heterogeneity
In βC Only -0.335∗∗∗ -0.049 0.060∗∗ 0.043∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.022) (0.023)
In βL Only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.048 0.045∗∗ 0.046∗
(0.061) (0.038) (0.021) (0.023)
In βC and βL -0.475∗∗∗ 0.016 0.012 0.013
(0.070) (0.044) (0.019) (0.022)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In βC Only 0.005 -0.006 -0.059∗ -0.051
(0.014) (0.023) (0.032) (0.030)
In βL Only 0.005 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.037
(0.013) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027)
In βC And βL -0.041∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.069∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.013) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)
In βC And βL With Correlation -0.119∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Wage Imputation
Full Sample, No Correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.121∗∗∗ 2.235∗∗∗ 2.240∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.094) (0.091) (0.086)
Full Sample, Error Integrated Out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗ 1.406∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.119) (0.123) (0.124)
Full Sample, 1 Random Draw -0.104∗∗ 0.071 0.131 0.121
(0.049) (0.062) (0.093) (0.088)
Non-Workers, Error Integrated Out 0.000 0.048 0.040 0.041
(0.067) (0.063) (0.041) (0.041)
Non-Workers, 1 Random Draw 0.070 -0.230∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.094) (0.087) (0.087)
Labor Supply Type Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,730 13,219 13,219 13,219
Explanatory Power R2 0.854 0.849 0.870 0.881
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the individual wage rates by
10 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses. Dependent variables have been standard-
ized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is
negatively related to the statistical t of the model – the better the t, the lower the AIC. Standard errors
clustered by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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also economically interesting. Our results show, e.g., that combining this model set-up with a
quadratic utility function instead of a translog specication increases the AIC by 12 percent of
a standard deviation in the sample and thereby worsens the statistical t. We summarize the
key ndings below.9
Goodness of Fit. Although the statistical t is usually not the main outcome of interest,
our results show several interesting patterns for future applications (see Table 4.4). First, the
choice of the utility function does not substantially improve or worsen the statistical t. Our
analysis conrms the usual nding that the implementation of hours restrictions, xed costs
and observed preference heterogeneity clearly help to explain the observed labor supply choices,
i.e., the AIC decreases. Estimating random coecients models that also allow for unobserved
heterogeneity yields little value-added in terms of the statistical t – especially compared to the
increased computational burden of the estimation. The results regarding the wage imputation
show that these modeling decisions aect the statistical t of the model substantially. Predicting
wages not only for non-workers but for the full sample of workers improves the t signicantly.
This mirrors the fact that much of the variation in the data is lost by using predicted instead of
actual wages for the full sample when not accounting for errors in the wage rate prediction.
More generally, our results show that apart from the implementation of xed costs or hours
restrictions, there is hardly a single modeling assumption that guarantees a good t. Instead,
several small issues help to explain the observed labor market outcomes and add up to a good
t.
Labor Supply Elasticities. More important than the statistical t is whether specic mod-
eling assumptions systematically inuence the out-of-sample predictions when simulating
policy or wage changes. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of simulated labor supply elasticities
across the converged models for four demographic subgroups.10 The graph shows considerable
variation across the dierent modeling set-ups (within population groups as well as across
groups).
In line with the literature, we nd that the simulated elasticities are rather robust regarding the
specication of the utility function, as well as the implementation of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. This is reassuring as it shows that the frequently applied specications do
not restrict the labor supply decision a priori. The only (weak) exception seems to be the
9 The presented standard errors do not account for the (potential) variation in the statistical t and the simulated
elasticities for one specic model when estimating the same model using dierent samples. Accounting for this
uncertainty, e.g., by using bootstrap procedures, would produce larger standard errors than those presented but
is computationally infeasible in our context due to the large number of estimated models.
10 We aggregated couples with one and couples with two exible partners in this gure.
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Figure 4.1: Simulated Labor Supply Elasticities For Converged Models
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Notes: This gure shows the distribution of estimated labor supply elasticities over the 3,456 dierent
model specications for four labor supply groups (see panels). Elasticities are dened as hours
responses to a ten percent increase in the own wage rate, combining both intensive and extensive
margin and aggregating over individual responses. Panel A shows elasticities for single men,
Panel B shows the results for single women. We pool estimation results for the three types of
couple households and plot the response of the male and female partner in Panel C and Panel D,
respectively (see Section 4.3 for a discussion of the dierent labor supply types).
implementation of hours restrictions or xed costs, which tend to drive extensive elasticities
up. This nding supports the view that jobs with very few weekly working hours are harder
to nd than regular part-time or full-time jobs. It is thus more likely that people switch from
non-participation to 20 or 40 than to 5 or 10 hours of work when accounting for this fact, which
leads to higher elasticities at the extensive margin.
Substantially more of the variation in simulated elasticities can be explained when analyzing
the impact of the wage imputation and the handling of wage prediction errors. Our results thus
hold the important message that this part of the model specication is much more relevant
to the estimated elasticities than the utility specication. For instance, using predicted wages
not only for non-workers but for the full sample of individuals roughly doubles the estimated
elasticities. The average own-wage elasticity in our meta-analysis increases from 0.23 to 0.46.
This substantial dierence can be explained by the fact that predicting wages for the full sample
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reduces the variance of the wage distribution substantially. To explain the observed working
hours with less variation in wages and thus income and consumption, the implied elasticities
have to increase. Accounting for wage prediction errors and integrating them out during the
estimation markedly reduces the dierence. Predicting wages for all individuals but ignoring
the wage prediction error yields an average elasticity of 0.65 in our meta-analysis sample
as opposed to 0.35 when accounting for the prediction error. Interestingly, the results dier
substantially depending on whether a single random draw or higher numbers are used. The ad
hoc procedure of adding a single random draw tends to cancel out the eect of a full sample
prediction, estimated elasticities are close to those of the reference model relying mostly on
observed wages (average elasticity of 0.26). In contrast, correcting for the wage prediction error
tends to reduce the elasticities, but we still observe the estimated elasticities to be signicantly
higher than those in which the wage rates were only imputed for non-workers (0.47 vs. 0.25).
Robustness. We perform a wide range of robustness checks to conrm that our results are
not driven by the used data or the meta-analysis set up. In particular, we also use a dierent
wave from the same data set and perform our analysis also using data from the CPS for the
US (see Table 4.A.1 in the Appendix). In addition to the marginal impact (holding all other
specication details constant), we investigate the partial impact of the modeling assumptions
(see Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix), which only shows the dierences in means due to the specic
assumptions (e.g., the mean of elasticities using a translog utility specication vs. the mean of
elasticities using dierent functional forms, irrespective of other modeling issues). The results
we obtain are qualitatively the same. We also check the robustness regarding the calculation of
elasticities and nd no dierences whether we simulate one percent or ten percent changes
in the own-wage rate (see Table 4.A.3 in the Appendix). Also switching the calculation of the
elasticities from aggregated to mean, median or other quantile measures did not aect our
ndings (see Tables 4.A.4 and 4.A.5 in the Appendix).
Summary. Our results partly conrm previous ndings in the literature. While the empirical
specication of the systematic utility function has an impact on the statistical t, we nd only
little dierences in the estimated elasticities. It may thus be justied to rely on simpler model
set-ups when the computational burden is a major concern. However, the majority of the
robustness checks applied in the literature focus on the eects of dierent utility specications
and usually ignore how the underlying wage distribution – and especially the imputation of
wages – may inuence the results. We nd that these assumptions explain much more of the
variation in simulated labor supply elasticities than the specication of the utility function.
Most previous robustness checks have thus concentrated on issues of secondary order. Instead,
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more attention should be paid to the wage imputation and the handling of wage prediction
errors. Modeling choices regarding the wage handling may thus also explain part of the large
variation found in labor supply studies.
Which assumption should be preferred? Integrating out the error term of the wage prediction
is clearly preferred over no correction. Thanks to advances in computing power, the additional
computational burden should not be an issue anymore. Using only one random draw from
the wage distribution, which has been used as a shortcut to avoid long computations, is hence
not necessary anymore. In terms of predicting wages for the full sample vs. non-workers only,
the answer depends on the research question and data at hand. The rst option assumes that
all individuals, not only the unemployed, are aware of uncertainties about their individual
wage realization and base their labor supply decision on expected wages as derived from the
Mincerian wage equation. The second option, on the other hand, assumes that employed
workers make choices based on their current wage rate, independent of whether they drew a
positive, negative or no wage shock in their current job. Which of these models ts better is a
decision that the researcher has to make and it should be made explicit.
4.5 Conclusion
Structural labor supply models are frequently used in the empirical labor supply analysis for
many dierent purposes. In recent years, it has become a standard procedure to estimate labor
supply decisions as a choice among a set of dierent hours alternatives or job opportunities.
In contrast to this popularity, little is known about how the numerous modeling assumptions
inuence the statistical t as well as the simulated labor supply elasticities.
In this paper, we provide an overview of the most important specication issues and conduct a
comprehensive sensitivity analysis to disentangle the driving factors behind the results obtained
from structural labor supply models. Our results show that even if the modeling assumptions
concerning the direct utility specication increase or worsen the statistical t, i.e., the power
to explain the observed labor supply behavior, the models are robust in terms of their implied
labor supply elasticities. In contrast, the model predictions are highly sensitive to changes in
the underlying wage distribution, a mechanism almost completely neglected in the literature to
date. Thus, the questions of whether to use predicted or observed wages for actual workers and
whether and how to integrate the wage prediction error out during the estimation process have
a large and statistically signicant impact on the statistical t of the model and the estimated
labor supply elasticities.
Our ndings have important implications for tax policy design. Diamond and Saez (2011)
derive simple formulas for the optimal (top) marginal tax rates based upon labor supply elas-
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ticities.11 They assume an elasticity of 0.25 as an “a mid-range estimate from the empirical
literature” which is close to our mean estimate for models using the observed wage distribution.
This leads to an optimal top marginal tax rate of τ = 11+1.5·0.25 = 72.7 percent. However, an
elasticity of 0.65 as found in models using predicted wages reduces the optimal tax rate to
50.6 percent bringing it closer to actually observed values (the top labor tax rate in the US is
42.5 percent). While we cannot claim that we have identied the true value for the labor supply
elasticity – which might not even exist – our analysis shows that more attention should be
paid to the specication of structural labor supply models when using them for policy analysis.
Future research should try estimating preferences and wages jointly.
11 The formula for the optimal top tax rate is τ = 1−д1−д+a ·e where д is the marginal social welfare weight for the top
earners, a is the parameter of the Pareto (income) distribution and e is the labor supply elasticity. Diamond and
Saez (2011) assume д = 0 to derive the optimal revenue maximizing top tax rate and use an estimated Pareto
coecient of a = 1.5 for the US.
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Appendix 4.A Additional Results
Table 4.A.1: Marginal Impact of Modeling Assumptions (CPS)
Fit 10 % Own Wage Elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility Function
Quadratic 0.640∗∗∗ 0.217 0.207 0.210
(0.062) (0.183) (0.185) (0.185)
Number of Halton Draws -0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Hours Restrictions
Part-Time Restrictions -1.855∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.397∗ 0.403∗
(0.089) (0.188) (0.189) (0.190)
Fixed Costs -1.279∗∗∗ 0.192 0.125 0.142
(0.067) (0.120) (0.104) (0.106)
Observed Heterogeneity
In βC Only -0.138∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.078∗∗
(0.015) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031)
In βL Only -0.258∗∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.080∗ -0.076∗
(0.026) (0.036) (0.044) (0.042)
In βC And βL -0.309∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.094∗ -0.097∗∗
(0.027) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043)
Unobserved heterogeneity
In βC Only 0.067∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.013) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043)
In βL Only 0.070∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.007) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
In βC And βL 0.046∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.084∗∗
(0.009) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035)
In βC And βL With Correlation 0.021∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.007) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026)
Wage Imputation
Full Sample, No Correction -0.111∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.284) (0.300) (0.299)
Full Sample, 1 Random Draw 0.025 0.338 0.428∗ 0.413∗
(0.046) (0.244) (0.229) (0.230)
Non-Workers, 1 Random Draw 0.030 -0.329 -0.237 -0.255
(0.053) (0.362) (0.362) (0.363)
Constant 0.832∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗ -0.864∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.271) (0.270) (0.270)
Labor Supply Types Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,305 3,439 3,439 3,439
Explanatory Power R2 0.820 0.353 0.340 0.344
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the individual wage rates
by 10 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses. Dependent variables have been
standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome.
The AIC is negatively related to the statistical t of the model – the better the t, the lower the
AIC. Standard errors clustered by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure (∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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Table 4.A.2: Partial Impact of Modeling Assumptions (SOEP)
Fit 10 % Own Wage Elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility Function
Translog -0.045∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.047
(0.024) (0.021) (0.045) (0.040)
Quadratic 0.135∗∗∗ 0.067∗ -0.054 -0.037
(0.013) (0.039) (0.053) (0.046)
Box-Cox -0.093∗∗∗ 0.061 0.094∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.017) (0.049) (0.034) (0.034)
Welfare Stigma 0.965∗∗∗ 0.051 0.072 0.071
(0.076) (0.061) (0.047) (0.042)
Number of Halton Draws -0.013∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Hours Restrictions
None 1.376∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.067) (0.038) (0.039)
Part-Time Restrictions -1.110∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.013 0.035
(0.052) (0.041) (0.024) (0.026)
Fixed Costs -0.244∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023)
Observed Heterogeneity
None 0.398∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.035∗ -0.030
(0.063) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021)
In βC Only -0.046∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.024∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
In βL Only -0.121∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
In βC And βL -0.235∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
None 0.057 0.090 0.125 0.122
(0.040) (0.110) (0.117) (0.117)
In βC Only 0.029∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.013 0.023
(0.015) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
In βL Only 0.050 -0.123 -0.032 -0.047
(0.040) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
In βC And βL -0.035∗∗ 0.039 0.006 0.011
(0.015) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
In βC And βL With Correlation -0.102∗∗ -0.128 -0.124 -0.127
(0.039) (0.102) (0.111) (0.110)
Wage Imputation
Full Sample Imputation -0.498∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.288) (0.294) (0.296)
Error Integrated Out -0.037 0.267 0.190 0.207
(0.125) (0.351) (0.359) (0.362)
Full Sample, No Correction -0.720∗∗∗ 1.921∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.145) (0.144) (0.142)
Full Sample, Error Integrated Out -0.334∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.239) (0.253) (0.254)
Full Sample, 1 Random Draw 0.143 -0.599∗∗ -0.554∗∗ -0.569∗∗
(0.089) (0.237) (0.258) (0.257)
Non-Workers, Error Integrated Out 0.269∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗ -0.606∗∗ -0.602∗∗
(0.094) (0.227) (0.230) (0.231)
Observations 16,730 13,219 13,219 13,219
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the individual wage rates by
10 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses. Dependent variables have been standard-
ized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is
negatively related to the statistical t of the model – the better the t, the lower the AIC. Standard errors
clustered by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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Table 4.A.3: Marginal Impact, Aggregated 1 % Elasticities (SOEP)
Fit 1 % Own Wage Elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility Function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.030 0.043
(0.023) (0.028) (0.050) (0.043)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.133∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.026) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035)
Welfare Stigma 0.968∗∗∗ -0.028 0.084 0.071
(0.076) (0.084) (0.053) (0.044)
Number of Halton Draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours Restrictions
Part-Time Restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.071) (0.038) (0.041)
Fixed Costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.068) (0.039) (0.041)
Observed Heterogeneity
In βC Only -0.335∗∗∗ -0.057 0.060∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022)
In βL Only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.032 0.041∗ 0.041∗
(0.061) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023)
In βC And βL -0.475∗∗∗ -0.002 0.016 0.013
(0.070) (0.044) (0.020) (0.022)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In βC Only 0.005 -0.009 -0.054∗ -0.048
(0.014) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030)
In βL Only 0.005 -0.085∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.040
(0.013) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
In βC And βL -0.041∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.068∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
In βC And βL With Correlation -0.119∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.092∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Wage Imputation
Full Sample, No Correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗ 2.245∗∗∗ 2.248∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.117) (0.088) (0.084)
Full Sample, Error Integrated Out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.103) (0.114) (0.117)
Full Sample, 1 Random Draw -0.104∗∗ 0.086 0.102 0.100
(0.049) (0.085) (0.078) (0.079)
Non-Workers, Error Integrated Out 0.000 0.054 0.046 0.048
(0.067) (0.062) (0.035) (0.038)
Non-Workers, 1 Random Draw 0.070 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.028) (0.032)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.930∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.104) (0.084) (0.087)
Labor Supply Type Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,730 13,219 13,219 13,219
Explanatory Power R2 0.854 0.816 0.880 0.889
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the individual wage rates by
1 percent and aggregating individual labor supply responses. Dependent variables have been standard-
ized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The AIC is
negatively related to the statistical t of the model – the better the t, the lower the AIC. Standard errors
clustered by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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Table 4.A.4: Marginal Impact, Mean 10 % Elasticities (SOEP)
Fit 10 % Own Wage Elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility Function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.022 0.041
(0.023) (0.033) (0.047) (0.038)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.101∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.034) (0.033)
Welfare Stigma 0.968∗∗∗ -0.026 0.034 0.026
(0.076) (0.063) (0.045) (0.039)
Number of Halton Draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours Restrictions
Part-Time Restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.089) (0.045) (0.056)
Fixed Costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.087) (0.044) (0.053)
Observed Heterogeneity
In βC Only -0.335∗∗∗ 0.037 0.048∗ 0.046
(0.057) (0.036) (0.024) (0.027)
In βL Only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.040) (0.022) (0.027)
In βC And βL -0.475∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.036 0.074∗∗
(0.070) (0.053) (0.022) (0.029)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In βC Only 0.005 0.001 -0.046 -0.036
(0.014) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029)
In βL Only 0.005 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.041
(0.013) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
In βC And βL -0.041∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.059∗∗ -0.053∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
In βC And βL With Correlation -0.119∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Wage Imputation
Full Sample, No Correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.130∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.106) (0.092) (0.089)
Full Sample, Error Integrated Out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.134) (0.132) (0.140)
Full Sample, 1 Random Draw -0.104∗∗ 0.058 0.146 0.122
(0.049) (0.049) (0.087) (0.078)
Non-Workers, Error Integrated Out 0.000 0.035 0.062 0.057
(0.067) (0.053) (0.042) (0.043)
Non-Workers, 1 Random Draw 0.070 -0.164∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.966∗∗∗ -0.749∗∗∗ -0.814∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.119) (0.091) (0.097)
Labor Supply Type Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,730 13,219 13,219 13,219
Explanatory Power R2 0.854 0.820 0.876 0.883
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the individual wage rates
by 10 percent and taking the mean individual labor supply response. Dependent variables have been
standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The
AIC is negatively related to the statistical t of the model – the better the t, the lower the AIC. Standard
errors clustered by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01).
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Table 4.A.5: Marginal Impact, Median 10 % Elasticities (SOEP)
Fit 10 % Own Wage Elasticities
AIC Ext. Int. Total
Utility Function
Quadratic 0.119∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.079 0.098∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.063) (0.048)
Box-Cox -0.020 0.084∗∗ 0.042 0.056
(0.026) (0.036) (0.044) (0.040)
Welfare Stigma 0.968∗∗∗ 0.001 0.062 0.059
(0.076) (0.059) (0.068) (0.062)
Number of Halton Draws -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hours Restrictions
Part-Time Restrictions -1.647∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.046 0.116∗
(0.082) (0.084) (0.069) (0.058)
Fixed Costs -1.093∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.112 0.181∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.085) (0.076) (0.063)
Observed Heterogeneity
In βC Only -0.335∗∗∗ 0.046 0.010 0.013
(0.057) (0.035) (0.023) (0.022)
In βL Only -0.381∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.001
(0.061) (0.037) (0.022) (0.023)
In βC And βL -0.475∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.044) (0.025) (0.024)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In βC Only 0.005 -0.020 -0.098∗∗ -0.088∗∗
(0.014) (0.027) (0.038) (0.036)
In βL Only 0.005 -0.077∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.017
(0.013) (0.026) (0.038) (0.036)
In βC And βL -0.041∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029)
In βC And βL With Correlation -0.119∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036)
Wage Imputation
Full Sample, No Correction -0.811∗∗∗ 2.169∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.098) (0.123) (0.112)
Full Sample, Error Integrated Out -0.530∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.390∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.140) (0.106) (0.103)
Full Sample, 1 Random Draw -0.104∗∗ 0.060 0.227 0.199
(0.049) (0.053) (0.140) (0.127)
Non-Workers, Error Integrated Out 0.000 0.042 0.013 0.021
(0.067) (0.050) (0.035) (0.032)
Non-Workers, 1 Random Draw 0.070 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.033) (0.047) (0.042)
Constant 1.004∗∗∗ -0.940∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.114) (0.104) (0.096)
Labor Supply Type Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,730 13,219 13,219 13,219
Explanatory Power R2 0.854 0.832 0.769 0.806
Notes: Uncompensated labor supply elasticities are simulated by increasing the individual wage rates
by 10 percent and taking the median individual labor supply response. Dependent variables have been
standardized, i.e., an estimate of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation in the outcome. The
AIC is negatively related to the statistical t of the model – the better the t, the lower the AIC. Standard
errors clustered by labor supply group and wage imputation procedure (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01).
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